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This thesis focuses on the participation of Islamic political parties that have a 
democracy platform in Indonesia and Malaysia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and 
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), during 1999-2005. I examine the similarities and 
differences between these two Islamic political parties: origins, views on the relationship 
between Islam and democracy, manner of recruiting members and leaders, and their 
participation in the 1999 and 2004 elections. The thesis takes the position that these 
Islamic political parties are not a threat to democracy at all. Therefore, the main questions 
addressed here is: How do the PKS and PAS reconcile Islam and democracy? 
In order to answer the question, I evaluate the PKS and PAS’s view on 
democracy, implementation of democratic values in the process of parties’ establishment, 
in recruiting members and leaders, and in their participation in the 1999 and 2004 
elections. 
Having examined the research questions, data and evidence, the thesis argues that 
two possible and comparable, ways, are embodied in the experiences of PKS and PAS, in 
which an Islamic political party can co-exist with democratic rules and can share in the 
same vision and enjoy a reasonable possibility of electoral success. PKS and PAS believe 
that democracy goes to the roots of Islam and the Indonesian and Malaysian context in 
which they exist; and that it is a good political tool for an Islamic party like PKS and PAS 
to achieve its political goals. Due to different historical establishments and the different 
national political contexts of Indonesia and Malaysia, PAS and PKS have their own styles 
of promoting their ideology and programs to their supporters. However, the PKS and 
PAS are similar in their objectives of struggling for Islamic ideology through the 
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democratic process and not through “street parliaments,” and of being actively involved 
in strengthening democracy in their countries. 
This comparative study suggests that Islamic political parties in Southeast Asia 
can successfully participate in democracy in the region. The PKS and PAS have proven 
this to be so. If both parties are consistently playing their role in democratization and are 
given the opportunity to be ruling parties in the future, I believe that the stereotype of 
Islam as incompatible with democracy could finally be eliminated. The experience of 
PKS and PAS, which struggle through democratic processes in promoting their 
objectives, offers us a picture of the peaceful development of Muslim movements in 
Southeast Asia, which differs markedly from the dominant stereotypes of Islamic 
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 This thesis examines the relationship between Islam and democracy. The focus of 
this study is the participation of political parties that have a democracy platform in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. It focuses, in particular, on the similarities and differences 
between the two Islamic political parties, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Parti Islam 
Se-Malaysia (PAS), from 1999 to 2005. It examines their origins including their 
ideologies, their manner of recruiting members and leaders, and their participation in the 
1999 and 2004 elections. More specifically, the thesis examines and compares their views 
on the relationship between Islam and democracy. 
 Much has been written by scholars about the relationship between Islam and 
democracy. Some believe that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Huntington for 
example argues that since democracy is a Western construction, it will only develop in 
societies that share Western values.1 Meanwhile Sen argues that the absence of 
democracy in Muslim societies is due to the way these cultures are portrayed as less 
tolerant to individual freedom. Sen says: “…due to the experience of contemporary 
political battles, especially in the Middle East, Islam is often portrayed as fundamentally 
intolerant of and hostile to individual freedom.”2 Ehteshami also believes that Muslim 
societies and Muslim countries have failed to adapt to modern values such as 
                                                 
1Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs  72 (1993): 40-41. 
2Amartya Sen, ”Democracy as a Universal Value,” in The Global Divergence of Democracies, ed. L. 
Diamond and M. F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 15. 
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democracy.3 Freedom House’s Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberty (FHIPRCL) as 
quoted by Mujani reports that in the last three decades, Muslim states have generally 
failed to establish democratic politics. In that period, only one Muslim country has 
established a full democracy for more than five years, i.e., Mali in Africa.”4  The 
FHIPRCL’s report implies that there is a connection between Muslim states and failed 
democracies. 
There are scholars, on the other hand, like Hefner,5 Esposito and Voll, who reject 
the assumption that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Hefner argues that Islam and 
democracy are not totally incompatible because Islam contains values such as pluralism 
and tolerance, which support democracy.6 Esposito and Voll, as quoted by Bukay, argue 
that Muslim states ‘can develop a religious democracy’ because in Islamic cultures are 
found the traditions of democratic discourse through the concepts of shura (consultation), 
ijma (consensus) and ijtihad (independent interpretative judgment). They even conclude 
that although the word “democracy” is rarely used or even never used, democracy itself 
has existed in the Muslim world.7 According to Bukay, it is unfortunate that Muslim 
scholars themselves have followed the arguments of Western scholars about democracy 
in Islamic countries without critically assessing such assertions. Bukay bemoans the fact 
that “…rather than lead the debate, [Muslim scholars] often follow it, peppering their 
own analyses with references to western scholars who, casting aside traditional 
                                                 
3Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy,” Democratization 11, no. 4 (August 
2004): 91. 
4Saiful Mujani, “Muslim Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-
Suharto Indonesia,” (PhD diss., Ohio State University: 2003),1. 
5Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratizations in Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 4, 7, 56. 
6The pros and cons of compatibility between Islam and democracy will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
7David Bukay, “Can There be an Islamic Democracy?,” Middle East Quarterly 14, no. 2. (Spring 2007): 
71. 
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Orientalism for the theories of the late literary theorist and polemicist Edward Said, twist 
evidence to fit their theories.”8 
 
 Following upon the above debate as to whether Islam is compatible with 
democracy or not, in this thesis I examine the PKS and PAS in Indonesia and Malaysia 
and attempt to assess the impact of these Islamic political parties on the process of 
democratization in Indonesia and Malaysia. This study examines the power play of 
Muslim political parties to suggest whether under a democratic system Islam as an 
ideology need necessarily be a barrier to multi-party politics, or not.  
Besides the fact that both PKS and PAS were born in Southeast Asian countries 
where Islam is the dominant religion and a growing factor in mainstream political life,  
several additional reasons can be put forward to justify this comparison. First, unlike 
radical groups that try to enforce Islamic law on the streets, both the PKS and PAS use 
the constitutional process and follow democracy's rules by establishing Islamic political 
parties.9 Second, the PKS and PAS have played significant roles in bringing about 
political change in both Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Although the PKS is a new party in Indonesia, many describe it as the most solid 
in Indonesia and as having a clean and well organized machinery. When the party was 
newly established, it gained only 1.4 percent of the vote and 7 seats in the House of 
                                                 
8
 Ibid.  
9In Indonesia, after Soeharto's downfall in 1998, the ensuing euphoria of freedom brought renewed vigor 
and hope not only to political parties but also to various socio-religious organization including radical ones. 
They believed that Soeharto’s resignation was a good chance for them to express their interest particularly 
their aspirations to implement sharia (Islamic law) in Indonesia. Unlike the Islamic political parties, it was 
not through the ballot that the more radical Muslim groups expressed their agenda, but through street 
politics. Among them were MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahidin Council), FPI 
(Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender's Front), Laskar Jihad or Holy War Soldiers, Hizbu al-Tahrir 
Indonesia (Independence Party Indonesia) and KISDI (Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or 
Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity). See C. Wilson, “Indonesia and Transnational 
Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 6 (October 2001): 1. 
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Representatives (MPR) in the 1999 general election (at that time it was still called the 
Justice Party or Partai Keadilan). After it changed its name (as required by the legislation 
as it failed to win a minimum 2.5 percent of the vote) to the PKS, it won 7.3 percent of 
the votes and 45 seats in the House of Representatives in 2004.10 Meanwhile, PAS, an 
opposition party in Malaysia since its establishment in 1951, is powerful in Kelantan and 
Terengganu. In the 1999 elections, PAS won state-level control of both Kelantan and 
Terengganu. However, it suffered from embarrassing losses in the 2004 election.11 
Third, both the PKS and PAS are widely believed to be identical as Islamic 
parties that have an Islamic agenda in their objectives.12 However, we can legitimately 
query the apparent similarities between these parties' programs, strategies, concept of 
Islam and relationship with the state, and their participation in elections. These are the 
arenas in which one can measure the extent of their commitment to the notion of 
democracy. From a historical perspective, moreover, one can argue that both parties have 
been influenced by Islamic movements in the Middle East, especially Egypt, as well as 
Pakistan. The ideological influence of the al-ikhwan al-muslimun or Muslim Brotherhood 
movement led by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt can easily be found in both parties’ strategies, 
programs and pronouncements.  
 
Problems and Research Questions 
This thesis analyses how both PKS and PAS conceptualize and operationalize 
themselves as political parties in a democracy. While a democracy’s quality, according to 
                                                 
10Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan?:The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia, 
(Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), 69. 
11Ahmad Ali Nurdin, “Comparing the Ideology of PKS and Malaysia’s PAS,” The Jakarta Post, November 
28, 2005. 
12For example, the PAS has its own ‘blue print’ document for an Islamic state, while PKS does not. 
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Morlino,13 can be determined in terms of procedures, content and results, in the context 
of PKS and PAS as Islamic political parties in democratic Indonesia and Malaysia, these 
will refer to the parties’ ideologies, practices, policies and the results of their participation 
in democratic processes. A problem tackled in this thesis is how these Islamic parties 
found their place in Indonesia and Malaysia and what they have done to integrate 
themselves into democratic politics during this period 
This study will address the following general questions: How are the 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of a political party for democracy similar to or 
different across the two Islamic political contexts? The key questions this study 
specifically proposes to address are: 
1. How do the PKS and PAS reconcile Islam and democracy?  
2. How do the PKS and PAS implement democratic values in party politics (in terms 
of recruiting members and leaders)? 
3. How did PKS and PAS implement democratic values in Indonesia and Malaysia 
during their participation in the 1999 and 2004 elections? 
 
Scholarly Works on PKS 
To the best of my knowledge, there is a limited number of scholarly studies on 
PKS. This is probably due to the scarcity of sources on the subject, and the interests of 
the scholars who are more absorbed in studying the big secular political parties in 
Indonesia such as Golkar. 
                                                 
13Leonardo Morlino, “What is a Good Democracy?,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 10-32. 
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As far as I know, there are three books that discuss the development of PKS, 
written in Indonesian. These are Ali Said Damanik’s (2002) Fenomena Partai Keadilan: 
Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, Aay Muhamad Furkon’s (2004) 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideology dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia 
Kontemporer and Yon Machmudi’s (2005) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam 
Politik Indonesia. 
Damanik’s book is an expanded undergraduate thesis at the faculty of Social and 
Political Science at University of Indonesia with the original title of Transformasi 
Gerakan Sosial Keagamaan di Indonesia: Studi Tentang Gerakan Dakwah Kampus 
Menjadi Partai Keadilan (Transformation of Social and Religious Movement in 
Indonesia: A Study of Transformation of Campus Dakwah Movement to become the 
Justice Party). As can be inferred from the title, this book examines the historical 
background of the establishment of the PKS. The author argues that the foundation of this 
party was the Muslim students’ movement known as Dakwah and Tarbiyah movement in 
several top universities in Indonesia such as ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology), 
UGM (Gajah Mada University), IPB (Bogor Institute of Agriculture) and UI (University 
of Indonesia). After twenty years, these movements were transformed into the Partai 
Keadilan (Justice Party) that is now well known as the PKS. 
Damanik attempts to discuss the discourse of the dakwah movement among 
middle class Muslim students in Indonesia and its impact on the growth of PKS following 
the fall of the New Order regime. Since his focus is on the formative stages of PKS 
establishment, Damanik does not explain how Islamic values influence its party ideology 
and to what extent this ideology influences the party’s programs and developments. The 
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book also does not examine the involvement of PKS in the democratization process in 
Indonesia’s post-Soeharto era. 
Like Damanik’s, Furkon’s work is also an expanded M.A. thesis on PKS which 
was submitted to the Political Science Program at the University of Indonesia under the 
title “Pengaruh Pemikiran al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun Terhadap Gerakan Politik Islam 
Indonesia (1980-2000): Study Kasus Partai Keadilan.” The book is more focused on 
Hasan Al-Bana’s (the founding father of al-ikhwan al-muslimun movement in Egypt) 
political ideology and how Islamic political parties in Indonesia, particularly PKS, 
adopted it. 
The richness of Furkon’s analysis is that he tracks back a historical relationship 
between the al-ikhwan al-muslimun movement in Egypt and PKS in Indonesia. However, 
the book is too focused on Hasan Al-Bana biography and  al-ikhwan al-muslimun’s 
movement, thus it seems to me that his work is not entirely devoted to the study of PKS 
as the subject of research but on  al-ikhwan al-muslimun instead. 
Machmudi’s book analyses the emergence of what he calls ‘a new Islamic force, 
Jamaah Tarbiyah’ and also PKS that acts as the political vehicle. By analyzing the 
religious background of PKS, Machmudi argues that  the Tarbiyah existence has 
contributed to shaping other forms of Indonesian Muslim movement. The strength of 
Mahmudi’s book is in his  ability to track back the history of PKS’s establishment, which 
originally emerged as a Jamaah Tarbiyah and later transformed itself to become a formal 
political party, PKS. This Jamaah Tarbiyah movement according to Machmudi has gone 
beyond the modernist and traditionalist classification of Indonesian Muslim movement. 
Mahmudi proposes the typology of three movements,  what he calls convergent, radical 
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and global Muslim, and PKS represents one of these three strands. For Machmudi, PKS 
can be categorised as a global Muslim movement because its cornerstone, Jamaah 
Tarbiyah, was influenced by the Muslim brotherhood movement in Egypt. However, 
Machmudi’s study does not go beyond analyzing the way of PKS’s struggle in its 
adaptation to the Indonesian political context. The conceptualization and implementation 
of democracy within the Indonesian context and how the movement recruits members 
and leaders are also lacking from the study of Machmudi.  
Another study of PKS is Ahmad Norma Permata’s PhD thesis entitled Islamist 
Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-
2006. This thesis was submitted to the University of Munster, Germany, in 2008, almost 
at the same time as my thesis was being written. The focus of his study is about the 
influence of PKS’s ideology on the party’s behavior. The richness of Permata’s study is in 
his ability to show how the PKS that was inspired by its Islamic ideology, implements 
religious ideas within the party organization. According to Permata, the party leaders are seen 
by its constituents as moral and religious leaders who command religious and moral authority 
over the party members. However, Permata did not go beyond showing how PKS party 
ideology influences the style of recruitment of members and the way in which PKS chooses 
its leaders in the party’s organization. Due to its implementation of ideological inspirations, 
Permata argues that PKS participation in the elections is basically just another tool to 
communicate their Islamist political visions to a larger segment of the society, the Indonesian 
people at large. However, Permata misses to analyse how PKS perceived democracy and its 




Scholarly Works on PAS 
There is a limited number of scholarly studies on PAS. Although there are a few 
works that deserve credit, generally, however, the development and analysis of the 
Islamic political thought of PAS, its involvement in democracy, its views on democracy 
and its responses to the concept of an Islamic state have received scant attention. 
The works on PAS which deserve special attention are Shafie Ibrahim’s The 
Islamic Party of Malaysia: Its Formative Stages and Ideology (1981), John Funston’s 
Malay Politics in Malaysia: UMNO and PAS (1980), Hussin Muthalib’s Islam and 
Ethnicity in Malay Politics (1990) and Farish A. Noor’s Islam Embedded: The Historical 
Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951-2003 (2004). These four 
works probably comprise the outstanding scholarly literature on PAS. 
The work by Funston is basically an examination of the two major Malay political 
parties in Malaysia, UMNO and PAS, prior to the racial riots of May 1969. Funston sees 
that the 1969 event demarcates the two phases of the Malaysian politics in terms of ethnic 
relations. His writing is important in giving some historical perspectives on UMNO and 
PAS, and on the development of their ideologies and leadership. However, he seems to 
stress only a single force that led to the formation of PAS: Malay radicalism. This trend 
was predominantly anti-British and anti-feudal. 
Like Funston’s, Shafie’s work is also an expanded M.A. thesis on PAS. Shafie is 
clear in his purpose of describing PAS’s formative stages, which mainly involves 
historical analysis. He describes the advent of PAS by using an internal analysis which 
explains certain political behaviors nurtured by ideological affinity and organizational 
structure. He seems to be more reliable in undertaking certain historical analyses based 
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on a single-event study of the ideological differences within UMNO, the party that gave 
rise to the advent of PAS. However, his analysis has long been outdated by the 
development of PAS over the past twenty to twenty-five years. 
The work of Hussin Mutalib seems to complement the work of Shafie. The main 
focus of his work is an analysis of the impact and implication of Malay politics upon 
peninsular Malaysia from 1963-1987, and how Islam provided an effective political tool 
in stimulating the Malay political consciousness. His work, however, is not entirely 
devoted to the study of PAS as the subject of research. 
The two-volume book written by Farish A. Noor seems to me to be the most 
remarkable book discussing PAS and its challenge to UMNO rule in Malaysia. Noor 
explains the phenomenal emergence, rise and development of PAS that has been on the 
scene in Malaysia for more than five decades. The author is very clever to not only 
examine the institutional and organizational development of PAS as a party, but also to 
do a close critical reading of the discourse of the party itself and to deconstruct the 
workings of its ideology from 1951-2003. However, Farish’s work did not go beyond 
PAS’ conceptualization and implementation of democracy in Malaysia and how they 
recruit their members and leaders. How did PAS define the Islamic state and implement 
the concept in its programs and pronouncements, particularly after September 11, 2001 





How the Present Study Differs from Others 
The above scholarly works on PKS and PAS show that nothing has been done to 
conduct a comparative analysis of Islamic political parties in Southeast Asia, particularly 
between PKS in Indonesia and PAS in Malaysia. Although there are several studies on 
PAS and PKS as mentioned above, none of them have focused on the conceptualizations 
and operationalizations of PKS and PAS as Islamic political parties for democracy.  
The previous studies also show that no work has been carried out to analyze PAS 
and PKS using Islamic notions of political parties and democracy. Existing studies rarely 
use Arabic references despite the fact that both PAS and PKS elites very often cite 
Quranic verses and Arabic references in their method as ‘tools’ to influence and recruit 
their members. In PKS for example, it is common to hear terms like akhi (ا) or ukhti 
(ا) to call each other among the members and terms liqo () and muqayyam (	) for 
cadre training programs.The terms ا and  ا literally mean brother and sister. These 
terms are commonly used by PKS members to call each other to show that between 
themselves as members there is a very close relationship, like that of  brother or sister. 
The term  literally means 'meeting'. This term is used by PKS members to refer to a 
weekly gathering  that consists of a small group (5-10 persons) to learn Islamic studies 
under the guidance of more senior PKS members also well–known for their Islamic-
teaching. Although generally they discuss Islamic teachings in this gathering, it is also 
used as a tool to strengthen their cadre relationship within the party. And the term 	 
literally means resident or inhabitant. This term is used by PKS to refer to cadre training 
activities in which the cadres are trained for about three to five days, which takes place in 
the mountains. In this training, the cadres not only train in physical activities like 
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mountain climbing but are also taught Islamic studies and the practice of Islamic 
teachings like performing midnight prayer and Quranic reading collectively to strength 
their communal relationship. For PAS, one of the arenas for recruiting members is the 
‘pengajian Jumat’ (Friday gathering) in Kota Bharu in which PAS’s leaders deliver 
‘Quranic interpretation’ or  followed by a discussion on current political issues in 
Malaysia.14  
Due especially to the Islamic identities of the political parties under study and the 
different approach this requires from previous studies on political parties, this  
dissertation examines political party in the light of ‘Islamic’ notions of  democracy in 
order to make a case that Islam and democracy are compatible in Southeast Asia, at least. 
Of particular importance are ideas within Islam that have a bearing on our common view 
of politics—ideas such as mutual consultation or shura (ىر), equality or al-musawat 
(ةاوا), and freedom or huriyyat (), discussed by Muslim scholars such as Abu A’la 
Maududi,15 Hasan al-Bana,16 Abu Hasan Al-Mawardi17 and Fazlur Rahman.18  
Properly understanding Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s Islamic political parties and 
how they play a role in the advancement of democracy in these countries is vitally 
important for the 220 million Indonesian people of whom more than eighty percent are 
Muslims, and 24 million Malaysian people, more than fifty percent of whom are 
Muslims. If the Islamic political parties in these countries have been successful in 
                                                 
14Every Friday morning, in front of  PAS headquarter in Kota Bharu, spiritual leader of PAS, Tok Guru Nik  
Abdul Aziz Nik Mat delivers religious advice by referring to Quranic verses and Quranic interpretation 
which is written in Arabic and explained in Malay with Kelantan accent. In this gathering, a discussion of 
political issues cannot be avoided as well. 
15Abu A’la Maududi, Political Theory of Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1983). 
16Hasan al-Bana is the founding father of al-ikhwan al-muslimun or Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. 
17Abu Hasan Mawardi, Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyah (Al-Qahirah: Mustafa Babi al-Halabi wa Auladuhu, 1996) 
18Fazlur Rahman, “The Principle of Shura and the Role of Ummah in Islam,” in State, Politics and Islam, 
ed. Mumtaz Ahmad (Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, 1986). 
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developing democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia, understanding how they did so could 
help to reduce the stereotype that Islam is not compatible with democracy. It could also 
help in arguing against the assumption that parties based on the Islamic religion are 
usually (in practice) a danger to democracy. However, it is important to note that people 
resort to mass action and violence when their attempts to effect change through 
parliamentary means are frustrated. Political change is not a game for those who are 
oppressed or marginalized and see no way out except through firm action. If PKS and 
PAS really captured power in Indonesia and Malaysia, they may still have to work in 
concert with other major forces in their respective societies. The fact that they are still 
successful is because they are still fairly marginal. 
 
Methodology and Field Work 
The study is based for the most part on interviews that have been conducted with 
main figures of political parties and their constituents in Indonesia and Malaysia. In order 
to better communicate with the parties’ constituents (grassroots party members) in the 
research sites, I conducted fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur, Kelantan, Jakarta and Depok for 
seven months, from April to October 2006. I also participated in party events and 
observed the local people’s behavior, attitudes, and relations with their leaders or elites.  
During the fieldwork I found several obstacles. In Jakarta, when I first came to the 
office of PKS headquarters, the office was being renovated and several officials’ 
documents concerning the party could not be accessed. It is interesting, however, that 
when I came to Kelantan, the office of PAS was being renovated as well. According to 
PAS staff, the office was being renovated because of fire.  
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To interview party elites was also one of the obstacles because some of them were 
very busy with their activities and so it was hard to have interviews with them, 
particularly with PKS’ elites in the early stage of my research. PAS elites were more 
open to be interviewed compared to the leaders of PKS. However, after intensive 
approaches, some party elite and parliament members from PKS were successfully 
interviewed at the parliament building in Jakarta as well as in the party’s headquarters in 
that city. 
In Indonesia, I also attended the 8th PKS birthday anniversary on April 16-20, 
2006, which was held at Gedung Olah Raga Bung Karno Senayan Jakarta. In this 
anniversary, several activities were held, such as a political oration by the PKS President, 
Tifatul Sembiring,  seminars, a PKS award for teachers, a nashid (Islamic music) parade, 
the launching of dakwah thulabiyah (educational proselytizing), and taujihat (advice) 
delivered by the head of Majlis Shuro PKS, KH. Hilmi Aminuddin. Almost a hundred 
thousand cadres, members and PKS constituents around Indonesia, particularly from 
Jakarta and other big cities in Java attended the meeting. In this occasion, I interviewed 
not only PKS political elites but also members and constituents to understand why they 
supported the PKS. During this five-day meeting, the PKS also held what they called 
‘Bazaar PKS’. Here I found many PKS accessories’ and books. What is interesting is that 
among them were many translated books written by Middle Eastern Scholars like Hassan 
Al-Banna, the founding father of al-ikhwanul al-muslimun movement in Egypt, and 
Sayyid Qutub. This could serve as proof of the assumption that the PKS leaders are more 
or less influenced by the Hasan al-Bana ideas about forming Islamic parties. 
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 I also attended several Musyawarah Daerah (District Annual Meetings) of the 
PKS in Bogor,19 Bekasi,20 and Kuningan.21 Although the main purpose of these meetings 
is to select party leaders at the district levels and to formulate programs and activities of 
the party for the next five years, I could see that this opportunity has been used by the 
party to indirectly campaign about their existence and programs. It is commonly known 
by Indonesians that during these meetings, PKS always hold a ‘PKS Bazaar’ in which 
PKS accessories, books and other publications about the political achievements of PKS at 
the district level are displayed. During such meetings, PKS also promotes the music 
which is claimed to be Islamic music, called nashid by members and constituents. This 
music has been claimed as an alternative music for Muslims to listen to instead of 
Western or Indonesian pop music.  
To interact with a broader PKS constituency, I also attended and became involved 
in a protest-rally on Palestine issues in Jakarta, starting from Bundaran Hotel Indonesia to 
the U.S. Embassy. The main objectives of this activity were to protest against American 
policy on the Palestinian issue and to support the struggle of Palestine people for 
independence by collecting donations from PKS members under their program “One Man 
One Dollar to Save Palestine”. More than fifty thousand members and supporters of PKS 
attended this protest. True to the special and positive reputation of protests held by the 
PKS, the rally I attended was run in a very smooth and peaceful manner. This is also 
considered to be an effective method by which PKS tries to attract new members and 
                                                 
19It was held on May 20-21, 2006 in YPI-Ciawi Bogor under theme ‘Bangun Kepedulian Menuju Bogor 
Sejahtera’ (Build Awareness to Make a Prosperous Bogor) 
20It was held on April 28-30, 2006 in Asrama Haji Bekasi under theme ‘Bangun Kebersamaan Sejahterakan 
Kota Bekasi’ (Build a Togetherness and Make Bekasi Prosper). 
21It was held on May 13-14, 2006 in Hotel Ayong Linggarjati Kuningan under theme ‘Wujudkan Keadilan 
Sejahterakan Kuningan” (Realize Justice and Make Kuningan Prosper). 
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constituents. During this activity, I interviewed PKS members and party elites to 
understand what PKS’s position was on international Islamic issues like Palestine. What 
is interesting about the Palestine issue is that when I visited PAS headquarters in Kota 
Bharu,  I found a banner on the wall of the PAS building with a slogan “Satu Ringgit 
Untuk Selamatkan Palestine” (One Ringgit for the Benefit of Palestine), which is the 
same slogan used by PKS. 
In Malaysia, I visited PAS political elites in their headquarters both in Kuala 
Lumpur and Kelantan. I attended several party events such as Muktamar PAS Ke 52 
(52nd PAS Annual Meeting) on June 7-9, 2006 in Kedah, and several Friday sermon 
gatherings in front of PAS headquarters in Kelantan during my visit to Kota Bharu. This 
gathering was held to facilitate political communication between the elites and grassroots 
constituents and was attended by large numbers of people consisting of the elderly, 
youth, and even children who come to this place to listen to Islamic and political 
speeches of PAS spiritual leaders such as Nik Aziz. At this event, in front of Khota Baru 
people, Nik Aziz delivered a sermon not only about Islamic teachings but also concerning 
current political issues. This gathering was not limited to only PAS members or 
constituents. Everyone could come to hear this speech, whatever his or her ethnic, 
religious, or political affiliation. This event showed me how political elites of PAS could 
directly or indirectly build a political awareness among the people because everybody 
could understand contemporary political developments and issues in Malaysia. At this 
event, the views of PAS on how the party responds to such issues are openly displayed to 
the public. Based on the interviews with the grassroots audiences who attended the 
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gathering, I came to understand that one of the reasons why they supported PAS is 
because of the leadership of Nik Abdul Aziz. 
Besides this Friday morning gathering, I also attended several night gatherings 
called ‘ceramah agama dan isu-isu semasa’ (religious and contemporary issues’ 
speeches). Almost every night in Kelantan, I could find political religious gatherings held 
in an open field, from one place to another interchangeably. At this type of gathering, 
there are usually at least two or three speakers being listened to by huge numbers of 
Kelantan people. The first speaker usually delivers a sermon on religious matters such as 
Quran and Hadith studies and he is followed by other speakers who discuss contemporary 
political issues both at local and federal government levels and even on international 
Islamic issues such as Palestine’s struggle. 
I also visited several pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) in Kelantan such as 
Ma’had Muhammadi, Pondok Pasir Tumboh and Pesantren Darul Anuar (this Pesantren 
belongs to Mursyidul Am PAS Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat). Through these visits, I 
understood that among the PAS members and loyal participants are those who are 
teaching and studying at pesantren. Although the pesantrens are welcoming towards 
whoever wants to study at those places, most of them, both teachers and students, are 
PAS members and participants. PAS could not be separated from the Islamic schools, 
pesantren or Mahad (taken from Arabic) in Kelantan, one of the heads of pesantren that I 
interviewed told me. 
All of the above activities were required for me to understand the relationship 
between the local people, party members and party elites. The techniques of interview I 
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employed relied mainly on casual, day-to-day communication or on informal meetings 
and visits to the district offices of the parties.  
Secondary resources have also been used in this thesis, such as official documents 
of the PKS and PAS, particularly the reports of their annual meetings between 1998 and 
2005, the journal Harakah, books, journals, newspapers, magazines, and Internet 
resources. For the internet resources, there was ready access to the official websites of 
both PKS22 and PAS.  The official documents of the parties were found in the offices of 
the PKS in Jakarta and the PAS both in Kuala Lumpur and Kelantan. 
 
Thesis Structure  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 (the present chapter) provides 
an introduction starting with the background of the study and followed by the conceptual 
issues and research questions. The significance of the study, theoretical perspectives, and 
methodology of the research are also discussed in the chapter.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the notions of Islamic political party and democracy. It 
examines the meanings of democracy as put forward by various scholars, including 
political scientists but not confined to them. Agreements and conflicts among scholars 
concerning the definition and nature of democracy are analyzed. The formalist and 
substantive approaches on democracy used by scholars could be used to pinpoint whether 
PKS and PAS implement substantive or formalist democracy, or both. This is followed 
by a discussion of the relationship between political party, Islamic party and the 
                                                 
22For the websites related to the PKS, it is amazing enough that there are more than 50 website addresses  
officially belonging to the PKS’s organization (at the local, national and international levels) and unofficial 
or individual  websites belonging to its leaders, members and supporters. 
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advancement of democracy, which helps us understand and ‘locate’ the PKS and PAS 
positions and roles as Islamic parties advancing democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
This chapter also discusses the concept of democracy in Islam. Islamic principles 
on democracy such as shura, musyawah, and huriyyah, which are debated among Muslim 
scholars, and their opinions as to whether to accept or reject such concepts and ideas, are 
also examined. More importantly, however, this chapter also discusses the views of PKS 
and PAS concerning democracy. The chapter ends by briefly examining the experience of 
an Islamic political party and the advancement of democracy in developing countries. 
This example shows how the participation of Islamic parties in developing democracy 
has its precedents in history.  
Chapter 3 outlines the origins and historical development of PKS and PAS and 
their involvement in the internal democratization processes in their respective areas. The 
PKS was established when the country faced a crisis of legitimacy prior to the fall of 
Soeharto. Its foundation through a democratic process is examined in order to 
demonstrate that the PKS plays by its own procedures in adapting to democratic rule. The 
chapter moves on to an account of the development of PAS since its establishment in 
1951, in the context of Malaysian politics in general and the split within UMNO that gave 
rise to the PAS. The chapter ends with a comparison of the origins and historical 
development of the PKS and PAS. 
Chapter 4 discusses how PKS and PAS participate in democratic processes, taking 
the recruitment process of the members and leaders as case studies. The chapter focuses 
initially on how the PKS has implemented the concept of shura in recruiting important 
figures such as party leaders and candidates to run for parliamentary office. This is 
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followed by a discussion of how PAS, in turn, has recruited its members and leaders, 
showing in particular how they adhere to democratic processes in recruiting their leaders. 
The chapter is closed by a comparison of both parties’ styles in recruiting their members 
and leaders. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the PKS and PAS’s involvement in democratic processes 
taking their participation in general elections as case studies. The chapter focuses on the 
involvement of the PKS in the 1999 general elections. The political situation prior to this 
election is examined to determine the political context of PKS participation, followed by 
a discussion of the party’s performance in that election, including the 1999 legislative 
election in which it also fielded candidates. The chapter then looks into PAS participation 
in the 1999 Malaysian general election. The political situation prior to the 1999 election, 
including the Anwar Ibrahim trial case which is believed to be a factor in PAS’s great 
victory in this election is examined. It is followed by discussing PAS’s performance 
during the 1999 election including other factors leading to PAS’s huge victory in the 
election. The chapter is closed by making a comparative discussion of both parties’ 
performance in the election. 
Chapter 6 focuses on PKS and PAS involvement in democracy taking the 2004 
general elections as case studies. PKS participation in the 2004 Indonesian general 
elections serves to illustrate the party’s support for democracy in Indonesia. The chapter 
discusses the factors leading to PKS’s victory in the 2004 legislative election and its 
position during the first direct Indonesian presidential election. Then the chapter shifts 
focus to the PAS and its participation in the 2004 Malaysian general election, in which it 
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suffered an embarrasing loss. A comparison is made at the chapter’s end of both parties’ 
performance in the 2004 elections. 
Finally, in drawing together the various strands of the discussion, the thesis ends 
(Chapter 7) by assessing the significance of PKS and PAS participation in the 
democratization process in Indonesia and Malaysia. Like all studies, this is not the last 
word on the subject, but it will, I hope, fill some gaps in our understanding of religion 
and electoral politics in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, what I try to do in this thesis is to 
clarify the relationship between Islam and the politics of democracy, which has been 
plagued with negative stereotypes thus far, through a close examination of the 
experiences of PKS and PAS in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
Democracy and Islamic Political Party: 
Contending Approaches 
 
This chapter examines the literature on democracy, political party and the 
relationship between Islam and democracy. It analyzes meanings of democracy, the 
agreements and disagreement among scholars on its nature. Scholars generally describe 
democracies in terms of procedure- (formalist) or value- (substantive) based systems. I 
use these categories to locate the modus operandi of PKS and PAS.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the relationship between party, Islamic party and the advancement of 
democracy, and the PKS and PAS’s views on democracy. 
 
Democracy and Political Party 
The term democracy could be the most popular and controversial word not only 
among political scientists but also in contemporary discourse on political systems in the 
world. Political scientists have debated this term but no consensus has arisen among them 
on what they meant by democracy. This term originally comes from the Greek word 
‘demos’ meaning ‘people’ and kratein or cratia, meaning ‘to rule’. Democracy refers to a 
governmental system ruled by the people in a society. In this system, the people are a 
source of power and sovereignty. In democracies, it is the people who hold sovereign 
power over legislator and government.  
The general definition of democracy, which is commonly used by social 
scientists, is the one popularized by Holden who defines democracy as a kingdom ruled 
by the people.  People in a democratic system, in Holden’s words, “positively or 
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negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic determining decisions on important 
matters of public policy.”23 In line with Holden’s argument, another political scientist, 
Lijphart, defines democracy as a people-ruled government in which all government 
activities should accommodate people rights equally for all citizens.24  Carl Cohen in his 
book Democracy characterizes democracy as a government supported by a popular 
majority; “Democracy is a system in which the people govern themselves…, government 
by consent, rule by the majority, government with equal rights for all, sovereignty of the 
people, and so on.”25 
The phrase ‘by the people,’ repeatedly stated above, is hard to explain and 
implement. It is almost unlikely to be found in reality because those who govern and rule 
democratic polities are usually only the political elites. According to Parry, “government 
in a democracy was certainly of the people, it might even be for the people, but it was 
never by the people but only by the ruling class.”26 
 From the above discussion, it is clear that the definition of democracy is still 
debatable. Democracies are diverse, reflecting each nation’s unique political, social and 
cultural life. However, Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall believe that in such 
controversy there are areas of agreements and disagreements. On the one hand, the most 
important issues of the differences and disagreements are “(1) between those who regard 
democracy as merely a form of government, and those for whom it is also a social 
                                                 
23Barry Holden, Understanding Liberal Democracy (Oxford and New Jersey: Philip Allan, 1988), 8. 
24Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one 
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984),1. 
25Carl Cohen, Democracy (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971), 3. 
26Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Alen and Unwin, 1969), 25. 
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system, an economic system, and/or a way of life; and (2) between those who identify 
democracy with majority rule and those who refuse to do so.”27  
 On the other hand, several principles could be agreed upon by almost all who talk 
or write about it today. These principles include political equality, governmental 
responses to the popular will, rule by majority instead of the minority, protection of 
human freedom, free and fair elections open to all citizens, citizens receiving equal 
protection under the law and commitment to the values of tolerance, cooperation and 
compromise. 
 
Procedural/Formalist Vs Substantialist 
Following Ranney’s arguments above one would argue that in looking at the 
concept of democracy, how political scientists approach democracy can be divided into 
two big groups: formalist/proceduralist and substantialist.  
The formalist or proceduralist approach places more emphasis on the political 
institutions and procedures that comprise democracy, namely elections, political parties, 
and governmental bodies rather than ideals and principles that underscore those 
mechanisms. It is underpinned by the belief that democracy requires certain institutions, 
such as elected officials; free and fair elections; freedom of expression, information and 
associations; and inclusive citizenship28 and that a democracy’s success is measured by 
its system’s conformity to the principles of contestation and participation29 as individuals 
                                                 
27Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, “Democracy: Confusion and Agreement,” The Western Political 
Quarterly 4, no. 3 (September 1951): 434. 
28Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 85. 
29See Bova Russel, “Democracy and Liberty: The Cultural Connection,” in Global Divergence of 
Democracies, ed.  L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 
2001), 64. 
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compete for power and people choose or remove their leaders.30 From this formalist 
perspective, if these institutions are present, then democracy is present. In addition, Dahl 
in his book A Preface to Economic Democracy, argues that for such a system to be fully 
democratic it would have to meet the following criteria: “equal votes, effective 
participation, enlightened understanding, final control of the agenda by the demos and 
inclusiveness.”31 
Dahl’s criteria above and these formalist perspectives on democracy are not 
immune to criticism. According to Alfred Stepan, Dahl's criteria are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of democracy. He says: 
They are insufficient because no matter how free and fair the elections and no 
matter how large the government's majority, democracy must also have a 
constitution that itself is democratic in that it respects fundamental liberties and 
offers considerable protections for minority rights. Furthermore, the 
democratically elected government must rule within the confines of its 
constitution and be bound by the law and by a complex set of vertical and 
horizontal institutions that help to ensure accountability.32  
Scholars like Stepan insist that the concept of democracy must also include those 
elements that are regarded as substantive, hence the notion of “substantive democracy.”  
Like Stepan, Beetham also believes that there are elements that can be categorized as 
substantive democracy, which according to him “are that the people have a right to a 
controlling influence over public decisions and decision makers, and that they should be 
treated with equal respect and as of equal worth in the context of such decisions.”  
Beetham mentions concepts such as “popular control” and “popular equality,” both of 
                                                 
30Joseph Schumpeter, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,” in The Democracy Sourcebook, ed. Robert 
A. Dahl, I. Shapiro and J.A. Cheibub (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2003), 9. 
31Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 59-
60. 
32Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations",” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 
(2000): 39. 
 26
which contribute to the foundation of the principles and institutions that inform 
democracy.33  However, Hefner believes that democracy’s possibility is not singular but 
multiple. He says: “…there is no one size-fits- all democracy but a variety of forms 
linked by family resemblance. Democracy’s values of freedom, equality, and tolerance –
in-pluralism do not come with unbending instructions for all places and times.”34 
In summary, it can be noted that up to the present there are still different 
interpretations of democracy used and defined not only by scholars but also by 
governments everywhere, including communist and even Muslim-led governments. 
Those concepts have not only been used to legitimate policies of government, but also to 
contextualize and adapt democracy to local values and cultures. In addition, what is clear 
from the above discussion is that there are two approaches in dealing with the concept of 
democracy:  the formalist (procedural) and the substantive. However neither approach 
should be considered more important than the other. The principles that underscore 
substantive democracy will only remain theoretical ideals unless mechanisms are present 
for translating those ideals into reality, while procedural institutions, however democratic 
in form, are meaningless if they do not yield ends that reflect democratic values. This 
means that democracy’s quality, according to L. Morlino cannot only be determined by 
the procedures, but also by the contents and results.35 
                                                 
33David Beetham, “Democracy and Human Rights: Contrast and Convergence” (paper presented at the 
conference on The Interdependence between Democracy and Human Rights, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations, Geneva, November 25-26, 2002). 
34Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 216. 
35Leonardo Morlino, “What is a Good Democracy?,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 10-32. 
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 The brief discussion of procedural and substantive democracy above may help us 
understand through the language of political science  how the PKS and PAS  actually 
relate to or practice democracy in the context of Islam. The findings of this research 
suggest that both parties combine some elements of procedural and value-based ideals in 
their participation in national politics. In the light of the definitions we have laid down 
above, let us now examine a polemic about whether Islam supports democracy or not, 
followed by a discussion of democratic values in Islam, which some scholars believe 
have always existed in Islamic traditions although there is no formal mention of the word 
“democracy.” 
Islam and Democracy 
The debates on whether Islam is compatible with democracy have occurred not 
only among scholars in the Western world but also among Muslim themselves. This 
controversy in the Muslim community cannot be separated from the fact that there is a 
myriad of interpretations of Islamic texts – the Quran and Hadith -- and cleavages within 
the Muslim community in response to modernity.  
In the Muslim community, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, there have 
been ongoing debates about how Islam should be reconciled with other values as well as 
how to adopt and bring normative Islam into dialogue with modernity. Therefore, there 
are debates about the compatibility of Islamic values with modern values such as 
democracy, liberalism, pluralism, human rights and gender equality. In general, 
arguments proposed by Islamic scholars can be categorized into two main contradicting 
points of view.  
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The first position is based on the textual interpretation of the Quran, which states 
that Islamic values are not compatible with liberalism and democracy. This argument is 
based on the belief that Islamic values were God-created and theological doctrines of 
divinity, while liberalism and democracy were invented and developed by human beings, 
and therefore based on the primacy of reason. This view is mostly proposed by dogmatic, 
textual-minded Islamic scholars. Islam in their view is superior to other values, and it 
should be the sole source of individual values. Islam is a perfect, complete set of values 
that is adequate to guide people’s conduct in life. 
The second position is based on the contextual interpretation of the Quran, which 
argues that both values can be reconciled. Islamic values and liberalism and democracy 
are not totally in contradiction. In many aspects, Islam and democracy reinforce and 
reconstitute the values needed by the individual to pursue justice, equality, liberty and 
happiness. This argument derives from the belief that Islam as a set of values can be 
interpreted contextually. In this view, Islam is a source of ethics and morals that should 
be elaborated in the broader context of social life by utilizing rationality. Islam should be 
reconciled with other universal values in order to harmonize with the basic structure of 
society.  
These two kinds of interpretations above have resulted in the emergence of two 
opposite camps in Islam, known as moderate36or progressive Muslim on the one hand, 
                                                 
36The term moderate Islam (Muslims) is still highly contested and has myriad interpretations. It will highly 
depend on who defines it and for what purposes he defines it. However, as a working definition, a moderate 
Muslim could be defined as one who cherishes freedom of thought while recognizing the existential 
necessity of faith. This term commonly refers to Muslims who believe that Islam can reconcile with 
modernism. Although their names are different such as moderate, progressive, modernist, inclusive, and 
reformist Muslim,, they have a common platform that Islamic values which are taken from the Quran 
verses and the Prophet Muhammad’s hadith could be interpreted contextually. 
 29
and conservative or radical37on the other. Fuad Fachruddin gave the names Islamist for 
the conservative one and Modernist-reformist for the progressive camp.38 
These two camps up to the present have debated the concept of compatibility 
between Islam and democracy. For Zartman, this debate is understandable because the 
Quran as a primary source of Islamic teaching does not clearly and directly mention the 
concept of democracy. He says, “Like all scripture, Quran can be interpreted to support 
many different types of political behavior and systems of government. It contains no 
direct support for democracy.”39 In his explanation of the position and the reasons of 
these two camps who view democracy differently, Fachruddin argues that the “Islamists’s 
group believes that democracy is not compatible with Islam because democracy 
emphasizes the sovereignty of the people and this concept according to them contradicts 
with a fundamental tenet of Islam that is the concept of hakimiyat () of Allah (the 
sovereignty of God).”40  
 
Sayyid Qutb and Maududi’s Views 
Some of the above groups believe that “democracy” is a foreign concept that has 
been imposed by Westernizers and secular reformers upon Muslim societies. They often 
                                                 
37This term is also still debatable. However, Lili Zakiah Munir describes four common platforms of the 
groups or what she calls fundamentalists and I quote. “First, they tend to interpret religious text literally, 
and refuse contextual reading of the texts as, to them; it can reduce the sacredness of the religion.  Second, 
they refuse pluralism and relativism. Third, fundamentalists monopolize the truth of religious 
interpretation.  They are authoritarian as they claim that they are the sole holder of ‘truth’ and that their 
readings of religious texts are final and unchallengeable.  Fourth, fundamentalist’s movements are 
correlated with fanaticism, exclusiveness, intolerance, radicalism, and militarism. The fundamentalist 
always takes action against every threat to the religion.” See Lili Zakiah Munir, “Islamic Fundamentalism 
and its Impact on Women,” http://www.law.emory.edu/IHR/worddocs/lily3.doc  (accessed June 4, 2007) 
38Fuad Fachruddin, “Educating for Democracy: Ideas and Practices of Islamic Civil Society Association in 
Indonesia” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2005), 3.  
39I. William Zartman, ”Democracy and Islam: The Cultural Dialectic,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Sciences 524, (November 1992): 188. 
40Fuad Fachruddin, 3. 
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argue that the concept of popular sovereignty denies the fundamental Islamic affirmation 
of the sovereignty of God and is, therefore, a form of idolatry.41 The view of this group 
cannot be separated from their argument and paradigm in looking at the relationship 
between Islam and the state. For them Islam is a total way of life, which guides its 
followers not only in terms of their religious rituals but also in their political life. Among 
the prominent Muslim scholars who have believed in this paradigm are Sayyid Qutb and 
Abu A’la Maududi. 
Maududi suggests that the need for an Islamic state is a natural one; “that it is part 
of a broad, integrated theology, the cardinal principle of which is the sovereignty of the 
Lord of Nature.”42 Everything that exists in the entire universe is subject to the law, 
which he calls ‘sunnatullah’; the reflection of this law in human life is Islamic law. 
Everything in the universe, according to Maududi, should obey God and “the natural 
order respects divine order.”43 And the most important implication of this view is the 
rejection of any division between state and religion. Application of the divine law to 
social issues requires an organized institution; this is the notion of ‘state’. Secularism in 
this context means the separation of state from religion, and is thus very contrary to the 
Islamic understanding of the nature of human existence. Maududi asserts that the raison 
d’etre of an Islamic state is to enforce and uphold the sovereignty of God: 
Whatever human agency is constituted to enforce the political system of Islam in 
a state, will not possess real sovereignty in the legal and political sense of the 
term, because not only that it does not possess de jure sovereignty but its powers 
are limited and circumscribed by a supreme law which it can neither alter nor 
interfere with.44 
 
                                                 
41See John L Esposito,and John O.Vol, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
42Abu A’la Maududi, The Islamic State (Birmingham: UK Islamic Mission Dakwah Centre, 1994), 11. 
43Abu A’la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1980),158. 
44Ibid, 218. 
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Thus, for Maududi, democracy is incompatible with Islam and is in contradiction 
with Islamic teaching because democracy believes in a sovereignty of people instead of 
sovereignty of God. Maududi’s belief seems to follow his teacher Sayyid Qutb’s 
argument rejecting the idea of popular sovereignty. For Qutb, only God –Allah—is 
sovereign.45 Sovereignty of Allah (Hakimiyat Allah) means that the right to legislate 
belongs to the lawgiver, Allah. Subsequently, political leaders and intellectuals are not 
sovereign. The believer's ultimate loyalty and absolute obedience without hesitation or 
reservation is to God (i.e., His laws), and wherever the government’s (or any one else’s) 
actions contradict His will the believer is not only entitled but actually obliged to oppose 
them. Masykuri Abdillah mentioned other Muslim scholars who support this idea such as 
Hafiz Salih, Adnan Ali Rida and Hasan al-Turabi who argue that the concept of 
democracy not only negated Allah’s sovereignty but also was not found in Islamic 
vocabulary.46 
 Differing from this point of view, some Muslims who are well known as 
moderate, liberal or reformist, believe that Islamic teachings consist of values that 
support democracy. Thus, for them Islam and democracy are compatible. Fachruddin 
identifies them as the “…liberalists or Modernists or reformists, who argue that 
democracy is neither a monolithic concept but rather a multi-faceted phenomenon, and 
thus various forms of democracy may be developed in both Muslim and non-Muslim 
societies.”47   
                                                 
45Jim Gould, “Islam and Democracy,” Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, 1,(2006): 4. 
46Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966-
1993) (Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer and Co. Kg, 1997), 14. 
47Fuad Fachruddin, 3.  
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This group’s position in looking at the relationship between Islam and democracy 
also could be traced back to their main argument about Islam’s relationship to the state. 
They believe that state and religion should have a mutual relationship (symbiotic). This 
view is based on the argument that, on the one hand, religion needs a state to develop, 
and on the other hand, that the state needs religion to make it work under moral and 
ethical guidance. In a real political implementation, one could argue that state 
(government ruler) and religion (religious scholars or ulama) are in a mutually dependent 
relationship, whereby each relies on the other, one for its physical protection and the 
other for its authority to rule. In commenting upon this relationship, Shahram Akbarzadeh 
and Abdullah Saeed state: 
Temporal rulers needed the air of legitimacy that Islamic scholars could offer by 
virtue of their position as interpreters of Divine Law and the latter needed the 
physical protection and social order in which Islam could flourish that the former 
was capable of securing. Din (religion) and dawlah (state) were not the same, but 
two sides of the same coin.48 
 
Ibnu Taimiyah and al-Mawardi’s Views 
The abovementioned view of Islamic history has been popularized by Muslim 
scholars such as Ibnu Taimiyah and al-Mawardi. Ibnu Taimiyah believes that religion and 
state have a mutual relationship; on the one hand, without a legal powerful state, religion 
would be in danger, and on the other hand, a state without religion could become a 
tyrannical institution. Thus, Ibnu Taimiyah argues that establishing a state to administer 
public affairs is a great religious duty because religion cannot flourish without a good 
                                                 
48Shahram Akbarzadeh and A. Saeed, ed. Islam and Political Legitimacy (London and New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), 4. 
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governmental institution. Another reason to establish a state is due to Allah’s command 
asking Muslims to enjoin good deeds (amar ma’ruf) and forbid bad or evil deeds (nahi 
munkar). This religious duty could not be performed without an established government 
or state that has the power to enforce Allah’s command.49 
Al-Mawardi, who is commonly known as an early Muslim political scientist, 
argues that religion has a central role to legitimate politics and state. In his magnum opus, 
al-Ahkam al-Shultaniyya50 (The Laws of Islamic Governance), he argues that imamate or 
khalifah is an institution that replaced the Prophet to maintain religious (sacred) and 
worldly (profane) concerns. To carry out this mission of maintaining religious and earthly 
concerns, al-Mawardi proposes six principles to establish a good state. First, the state 
should follow religious values. These values will guide and protect the state from abusing 
its power. Second, the state should have a leader with an authoritative bearing by which 
people will respect and follow his instructions. Third, the state should maintain justice for 
all people in the community. Justice will make all community members respect each 
other. Fourth, the state should maintain a peaceful and safe life for its members. Fifth, 
land fertility should be maintained by the state in order that community members may be 
safe from starvation, and sixth, the state should maintain its members’ rights to live.51 
From these six principles proposed, it is clear that for al-Mawardi, state and religion 
should have a symbiotic relationship to build a prosperous community.  
                                                 
49See Munawir Sjadzali, Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran (Jakarta: UI Press, 1993), 
63. 
50Asadullah Yate, trans. The Laws of Islamic Governance (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996), 5-6. 
51Asadullah Yate, 6. 
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Because the relationship between Islam and state should be looked upon as a 
mutual one, the political parties being examined in this thesis are premised on the belief 
that Islam and democracy are compatible. Moreover, PKS and PAS believe that Islam 
contains fundamental doctrines such as shura (ىر) or consultation and deliberation; 
huriyat () or freedom, including freedom of religion and Al-Musawat (ةاوا),52 all 
of which can be interpreted as supporting a democratic society.53  
However, these Islamic values, which serve to promote democracy, should be 
interpreted within the wide variety of historical, societal and political contexts in which 
this concept is implemented.  Islam as practiced in the Arabian political and social 
context need not necessarily be the same as those practiced in other countries in 
Southeast Asia where democracy has been widely practiced like Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
Democratic Values in Islam 
 From the discussion above of scholarly debates regarding the relationship 
between Islam and democracy, we come to understand that some believe that there are 
Islamic values which support democracy. They mainly draw upon three teachings in 
Islam that share similar notions of democracy as follows: 
                                                 
52They refer to several verses of the Qur’an and other texts presenting the prophetic tradition in which are 
stated basic principles of Islam that are compatible with the (liberal) notion of democracy. These include 
equality. “O Mankind, We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into 
nations and tribes, that you know each other. The most honorable in the sight of Allah is the one who 
excels in piety and heedfulness (Chapter 49:13);” (b) freedom (freedom of religion): “Let there be no 
compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error (Chapter II: 256); (c) commanding right and 
virtue: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoying what is right, and 
forbidding what is wrong (Chapter III: 104);” (d) justice “Oh ye who believe stand out firmly for justice, as 
witnesses to God even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin (Chapter IV: 135); and (e) 
freedom of speech “The best form of jihad is to utter a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler (Hadith).” See 
Robin Wright, “Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 
2 (April 1996). 
53Zaydan Abd al-Karim, Role of State and Individual in Islam (Delhi: Hindustan Publications, 1983). 
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 a. Mutual Consultation or Shura (ىر) 
In a discussion of the relationship between Islam and politics, the concept of shura 
could be seen as a very important concept. According to Lukman Thaib, the issue of 
ىر (mutual consultation) has a great significance not only among the Muslim 
community but also among the international community. This could be seen from the fact 
that there is a very widespread use of terms, particularly in the Muslim world, such as 
nadwah or “ةَوْَ,”54 “elders council” and “majlis council” or “majlis shura (  !	
ىر"ا).”55 The importance of shura as adopted by the two parties is examined in this 
thesis; PKS and PAS put the Majlis Shura and Majlis Shura Ulama as their highest 
institution, which has the final word in deciding the policy of the parties.56 
Muslim thinkers have agreed that shura as mentioned in the Quran,57 is obligatory 
in the political life of a Muslim leader. The ruled must be consulted. It is the duty of any 
Muslim leader to consult his subject for the Sharia obliges him to consult with the people 
about public matters. The Quran says:58 
َ$ِ%َ &َ ِ'َ ()%َ *َ+ُآ ْََو ْ.ُَ *َ+ِ /ِ ّا 1َ2	 ٍََْر ْِ4ْَ5ْاَو ْ.ُ+ْ6َ 7ُ6ْ%َ 8َِْَ 1ْ	ِ ْا9:َ;َ <ِ ْَْا  ْ.ُَ
= َ6َ >ْ?آََ%َ *َ	ْ@َ6َ اَذBِ%َ ِ	ْCَا %ِ ُْهْرِوََو 1َ ِ2آََُْا 9<Eِُ /َ ّا ?نِإ /ِ ّا 
 
It is part of the Mercy of Allah that thou dost deal gently with them Wert thou 
severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass 
over (Their faults), and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them; and consult them in 
affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision put thy trust in Allah. 
For Allah loves those who put their trust (in Him). 
 
                                                 
54Lukman Thaib, The Islamic Polity and Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: Delta Publishing, 1995), 71. 
55M. Th. Houtsma and A.J. Wensinck, Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1936), 438. 
56More details explanation of this institution will be explained in the chapter 3 of this thesis. 
57See Quran Chapter 3:159. 
58Abdi Omar Shuriye, Introduction to Political Science: Islamic and Western Perspectives (Kuala Lumpur: 
Ilmiah Publisher, 2000), 98. 
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In the history of early Islamic community development particularly during the era 
of Khalifa Rashidun (Rightly Guided) after Muhammad’s death, this concept has been 
implemented by Abu Bakar and Umar bin Khattab.59 Abu Bakar for example used shura 
in connection with consultation over the decision about his leadership. According to 
Mousalli, Abu Bakar established Majlis Shura or a kind of “House of Representatives” to 
ask their advice in regard to his leadership decision. This representative body consisted of 
both Muhajirin and Ansar’ people60 such as Ali bin Abi Thalib, Umar bin Al-Khattab, 
Uthman bin Affan, Zayd bin Tsabit, Abdullah bin Masud, Anas bin Malik, Abdurrahman 
bin Auf and Kaab bin Ubai.61 It is even clearer when the second caliph Umar bin Khattab 
adopted this concept on his deathbed for six Companions of the Prophet to decide on the 
leadership of the Muslim community after him. Before his death, Umar had appointed an 
election committee to choose his successor. This had six members, namely, Ali bin Abi 
Thalib, Uthman bin Affan, Sa’ad bin Abi Waqash, Abdurrahman bin Awf, Zubair bin 
Awwam, Thalhah bin Ubaydah and Abdullah bin Umar. By appointing the committee, it 
seems that Umar preferred to leave the question of leadership open, and let the 
community as represented by the committee of six eminent companions decide the issue 
                                                 
59Khalifa is an Arabic word literally meaning “one who replaces someone else who left or died” (English: 
Caliph). In the context of Islam, however, the word acquires a narrower meaning. The Muslim Caliph is the 
successor to Prophet Muhammad’s position as the political, military, and administrative leader of the 
Muslims. Rashidun, moreover, is the name used for the four first caliphs, from Abu Bakar to Ali bin Abi 
Thalib, and indicates that these were the just and admirable leaders of the Muslim community. According 
to Esposito, the word khalifa emerged spontaneously immediately after the Prophet’s death when leaders of 
the Muslim community elected Abu Bakar to succeed him. The first four caliphs, furthermore, succeeded to 
the office on a non-hereditary basis by acclamation of the community, preceded in the first three cases by 
designation made by a few leading people or the preceding caliph. These four then, are well known as the 
Rashidun (Rightly Guided) caliphs. See J.L. Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic 
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 239. 
60At the time of the Prophet’s death, there were two big groups among the Muslim community; Muhajirin 
(refugees from Mecca) and the Ansar (helpers or the people of Medina).  
61Ahmad S. Mousalli, “Discourses on Human Rights, and Pluralistic Democracy,” in Islam in Changing 
World: Europe and Middle East, ed. Anders Jerichow and J. B. Simonsen (Denmark: Curzon Press, 1997), 
72. 
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for themselves. After a few days of hard bargaining and extensive sounding of leading 
members of the Madinan community, the choice narrowed down to two candidates: Ali 
bin Abi Thalib and Uthman bin Affan. And after a discussion, Uthman was appointed as 
the new caliph to replace Umar. Related to this study, the question remains as to how the 
PKS and PAS implement this Islamic concept of Shura in the parties’ activities 
particularly in choosing their leaders. 
 Based on the practice of shura among the Companions of the Prophet above, 
Lukman Thaib says: 
In line with the mentioned context the most suitable definition of shura as a 
governmental system is to evaluate the opinion of the ummah with regard to the 
affairs of common interest which are conducive to the positive and healthy 
development of the state. This evaluation could be direct from the individuals 
themselves or indirectly through their representatives.62 
 
The availability of the concept of shura in Islamic teaching, according to 
Abdillah,63 is the main reason for Muslim scholars like Fazlur Rahman,64 Hamid 
Enayat,65 Mohammad Natsir,66 Ahmad Syafii Maarif67 and Nurcholish Madjid68 to 
                                                 
62Lukman Thaib, 73. 
63Masykuri Abdillah, 15. 
64Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) was a well-known scholar of Islam. Born in Pakistan, Rahman studied 
Arabic at Punjab University and went on to Oxford University where he wrote a dissertation on Ibn Sina. 
Afterwards, he began a teaching career, first at Durham University where he taught Persian and Islamic 
philosophy, and then at McGill University where he taught Islamic studies until 1961.In that year, he 
returned to Pakistan to head up the Central Institute of Islamic Research which was set up by the Pakistani 
government in order to implement Islam into the daily dealings of the nation. However, due to the political 
situation in Pakistan, Rahman was hindered from making any progress in this endeavor, and he resigned 
from the post. He then returned to teaching, moving to the United States and teaching at UCLA as a visiting 
professor for a few years. He moved to the University of Chicago in 1969 and established himself there 
becoming the Harold H. Swift Distinguished Service Professor of Islamic Thought. At Chicago he was 
instrumental for building a strong Near Eastern Studies program that continues to be among the best in the 
world. While he was in Chicago, Rahman supervised Indonesian scholars who then become familiar as 
leading Indonesian Muslim modernist scholars like Prof Nurcholish Madjid (a former rector of Paramadina 
University, Jakarta) and Prof. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (a former Muhammadiyah chairman, the second largest 
Muslim organization in Indonesia). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlur_Rahman (accessed August 10, 
2007). 
65Hamid Enayat was Reader in Modern Middle Eastern History at Oxford University and Fellow at St. 
Antony's College, Oxford. Prior to his death in 1980 he was also Professor of Political Science at Tehran 
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believe that Islam is compatible with democracy. These beliefs are also held by political 
leaders of PKS and PAS, as can be seen in the discussion in the next section of this 
chapter. 
b. The Principle of Freedom or Huriyat () 
One of the important tenets of Islam is the concept of freedom. Man in Islam was 
freed from political or religious persecution. According to Islam, God has created man 
with a nature which entitles people to “their freedom of choices” in forming opinions and 
acting according to them. The Quran says: 
.َ+ْ	ِ Hَُآَو َ?+!َْا 8َIُْوَزَو *ََأ 1ْُ5ْا ُمَدN َ +َ ْOَُو َُَ%َ َةَ!َ?"ا PِQِـَه Sََْَ ;ََو َُTْِ Uُْَ ًا'ََر 1َِِ?)ْا 1َ	ِ  (35) 
Wَ%َ/ِ%ِ ََآ ?	ِ َ.ُIََْWَ%َ .َ+ْ6َ ُنXَْ?"ا َ.ُ?َز ِضْرCَا %ِ ْُََو Zوُ6َ [ٍ\ْ$َِ ْُ:ُ\ْSَ ْاXُ$ِْها +َ ْOَُو  =َِإ ٌعَ	ََو Zََْ	ُ
 1ٍِ(36) ??ا َُه /ُ?ِإ /ِْ َ6َ َبَ%َ ٍتَ َِآ /ِ2S?ر 1	ِ ُمَدN =? ََ%َُِ?ا ُبا (37)+َ ْOُ  2+2	 ُ?+َِWْَ ?	Bِ%َ ً\ِIَ .َ+ْ	ِ ْاXُ$ِْها
1َ%َ ىًُه َنُ@َEْَ ُْه ;ََو ْ.ِْ َ6َ ٌفْَ Hَ%َ َياَُه cَ$ِَ (38)  .َ%ِ ُْه ِر?+ا ُبEَdَْأ 8َTِـَوُأ +َِَeSِ ْاSُ?Qَآَو ْاوََآ 1َQِ?اَو
ََنوُِ 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
University where he chaired the Department of Politics. His opinion on response of Muslim to the 
modernity including democracy could be read in his book Modern Islamic Political Thought: Response of 
the Shi’i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century (Texas: Texas University, 1981). 
66Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993) was one of Indonesia's nationalist and revolutionary political leaders, 
who up to present still be believed as one of Indonesian Muslim scholars whose political thought on Islam 
and state relationship in Indonesia has been influencing Islamic political leaders in the country. He was a 
Chairman of Masyumi, the first Islamic party in Indonesian history from 1952-1958. For a detailed 
explanation of his political career and thought, see George McT Kahin, “In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir 
(1907-1993),” Indonesia 56 (October 1993): 158-165. 
67Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif (born in Sumpur Kudus, West Sumatera 1935) is a prominent Indonesian Muslim 
scholar. He was the former leader of Muhammadiyah (1998-2005), the second biggest Muslim 
organizations in Indonesia after Nahdhatul Ulama (NU). Hold PhD from Chicago University, Maarif is also 
well known as a prolific writer on Islam and politics relationship in Indonesia. Among his books are 
Dinamika Islam (the Dynamic of Islam), Islam, mengapa Tidak? (Islam Why not?), Islam dan Masalah 
Kenegaraan (Islam and State Issues), Muhammadiyah dan Politik Islam (Muhammadiyah and Islamic 
Politics). For a detailed of his biography, see his book Titik-titik Kisah Perjuanganku (Jakarta: Maarif 
Institute, 2006). 
68Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) popularly known in Indonesia as “Cak Nur," was a prominent Indonesian 
Muslim scholar. Early in his academic career, Nurcholish was a leader in various student organizations. He 
soon became well known as a proponent for modernization within Islam. Throughout his career he 
continued to argue that for Islam to be victorious in the global struggle of ideas, it needs to embrace the 
concepts of tolerance, democracy and pluralism. Born in Jombang, East Java, Madjid received his early 
education in religious institutions in Indonesia, so called pesantren. He later received his PhD in Islamic 
studies from University of Chicago under Fazlur Rahman’s supervision. He was also well known as a 
prolific writer in Indonesia. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nurcholish_Madjid (accessed August 10, 
2007).  
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We said: "O Adam! dwell thou and thy wife in the Garden; and eat of the 
bountiful things therein as (where and when) ye will; but approach not this tree, or 
ye run into harm and transgression (35) Then did Satan make them slip from the 
(garden), and get them out of the state (of felicity) in which they had been. We 
said: "Get ye down, all (ye people), with enmity between yourselves. On earth 
will be your dwelling-place and your means of livelihood - for a time (36) Then 
learnt Adam from his Lord words of inspiration, and his Lord Turned towards 
him; for He is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful (37) We said: "Get ye down all from 
here; and if, as is sure, there comes to you Guidance from me, whosoever follows 
My guidance, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve (38) "But those who 
reject Faith and belie Our Signs, they shall be companions of the Fire; they shall 
abide therein (39).69 
 
In Islam, man is given the will and ability to choose without any restrictions as 
God said. Several other Quranic verses can be cited here to show that Islam has promoted 
clearly the idea of freedom in every aspect of human life. They are for example:  
1ِِد ََِو ْُ+ُِد ْُَ 
To you be your Way, and to me mine.70 
 
;َ 1ْَ%َ 24َْا 1َ	ِ ُْ9ا 1َ?$َ? Oَ 1ِ2ا %ِ Pَاَْآِإ 8ََْَ5ْا ِَ%َ /ِ ّSِ 1	ِfْَُو ِت'ُ?XSِ ْُْَ  .ََ َمgَِا ;َ =ََhْُْا ِةَوْ\ُْSِ
/ُ ّاَو ٌ ِ6َ cٌِ5َ  
 
Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: 
whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy 
hand-hold that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things.71  
 
>ِOَُو Eَْاْُْَ ْ%َ ءَ 1	ََو 1	ِfْُ ْ%َ ءَ 1َ%َ ْُ2S?ر 1	ِ 9j .َOُِداَ5ُ ْ.ِSِ َطََأ اًرَ 1َِِ?) ِ َْَ6َْأ ?ِإ  اhُ4َُ اlُ4ِَْَ نِإَو
PَIُُْا يِ"ْَ >ِ.ْُْَآ ءَSِ ًََْ	ُ ْتء5ََو ُباَ?"ا َTْSِ 
 
Say, "The truth is from your Lord": Let him who will believe, and let him who 
will, reject (it): for the wrong-doers We have prepared a Fire whose (smoke and 
flames), like the walls and roof of a tent, will hem them in: if they implore relief 
they will be granted water like melted brass, that will scald their faces, how 
dreadful the drink! How uncomfortable a couch to recline on!72 
  
 
                                                 
69Quran Chapter 2: 35-39 
70Quran Chapter 109: 6 
71Quran Chapter 2: 256 
72Quran Chapter 18: 29. 
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Among the Quranic verses above, the most important concept of freedom in Islam 
is the freedom of religion, conscience and expression. The Quranic dictum of Laikraha Fi 
Diin or 1د % Pاآإ ; (no compulsion in religion) proves to be a cornerstone in 
establishing this freedom. The logic of the argument is that if God does not want us to be 
all alike in our beliefs and gives an individual the right to chose between belief and 
disbelief, which is the most crucial decision one can possibly make, why then restrict his 
choice in less paramount issues? As Huwaydi puts it: "If God has decreed that there shall 
be no compulsion in religion, by way of priority, then, there should be no compulsion in 
the administration of this world, or Syiyasat al-dunya (ُْد 5ََ5ِ)."73 Chapter four, 
particularly the section on the recruitement of members, will discuss this concept of 
freedom, to explain the way PKS and PAS have implemented those prinicples in their 
political life. 
c. Equality or Al-Musawat (ةاوا) 
Equality has been regarded as one of the most important principles in Islam. If we 
consider Islamic law, we will find a striking place for the principle of equality among the 
basic values which the source of this law postulates and which the Prophet had applied. 
The Holy Quran states: 
	ََو >ََOَ 1	ََو TًXََ ?;ِإ +ً	ِfْ	ُ >َُْَ نَأ 1ٍ	ِfْُِ َنَآ ٌَِدَو ٍ+َ	ِfْ9	 ٍ$َOََر ُِEْَ%َ TًXََ +ً	ِfْ	ُ ٌَ? َ9	  نَأ ?;ِإ /ِ ِْهَأ =َِإ
1	ِ َنَآ نBِ%َ ْاOُ??gَ ٍ+َ	ِfْ9	 ٍ$َOََر ُِEْَ%َ 1ٌ	ِfْ	ْ َُهَو ْُ? mوُ6َ ٍمْOَ ٌَِ%َ ٌقlَ2	 ْ.ُ+َْSََو ْُ+َْSَ ٍمْOَ 1	ِ َنَآ نِإَو  ٌَ? َ9	
 ً+َ	ِfْ9	 ٍ$َOََر ُِEْََو /ِ ِْهَأ =َِإ1َ%َ /ِ ّا 1َ2	 ًSَْَ 1ِْ\َSِََ	ُ 1ِْَ.ْَ ُمَgِ%َ ْ!ِَ ْ? ًِَ ً ِ6َ /ُ ّا َنَآَو 
 
Never should a believer kill a believer; but (If it so happens) by mistake, 
(Compensation is due): If one (so) kills a believer, it is ordained that he should 
free a believing slave, and pay compensation to the deceased's family, unless they 
remit it freely. If the deceased belonged to a people at war with you, and he was a 
believer, the freeing of a believing slave (Is enough). If he belonged to a people 
with whom ye have treaty of Mutual alliance, compensation should be paid to his 
                                                 
73Fahmi Huwaydi, al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyyah (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li al- Tarjamah wa al-Nashr, 
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family, and a believing slave be freed. For those who find this beyond their 
means, (is prescribed) a fast for two months running: by way of repentance to 
Allah: for Allah hath all knowledge and all wisdom.74 
 
Again God said: 
 
َ =lَُأَو ٍَآَذ 12	 ُآ+َْ ََ ?ِإ ُس?+ا .َ9َأ ْُ	ََْآَأ ?نِإ ا%َُر\ََِ >َpِ$َOََو Sً\ُُ ُْآ+َ ْ\َIََو  ُْآََْأ /ِ? ا َ+6ِ 
 
O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and 
made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may 
despise (each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he 
who is) the most righteous of you.75 
 
 
The Prophet reinforced the idea of equality with a homely comparison: “People 
are as equal as the teeth of a comb; there is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab 
except by virtue of piety.76 The Prophet’s tradition explained that all human beings are 
equal or must be treated equally before the law. In Islamic administration, people must be 
considered equal regardless of their political, social or administrative positions. This 
Islamic principle of equality has implications of great significance in social life. Again in 
this study of PKS and PAS, it is beneficial to unravel the extent to which political parties 
follow the teachings found in Islam about equality in real political life. 
Besides these values above, Islam is also seen as compatible with democracy 
because it provides a tradition that encourages people to promote freedom of mind and 
public debates in the forms of ijtihad (د.Iا) or reinterpretation, ijma’(عIِْإ) or consensus, 
and ikhtilaf (فHِِْا) or disagreement/difference of opinion, istishlah ( g5ا  ) or public 
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interests , tasamuh (r	) or tolerance and tahasub (<5E) or public accountability and 
ombudsmanship).77  
In summary, the concept of democracy has been debated by people around the 
world, not only by political scientists concerned with the development of models of 
democracy but also by political practitioners like ruling governments which claim that 
they are following democratic rule. However, scholars can generally be divided into two 
camps - formalist or proceduralist, and substantialist - when they approach the theory of 
democracy. As discussed earlier, the formalists hinge their theories of democracy on 
certain institutions and focus on the characteristics of democratic processes, while the 
substantialists focus on particular norms or values that may accompany them.  
When these two approaches are applied in looking at the concept of democracy in 
Islam or the compatibility between Islam and democracy, it is clear from the discussion 
above that Islam has provided several values that support democracy, and this is where 
the substantialist approach takes on greater significance. Islam has provided the concept 
of Al-Musawat (ةاوا) or equality; huriyat () or freedom, including freedom of 
religion; shura (ىر) or consultation and deliberation, all of which can be interpreted as 
supporting democratic values as mentioned by the substantialist scholars. 
 
 
                                                 
77Esposito hence, states firmly that “contemporary Islam is more a challenge than a threat. It challenges the 
West to know and understand the diversity of the Muslim experience. It is a challenge to Muslim 
governments to be more responsive to popular demands for political liberalization and greater popular 
participation, to tolerate rather than repress nonviolent opposition movements, to build viable democratic 
institutions. At the same time, it challenges Western powers to stand by the democratic values they 
embody, distinguish between authentic populist movements and violent revolutionaries, and recognize the 
right of the people to determine the nature of their governments and leadership.”  See John L Esposito, ed. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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PKS and PAS Views on Democracy 
Two leading figures of PKS who actively advocate that their party support 
democracy are Hidayat Nur Wahid (the former President of PKS and now Chairman of 
MPR) and Zulkieflimansyah, a Member of Parliament from PKS. According to 
Zulkieflimansyah, his party is commonly suspected of having a hidden agenda to form an 
Islamic state in Indonesia once PKS became a ruling party. In response to this unfounded 
suspicion, he insisted that his party believes in modernity in the Indonesian educational 
system, believes in democracy in the political system and in going back to Islam as a 
moral code. For him, PKS as an Islamic party should actively involve itself in preventing 
the country from breaking apart and degenerating into chaos; thus a democratic and 
economically viable Indonesia must be the final outcome.78 To strengthen his argument 
that PKS accepts democracy and that it should adapt its ideological framework to the 
reality of democratic politics in Indonesia, Zulkieflimansyah says: 
 
The PKS is not confronted with an authoritarian regime that it must fight against. 
Instead, it is faced with access to government via a democratic process, and this 
has translated into the practical realities of bargaining as part of a governing 
coalition. In other words, the party has to deal with the necessary compromises 
with other actors within the political system, including other political parties and 
the government.79  
 
Zulkieflimansyah’s view is also supported by another PKS leading figure Hidayat 
Nur Wahid who believes that democracy is a good political tool to achieve the PKS’s 
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 Zulkieflimansyah, “Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and Political Islam,” USINDO 
Open Forum (Washington DC, June 8, 2006), 1. 
79Zulkieflimansyah, “Overcoming the Fear: PKS and Democratization,” The Jakarta Post, December 13, 
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political goal. When Wahid was questioned about whether democracy or theocracy is 
better for Indonesia, he said:  
Democracy or theocracy is a product of society’s interest. In the Indonesian 
context, democracy becomes a good tool as long as it is implemented according to 
democratic means and not manipulative methods.80 
 
Wahid even believes that the issue of the relationship between Islam and 
democracy in Indonesian context will always appear in the future just as it has been 
discussed since Indonesian independence in 1945. While many Indonesian people believe 
that Islam and democracy are in basic conflict, Wahid and his party PKS believe that 
democracy goes to the roots of Islam in at least three aspects. First, Islam views 
humankind as equal and universal in spirit. Humans were created as men and women, not 
with original sin, nor as members of a favorite nation of God. The second aspect is the 
principle of learning. The Quran encourages Muslims to learn and to acquire knowledge 
from whatever source, regardless of race, ethnicity or nationality. The third aspect is the 
moral system of Islam that encourages wisdom and not egoism. Islam includes all the 
commonly accepted moral rules but the teaching of morality is more practical than 
theoretical -- through example and by modeling moral behavior.  
Wahid further elaborates that the above three Islamic aspects that are relevant to 
democracy have led to three other consequences. He says: 
 The first consequence is egalitarianism and tolerance. A second consequence is 
the democratic principle of shura in Islam. Finally, a third consequence is that of 
moderation. According to Islam, humans are neither angels nor devils. They 
should not be materialistic or ascetics. Neither should they be on the far ends of 
individualism and collectivism. Islam rejects all extremes, whether in the form of 
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consumerism or terrorism. At the same time, Islam encourages a democracy that 
can protect the weak and poor as well as supporting economic growth.81  
 
Based on his view of the relationship between Islam and democracy, Wahid said that his 
party was committed to the Medina Charter written by the prophet Muhammad for the 
multi-religious city state, instead of the Jakarta Charter. This Medina Charter refers to 
concepts in the Quran such as equality, rule of law, justice and Islamic social services. 
However, according to Collins and Fauzi, when the issue of the Jakarta Charter was 
raised again in the legislature in 2000, PKS abstained from voting on whether to accept or 
reject the motion that it be put on the amended Indonesian constitution.82 
 For Collins and Fauzi, that the PKS abstained from the voting was understandable 
because although the majority of PKS leading figures agreed that democracy is a good 
way for PKS to be involved in the political process in the post Soeharto era, there are 
divisions within the party that derive from the tension between Islamist goals and 
commitment to democracy. Collins and Fauzi give an example of some PKS leaders like 
Fachry Hamzah, a current parliament member from PKS, who believes that the party’s 
true political objective is a state based on Islamic law. As quoted by Collins from 
Djalal,83 Hamzah said: “Today democracy is our playing field, but we cannot abandon 
our religious ambitions”.84 However, it is necessary to note that Hamzah’s statement 
above was stated by him when he was not a parliament member yet, but still a student 
activist. 
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 From the above discussion, it is clear that although PKS is suspected of having a 
hidden agenda to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, up to the present they still 
uphold the values of democracy and believe that democracy is the only tool for PKS to be 
involved within Indonesian politics. Their commitment to democracy also could be seen 
from the fact that since its establishment, they have participated in Indonesian elections. 
The same as PKS, PAS also believes that following democratic process is the best tool to 
participate in Malaysian politics. 
The PAS view that democracy is the best way to articulate its political aspirations 
has been confirmed since its third annual conference held on January 4, 1953. One of the 
conference recommendations was to work hard at disseminating and promoting the 
concept of democracy and its advantages to Muslim people particularly in Malaysia. This 
recommendation was also reconfirmed at the PAS third general meeting held in 
Madrasah al-Tahdib al-Diniyah, Parit Buntar, Perak, on August 12-14, 1954, in which 
PAS decided to participate in the 1955 Malaysian general Election.85 This was followed 
by the party’s official registration on May  31,1955 as a political party that will legally 
participate in the first general election after Malaysian independence. The PAS’s 
initiative to be actively involved in the election could not be merely seen as a maneuver 
to be legally allowed into the political process. It could also be seen that PAS was not an 
Islamic movement that took a radical or confrontative approach to achieve its goals; 
instead it followed democratic rule to achieve its political agenda. Here PAS can be seen 
as an Islamic political party that was ready enough to let the Malaysian people at that 
time decide whether they would support them or not through the general election. 
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The 1955 general election was the first political test for the PAS to be involved in 
the democratization process in Malaysian politics. Although PAS only won one 
parliament seat in this first election, this did not discourage PAS to continue its struggle 
through acceptance of democratic rule. Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmi states that his party 
will always struggle through democratic rules to achieve its goals. He says: 
…PAS berjuang karena kebebasan dan kemerdekaan dengan dasar 
demokrasi…kemerdekaan PAS adalah kemerdekaan bangsa dan Negara.86  
 
PAS competes (its struggle) because of freedom and independence’s objective 
based on democracy…. (The objective of PAS struggle for independence) is state 
and national freedom 
 
PAS still believes that democracy is the best way to achieve its political goal. 
Thus PAS does not agree with Islamic groups which use radicalism and violence as a tool 
to achieve their objectives. One of the parliament members from the PAS, Mohamad 
Sabu says: 
Kami menghadapi pasang surut, tetapi demokrasi tetap kami junjung. Walaupun 
gerakan-gerakan Islam yang lain di seluruh dunia banyak mengkritik kami, 
mereka mengatakan bahawa perjuangan Islam tidak boleh berjaya melalui 
demokrasi. Kami mempertahankan bahawa melalui demokrasi kami boleh 
mencapai kemenangan. Melalui suara rakyat kami boleh mencapai kemenangan, 
dengan syarat-sayarat demokrasi itu dipelihara dengan sebaiknya terutama oleh 
mereka yang memerintah. Walaupun badan-badan Islam yang lain menegurkan 
kami, kami tetap mengatakan bahawa kami akan mengikut saluran demokrasi87 
 
Our struggles have been moving up and down, but we still hold up democracy. 
Although several Islamic movements in the world criticized our struggle by 
saying that Islamic movement will not succeed through democracy, we always 
believe that through democracy we will achieve our goals. Through people’s 
voices, we will get our victory as long as the democratic rules are accordingly 
implemented, particularly by the ruling government. Although other Islamic 
groups criticized us, we say to them that we will always follow the democratic 
path to achieve our objectives.  
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From Sabu’s statement above, it is clear that PAS not only believes that 
democracy is their choice and the best way to voice their aspirations, but also reminds the 
ruling party to always maintain and follow democratic rules. The ‘room’ for democracy 
should be opened to all people and civil society movements in Malaysia including the 
opposition parties. PAS’s dedication to democracy is then unquestionable. 
The commitment of the party to democracy of course is not without reason.  
Several leading figures of the PAS believe that in the era of nation state and global 
politics in the world, one could not neglect the concept of democracy which was 
popularized by the Western countries. Based on the reality of the political situation in 
Malaysia, the PAS believes that there is no other way to be involved in the political arena 
except to follow democratic rules.  
The comments of leading figures of the PAS on democracy strengthen the 
argument that PAS up to the present still upholds a belief in democracy to achieve its 
objectives. Nasharuddin Mat Isa, for example, argues that people should be given the 
freedom to choose the form of government they want. The PAS believes that only by 
giving the freedom to the people, could democracy work perfectly. PAS believes that 
democracy could be applied completely if the government is determined by the people 
and for the benefit of the people. Furthermore, Nasharuddin states that “PAS menerima 
demokrasi kerana system ini merupakan muwajahah silmiyyah atau “cara lembut” untuk 
mendapatkan kuasa politik (PAS accepted democracy because this system is a ‘smooth 
and soft way’ ‘(muwajahah silmiyah) to gain political power).”88 This means that PAS 
rejects a radical and violent way to achieve its political goal. PAS does not agree that a 
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military coup, for example, will reach its goal to become a ruling government. Thus, PAS 
will maintain its participation in the general election as long as the legislation allows 
them to do so.  
PAS also believes that democracy (election) could be seen as a political 
mechanism to gain its objectives to pursue Islamic law in Malaysia if it got majority 
support from the people. Democracy will give opportunity for both Muslim and non-
Muslim voters alike in Malaysia to decide whether to vote for PAS or not. If the 
Malaysian people agree with the political agenda of PAS they can freely choose the 
party, or vice versa. This means that there is no compulsion for the people to choose 
whatever parties’ objective they prefer in the election. And this is the core of democracy.  
Mustafa Ali, another PAS figure argues that democracy is the best political 
system that exists today compared to feudalism or military government. For him, 
feudalism was out of date and military regime does not give freedom to the people to 
express their aspirations. Ali furthermore explains that with democracy, not only can the 
message of Islam be transmitted to Malaysian people but also democracy gives a chance 
for an Islamic political party like PAS to rule the Malaysian government. He believes that 
PAS can reap advantages through active involvement in the democratization process in 
Malaysia and particularly through its participation in the general election. Democracy 
could be used as a tool to implement and actualize the concept of shura in Islam.89 
In my interview with Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, Mursyidul Am PAS and Menteri 
Besar Kelantan, during my visit to Kota Bharu, he confirmed that democratic procedures 
could be used by PAS as opposition party and UMNO as ruling party to discuss and 
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debate (mudzakarah) political  issues and problems among them.90 At the parliament 
meetings both at the local and national level, for example, all parliament members (from 
PAS and UMNO) can meet and discuss any political issues that Malaysians face. These 
mutual discussions between the ruling party and opposition party in the parliament 
building are in line with the teaching of Islam, which encourages people to have 
musyawarah (discussion) to solve any problems. According to Nik Aziz:  
Demokrasi ajar muzakarah, Islam lebih lagi. Tiap-tiap negeri dalam Malaysia ada 
Dewan Undangan Negeri dan Dewan Undangan Negeri itu merupakan symbol 
bagi mudzakarah. Tiga empat bulan sekali orang pakat pergi ke Dewan Undangan 
Negeri berbincang dan bermuzakarah. Pandangan-pandangan daripada 
pembangkang yang kerajaan berasa betul, kerajaan terima dia. Dasar-dasar dan 
langkah-langkah kerajaan yang betul ahli Dewan Undangan beri sokongan, beri 
pujian kepada kerajaan, yang tidak betul dia tegur.91 
 
Democracy teaches a debate and Islam even promotes it more. Every state in 
Malaysia has a local parliament as a discussion place where three to four times a 
month, members of parliament hold debates. The views of opposition parties 
which are considered to be true are accepted by a ruling party. The good 
governmental policies would be supported by the opposition party in the local 
parliament as well and wrong policies will be criticized 
 
Although Nik Aziz seems to agree with the concept of democracy, at the same 
time he is critical of it because sometimes democracy could lead to political conflict 
among the people. He pointed out, for example, the general election which is held every 
five years in Malaysia. Prior to the general election, Malaysians were usually divided into 
several groups due to their different political alliances which could lead to conflict among 
the parties’ supporters. Moreover, Islam has differentiated between good and bad deeds 
in which Muslims could not choose between both of them but always followed a good 
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one. In democracy, instead, people could select even the bad thing as long as the majority 
of the people want to do so. This is another negative side of democracy.92 
PAS’s criticisms of democracy, however, did not deflect it from the process of 
democratization and its involvement in the democratic process like election. Abdul Hadi 
Awang, the current president of PAS, insists that PAS will always continue to follow the 
rule of democracy, participate in a general election and oblige its members to vote when 
the general election is held. He furthermore argues that whoever rejects his party’s policy 
to participate in the election has to leave the party.93 
PAS’s involvement in democratization in Malaysia is not without criticism from 
its opponents like UMNO. PAS was commonly attacked by its competitors as a party 
which is not genuinely supporting democracy. PAS has been criticized as using 
democracy to gain political power and that once it holds power it would destroy 
democratic institutions in Malaysia. This criticism, actually, was not only directed to PAS 
but also to other Islamic movements in the world. It was commonly portrayed that 
Islamic movements are anti-democracy, anti-secularism and authoritarian, and only used 
democracy to gain their objectives. As Amos Permutter, quoted by Zain, says: 
In Algeria or in Egypt, the modern Islamic movement is authoritarian, anti-
democratic, anti-secular and a protest movement of the economically deprived. 
Once in power, this movement will eliminate the electoral process for which some 
observers have so much hope. Democracy means frequent elections, 
representative government and political culture dedicated to civil and human 
rights. But the fundamentalist of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and in the West Bank and 
Gaza are inimically hostile to all the conditions of democracy, and they are as 
dedicated as was the Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini to destroying the ideas and 
institutions that provides the vehicle to bring them to power.94 
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To counter its criticism, PAS argues that in Islam, dictatorship and authoritarian 
leadership are not permitted. PAS leading figures argue that their party does not apply 
dictatorship at all. If a dictatorship was found in any political groups or movements, it 
means that this movement has deviated from Islamic values which glorify equality, 
freedom and justice. Although,the leadership of PAS is currently in the hands of ulama 
(Islamic scholar), PAS will always commit itself to democratic rules. This commitment is 
clearly stated in the party constitution’s article 6 (11): PAS akan senantiasa patuh dengan 
apa-apa yang digariskan oleh perlembagaan dan undang-undang Negara dalam usaha 
mereka memperjuangkan aspirasi politik Islam (PAS will always follow what the State 
and its legislation decided in its aspiration to champion political Islam).  
The PAS commitment to democracy can also be seen from the statement of 
current PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang in his opening speech at the recent 53rd 
Muktamar (annual meeting) 2007 in Kelantan entitled “Selamatkan Demokrasi, Tegakkan 
Keadilan.” Awang says: 
PAS terus memilih ‘Muwajahah Silmiyyah’ (Persaingan Aman) melalui amalan 
demokrasi, menjadi cara bagi mencapai cita-cita menegakkan keadilan mutlak 
untuk seluruh rakyat.95 
 
PAS always chooses a fair competition through democracy. The democratic way 
would be PAS’s way to achieve the party’s objectives to achieve justice and 
prosperity for all people.  
 
Thus, it is clear that up to the present PAS has institutionally accepted the concept of 
democracy and still follows democratic rules to achieve its political objectives which can 
also be seen from the fact that the party keeps participating in the Malaysian elections 
since PAS’s establishment in 1951. 
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From the previous discussions, it is clear that there are several similarities and 
differences between PKS and PAS with regard to the parties’ view of democracy. As can 
be seen from the statements of the leading figures of PKS and PAS, both parties agree 
that Islamic values are not inimical to democracy. They believe that the core values of 
democracy are also recognised in Islamic teaching. While a leader of PKS like Wahid 
believes that Islam promotes the ideas of egalitarianism, equality and tolerance which are 
in line with democratic values, Nik Aziz, a spiritual leader of PAS argues that Islam and 
democracy are not in contradiction because democracy could be considered as a system 
that admits the muwajahah silmiyah (smooth and soft way) to gain political power as 
promoted by Islamic teaching. Thus, both PKS and PAS have similar views in embracing 
democratic ways to achieve their political goals. Both parties do not agree with Islamic 
groups that used radicalism and violence as the principle tools to achieve their objective; 
the participation of PKS and PAS in the national elections shows their commitment to 
abide by democratic rules. 
 
Democracy and Islamic Political Parties in Developing Countries  
 
In the 1990’s , John L. Esposito argues, two important phenomena arose in 
Muslim societies in the world, namely, Islamic resurgence and democratization in 
political Islam. In the 80s, says Esposito, the political Islamists used radical and violent 
approaches to gain their objectives particularly after Iranian revolution of 1979. He says: 
Many in the Muslim world and the West charged during the 1980s that Islamic 
organizations were simply radical fringe groups that were not representative and 
would simply be repudiated by the electorate. The justification for the condemnation 
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and suppression of Islamic movements has been that they were violent extremist, 
small representative groups on the margins of society.96  
 
 During 1990s, however, there was a shift from violent approaches to a more 
democratic struggle. This means that political Islam seems to be more likely to accept the 
democracy game through the ballot box to achieve their objectives and agendas. Islamic 
movements would follow and have a greater participation in the political and 
democratization process. According to Haddad, the support of political Islam for 
democracy was inspired by ideas and concepts popular among Muslim activists in the 
1990’s, such as the concepts of ta’adudiyah (diversity), mujtama’ al-madani (civil 
society), huquq al-insan (human rights), hurrriyah (freedom) and shafafiyah (purity).97 
Furthermore, the participation of political Islam in democratic procedures and 
especially taking part in elections, cannot be separated from the democratization process 
in the world since the 1970s and 1980s.98 This phenomenon in the Muslim world was a 
new phenomenon in global politics. The capability to actively participate in power-
sharing with the incumbent regime and be ready to lose in an election, made the idea of 
compatibility between Islam and democracy relevant.  
However, recent developments suggest that political Islam’s participation in the 
democratization process is only accepted if it does not threaten an established regime. 
That is why whenever political Islam wins a victory in an election, this would be 
canceled to perpetuate the rule of the incumbent government and this Islamic party would 
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even be banned forever. This was what happened to the Refah Party in Turkey, which 
was banned in  February 2, 1998 after their victory because this party was assumed to 
threaten the secularization programs of the incumbent Ataturk regime. It could also be 
seen from the victories of religious parties in non-Western countries such as FIS (Front 
Islamique du Salut or Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party 
or Indian People's Party) in India. In fact, these two religious parties held anti-Western 
values. Thus, it is unfortunate that Western countries were happy to support a military 
regime (which is commonly believed in the West as an undemocratic regime) to take over 
the Algerian government after the cancellation of FIS’s victory in the 1992 general 
election. The BJP party in India also faced the same fate when its victories could not 
bring them to become a ruling government in 1995 and 1996. 
Based on the experiences of the religious parties in India, Algeria and Turkey, it is 
necessary to investigate how both Islamic parties in this study on Southeast Asia, play 
their role in politics. Do they share a similar fate with their counterparts in other areas as 
mentioned above, or does the experience of these two Islamic parties in the region have a 
different history because of the different socio-political contexts in which they operated? 
The experience of Islamic political parties in other regions could also help to analyse the 
way PKS and PAS face the same challenges from the secular elites in the region as 
happened to their counterparts in other countries.  How do PKS and PAS cope with the 
challenges that come from other political elites both Muslim and non-Muslim alike when 




The Rise of PKS in Indonesia and PAS in Malaysia 
 
This chapter discusses the origins and historical development of PKS and PAS 
and their involvement in the internal democratization process in their respective 
countries. The impact of modernism in the Muslim world in general on Southeast Asia, 
especially Indonesia and Malaysia, is discussed in this chapter, with a focus on the extent 
to which these parties adopted or were influenced by modernist developments in other 
countries. This is followed by a discussion of the local socio-political situation in 
Indonesia when PKS was established through a democratic process. Next the chapter 
examines the historical development of PAS since its establishment in 1951 as a result of 
a split within UMNO. The origins and historical development of the two parties are then 
compared. 
 
From Middle East and Pakistan to Southeast Asia 
The early development of Islamic movements including Islamic parties cannot be 
separated from the issues and problems that appeared and become a concern of Muslim 
scholars from the 18th to the early-twentieth century.  The role of Islam in Muslim 
politics was not restricted to government activity and Islamic organizations or 
movements, but Muslim scholars continued to be active as well. Scholars such as 
Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and 
Muhammad Iqbal in the Indian subcontinent were actively involved in disseminating 
ideas of modernism and Muslim resurgence.  
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“Islamic modernism” consisted primarily of intellectual movements driven by several 
factors, particularly Muslim concern about the ‘backwardness’ of their communities vis a 
vis Western colonial influences. Although this seems to have originally appeared in the 
Middle Eastern countries, the influence of their modernist movements has led Muslims 
around the world to get actively involved in this.  
Since Islamic modernism originated primarily in Middle Eastern countries, how 
did its ideas and movements become transformed in Southeast Asia, particularly in 
Indonesia and Malaysia? In the following section, I discuss the emergence of Islamic 
modernism in Indonesia and Malaysia and how the political thinking of some revivalist 
scholars in the Middle East and Pakistan, particularly Abu A’la Al-Maududi and Hasan 
Al-Bana, influenced the political thinking of Indonesian and Malaysian activists in 
establishing Islamic political parties that are PKS and PAS. 
The wave of Islamic reformism came to Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 
twentieth century. Transmitted mostly by returning Indonesian and Malaysian students 
from Cairo who brought with them reformist literature, Islamic modernism then soon 
gained momentum in the Malay-Indonesian world.  This Islamic modernist movement in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, which is considered to be the root of moderate and modernist 
Islam in these countries, constitutes a remarkable milestone in the continuous and 
substantial influence of the Islamic scholarship from the Middle East on Indonesia and 
Malaysia. The modernist movement in Southeast Asia had its influence from the Middle 
East even before World War II. This argument is taken up by Indonesian scholars such as 
Deliar Noer who, referring to the first four decades of the twentieth century, shows how 
reformist ideas like those of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida have fired the 
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imagination of Indonesian youth in particular.99 Eliraz states that the narrative of the 
Islamic modernist movement in Indonesia and Malaysia is, without question, intimately 
and deeply connected with the Middle East in general, and with Egypt in particular. 
However, certain Islamic ideas and streams of thought that spread to Indonesia and 
Malaysia from the Middle Eastern countries of course underwent some modifications.100 
The greatest success of Islamic modernist movements in Indonesia was to borrow from 
Egypt. They made Abduh’s ideas, essentially religious in their character, a platform for 
an original and comprehensive reformist project that posed a substantial challenge to the 
traditional status quo.101 Muhammad Abduh’s heritage appears to be a significant source 
of inspiration for progressive ideas, which emerged in the early 1970s to become an 
influential stream of thought in neo-modernist Islamic discourse in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
However, the influence of the transformation of intellectual thinking and 
movement among Middle Eastern scholars resulted not only in the modernist-reformist 
approaches but also some revivalist approaches to address the problems of Islam in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. For example, the ideas and movement led by Abu A’la Maududi 
and Hasan Al-Bana have had great impact on Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims. The 
emergence of what was known in Indonesia and Malaysia as the dakwah movement or 
the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in the seventies, which influenced the 
establishment of PKS and PAS, was in fact a continuation of the movement promoted by 
Maududi in Pakistan and Hasan al-Bana in Egypt. According to M. Kamal Hassan, 
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Maududi along with Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Khomeini (1900-1989) are the most 
important Islamic thinkers and spokesman for the holistic vision of Islam.102 
Based on his brief survey of Maududi’s influence on Muslim thought in Southeast 
Asia, Hassan concludes that Maududi’s ideas have had a great impact on Indonesian and 
Malaysian Muslim movements in the seventies. While modernist-reformist ideas have 
influenced mainstream Indonesian and Malaysia Muslim, as can be seen from the 
emergence of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah organizations in the case of 
Indonesia, the ideas of revivalism also influenced some Muslim movements in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Besides the fact of Malaysian and Indonesian students who returned from 
the Middle East and spread their ideas in their home countries, Hassan further explains 
how Maududi’s ideas particularly on the relationship between Islam and politics, Allah’s 
sovereignty and his idea about establishing an Islamic state were transmitted to both the 
countries. In the case of Malaysia, Hassan says: 
The English translation of Maududis’ writing and ideas were already available in 
Kuala Lumpur bookshops in the early sixties. Maududi’s writings, translated into 
English mostly by Khurshid Ahmad and published by the Islamic publications Ltd 
of Lahore, were one of the most important sources of Islamic education of the 
English-educated Malay intelligentsia in the seventies and eighties. The writings 
of Sayyid Qutb were equally popular.103 
This means that since the sixties, Malaysian Muslim have been familiar with the ideas of 
scholars from Middle Eastern countries.  
As alluded to by Eliraz and Noer, the influence of Islamic scholarship is evident 
in the establishment of PAS and PKS. The influence of Middle Eastern scholars, 
particularly leaders of al-ikhwan al-muslimun’s movement in Egypt, on PAS was clear 
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from the fact that several PAS leaders who studied in Al-Azhar University, Egypt, 
intensively attended the weekly training held in the headquarters of al-ikhwan al-
muslimun office back to 1960s. The PAS leader Zulkifli Mohamad (1927-1964) 
intensively attended the lectures delivered by Al-Bana and Qutb during his stay in Egypt. 
When he returned to Malaysia in 1952, he established the Kolej Islam Malaya in which 
he spread his thoughts on Islam and politics to his students. For him, establishing an 
Islamic state is a duty of every Muslim including Islamic party. He says: 
Tugas menegakkan sebuah negara Islam, yang didalamnya ideology Islam dan 
segala undang-undang di dalamnya, adalah kewajiban pokok yang harus 
diperjuangkan oleh tiap-tiap mereka yang bernama Muslim, lebih-lebih lagi parti 
Islam seperti PAS.104 
 
The duty to establish Islamic state in which Islamic ideology and laws are 
implemented is a primary obligation that every Muslim should struggle for, more 
so by Islamic parties such as PAS. 
 
Immediately after joining PAS in 1955, Zulkifli’s popularity led to his appointment as 
Timbalan Yang Dipertua Agung PAS on 5th PAS Muktamar, December 25, 1956 and to 
become a member of parliament in 1959 and democratically reelected to parliament in 
1964. He was also a popular parliamentarian who bravely argued against Tunku Abdul 
Rahman’s criticism of PAS’s desire for an Islamic State in Malaysia. During 
parliamentary sessions, Zulkifli often advocated that the Malaysian government recall its 
recognition of Israel’s existence. He was also known by PAS members as the first leader 
to initiate acceptance of  non-Muslims as party members.105 
                                                 




 Another PAS leader with an intimate connection to Al-ikhwan al-muslimun 
figures in Egypt was Jais Anwar, the former chairman of Dewan Pemuda PAS (1968-
1970). According to Anwar, one of the leading figures of al-ikhwan al-muslimun, Sheikh 
Taqiyyudin, regularly promoted the ideas of the Islamic movement of al-ikhwan al-
muslimun to young Malay students in Kedah since 1957. Taqiyuddin ran away from 
Egypt to Malaysia to avoid arrest by the government, at which time he became Anwar’s 
teacher. In Malaysia, Taqiyyuddin introduced a system of party cadres, usroh, in which 
each member of party should attend weekly meetings to strengthen his knowledge of the 
party’s programs and build brotherhood among the members.106 Additionally, in 1963 
PAS was invited by the President of Iraq Muhammad Arif As-Salam (term 1963-1966) to 
send ten students107 to Baghdad to take up Islamic studies by which, according to Hassan 
Syukri (one of the students), they were directly trained on Islamic politics and 
movements by leading figures of al-ikhwan al-muslimun in Iraq, and when these students 
returned to Malaysia, they joined PAS.108  
Yusof Rawa, the former President of PAS (1982-1989) and former spiritual leader 
of the party (1987-1993), can also be considered as a leader who promoted the ideas of 
Qutb in Malaysia. When he returned from Mecca after finishing his study in 1950s, he 
published a magazine entitled Al-Islam in which Fidzilal Al-Quran, a Quranic tafsir 
written by Qutb, was regularly published in his magazine. From PAS’s early beginnings, 
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the thinking of a democratic path to power and establishment of an Islamic state emerges.  
In this regard, Rawa comments:  
Kita memilih penyertaan dalam pilihan raya sebagai satu pendekatan untuk 
mencapai matlamat pelaksanaan Islam bersama dengan program tarbiyyyah yang 
berterusan dikalangan ahli dan masyarakat sebagai program yang utama dan asasi  
We choose to participate in elections as an approach to achieve the 
implementation of Islamic teaching through the continuous educational program 
among members and community as a main and a basic program.109  
 
In a later development, Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Al-Bana’s ideas have been 
popularized in Malaysia by the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia or Angkatan Belia 
Islam Malaysia (ABIM). ABIM published translated books written by Al-ikhwan al-
muslimun’s leaders and published articles written by those leaders at ABIM’s official 
magazine al-Risalah. And PAS since 1971 also contributed to the popularity of 
Maududi’s and Al-Bana’s thoughts among the Malay Muslims in the country.  
In my interview with current PAS President, Abdul Hadi Awang , he confirmed 
the transmission of ideas on political participation by Muslims from the leaders of Al-
ikhwan al-muslimun to PAS members. Hadi Awang, who is an alumnus of the University 
Al Azhar in Egypt, admitted that he had two political mentors from the Al-ikhwan al-
muslimun’s organization: Muhammad Al-Wakeel and Said Hawa. It is not a surprise that 
Awang’s writings such as Prasyarat Kejayaan Harakah Islam (Requirement of Islamic 
Movement’s Victory), Pembinaan Harakah Islam (Developing Islamic Movement), 
Tarbiyah Islamiyah Harakiah (Education of Islamic Movement) and Hizbul Allah and 
Hizbul Syaitan (Allah’s Party and Evil’s Party) have been adopted as the main sources of 
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PAS cadre training. These Islamic teachings about political party were influenced by Al-
Bana and Qutb, particularly in the stress on the comprehensiveness of Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
(Islamic education) and Islam as a way of life as constituting the main elements of party 
struggle. Awang advocates the importance of imbibing Islamic education and Islam’s 
comprehensive ways of life into the party’s political mechanism and membership: 
Diantara sifat-sifat tarbiyah islamiyah itu, ia mestilah syumul sebagaimana 
syumulnya Islam. Ia tidak boleh ditumpukan kepada sebahagian daripada aspek 
fitrah manusia tetapi semua aspek kehidupan. Dan hal ini menjadi tanggungjawab 
semua orang Islam di atas muka bumi ini…oleh itu maka tarbiyah itu mestilah 
meliputi tarbiyah rohaniah, tarbiyah ijtima’iah, tarbiyah jihadiyah dan sebagainya 
berdasarkan kesyumulan Islam di dalam aspek aqidah dan kaedah, syariat dan 
nizam.110 
Among the characteristic of Islamic education (tarbiyah) is that its tarbiyah should 
be as comprehensive as Islam itself. This Islamic education should not focus only 
on parts of human behaviour but  should encompass all of life’s aspect. And the 
responsibility of Islamic education belongs to all the Muslims in the 
world….Thus, Islamic education should cover spiritual education, social 
education, struggle education and so on based on comprehensive Islam that covers 
faith, laws, and governance. 
 
The influence of the leaders of Al-ikhwan al-muslimun on Awang is also clearly seen 
when he wrote a Quranic tafsir, Al-Tibyan, which is influenced by writing of Qutb, Tafsir 
Fidzilal al-Quran. The process of transmission of Al-ikhwan al-muslimun’s thought to 
PAS members is also obvious when Awang held the position of “Lajnah Tarbiyah dan 
Kepemimpinan” (Chairman of Training and Leadership) of PAS during which time he 
used sources written by leaders of Al-ikhwan al-muslimun for the PAS’s cadre training. 
Books written by Hassan Al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb are among the main sources of PAS’s 
cadre-training programs. 
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The influence of the scholars like Maududi and Al-Bana for the PAS later can 
also be seen clearly from the fact that among the PAS’s objectives is to establish an 
Islamic state as can be seen from the blueprint of an Islamic state that belongs to PAS.111  
According to Hassan, in his brief survey, he finds  two unpublished academic exercises 
entitled ‘The Ideas of Maududi and Hasan Al-Banna in the Method of the Struggle of 
PAS and The Islamic State Concept of Maududi: A Review of its Influence on PAS and 
Al-Arqam. These two articles assert that “although PAS did not simply adopt ideas of 
foreign thinkers, many of its leaders, in fact, have been implementing programs which 
originated from the writings of Maududi and Hasan al-Banna but creatively adjusted 
them to the Malaysian context and political system.”112  
 In the case of Indonesia, it is commonly known by Indonesians that besides the 
writings of modernist Middle Eastern scholars like Muhammad Abduh, Jamaluddin al-
Afghani and Rashid Ridha, as previously mentioned, the works of revivalist scholars like 
Maududi and Hasan Al-Bana are also popular. However, for Maududi’s ideas, it is not 
only through his writings that Indonesian scholars were influenced in the first place, but 
also by direct contact between the leader of the Masyumi Party, Mohamad Natsir, and his 
counterpart Maududi who was also the leader of the Jamaat’i al-Islami party in Pakistan. 
Natsir visited Pakistan in 1952 and met Maududi as part of his effort to gain International 
support for the fledging Indonesian Republic. Natsir was aware of the writings of 
Maududi by that time and other Masyumi leaders could very well have quoted some 
views of Maududi, particularly when there were serious debates in the early period of 
Indonesian independence between Natsir as a Muslim nationalist and Soekarno 
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(Indonesia’s first President) as a secular-nationalist, on whether Indonesia should become 
an Islamic state or not. In this debate, it was believed that Natsir adopted the ideas of 
Maududi, which articulated the holistic Islamic perspective and argued that Indonesia 
should become an Islamic state. However, Natsir did not totally adopt Maududi’s ideas 
but tried to implement them in the context of Indonesian politics.  
 The writings of Maududi were for the first time translated into Bahasa Indonesia 
from English in 1967. The work of Maududi entitled Islamic Way of Life was translated 
by Osman Raliby into Pokok-Pokok Pandangan Hidup Muslim.  And in the following 
years, huge numbers of revivalist scholars’ books were translated and published by 
Indonesians, which of course had a big impact on the Muslim movement in Indonesia. 
For example, Hasan notes that “from 1982 to 1986, twelve Indonesian translation of 
Sayyid Qutbs’ book, ten of Maududi’s, six of Shariati and three of Hasan Al-Bana were 
published in Indonesia.”113 
 In the current situation, I have noticed that translations of Arabic books written by 
Middle Eastern scholars into Bahasa Indonesia are mushrooming in the country. The 
books written by Maududi and Hasan Al-Bana are easily found in Indonesian book 
stores. When I attended PKS’s 7th anniversary and annual meeting in the district levels, it 
was very common to find books written by Middle Eastern scholars being sold in the 
vicinity of PKS’s meeting. Based on my interview with several PKS members whom I 
met during the PKS’s anniversary meetings in Jakarta and during my visit to several PKS 
district offices in Depok, Bogor and Kuningan, they admitted that these books also have 
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been used as main sources in their regular cadre trainings  known as liqo (weekly 
meeting) among the members of PKS.  
For the PKS and PAS, the books written by Maududi and Hasan Al-Bana have 
become main sources of their members’ training.114 The influence of their writings, 
particularly Al-Banna’s, to the dakwah movement has been admitted by the current 
President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring. He says: 
Pengaruh pemikiran Hasan Al-Banna terhadap gerakan dakwah, khususnya PKS, 
merupakan suatu hal yang aksiomatik. Bahkan dalam thesis saya, Rivalry between 
Modernist and Traditionalist Islamic Movement, saya berkesimpulan bahwa tidak 
ada satupun gerakan Islam modern di dunia yang tidak terpengaruh oleh 
pemikiran Hasan al-Banna 
The influence of Hassan Al-Banna’s thoughts to the dakwah movement, 
especially PKS, is obvious. Even in my thesis, Rivalry between Modernist and 
Traditionalist Islamic Movement, I come to a conclusion that there is no single 
Islamic modern movement in the world that is not influenced by Hasan al-
Banna’s thoughts.115  
 
Sembiring’s statement above shows that Al-Banna’s political thinking has significantly 
impacted upon not only PKS’ movement but also other Islamic movements in the world. 
Sembiring’s view above is strengthened by Igo Ilham116 who says: “mengaitkan PKS 
dengan gerakan dakwah Internasional seperti Al-ikhwan al-muslimun memang ada 
beberapa titik temu walaupun dalam aksi dan format yang berbeda…” (to make a 
connection between PKS and international dakwah movements like al-ikhwan al-
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muslimun actually there are common points though the acts and formats are different).117 
These two statements from PKS political leaders are proof of the influence of other 
Islamic movements in the Middle East on PKS. 
In addition to book translation, the transmission of revivalist ideas to Indonesia 
was also supported by government and non-governmental organizations and individuals 
from the Middle East through education and dakwah activities. Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia are among those Gulf countries actively involved in spreading revivalist ideas 
through educational approaches, either by sending teachers to Islamic institutions in 
Indonesia or by establishing educational institutions. Saudi-sponsored Islamic education 
in Indonesia has taken the most prominent and influential form through the Lembaga 
Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (the Indonesian Institute for Islamic and Arabic 
Sciences), popularly known in Jakarta as LIPIA. A branch of Imam Muhammad bin Saud 
University in Riyadh, it provides courses in both Arabic and Islamic studies for 
Indonesians. Through this institution, the ideas of Hasan Al-Bana have been transmitted 
to Indonesians because many of the school’s teachers have strong Brotherhood 
influences. Fealy and Bubalo even argue that LIPIA could be considered as a place to 
transmit brotherhood ideas to some of the leaders of PKS Islamic parties.118 These two 
scholars only offer a one- sided view, however. Based on my research findings, the 
composition of the PKS membership is more intricate. For example, from the forty-five 
PKS parliamentarians, only three people graduated from LIPIA-- Jazuli Juwaini, Hilman 
Rosyad Syihab and Muhammad Anis Matta. More than fifty percent of them graduated 
from Indonesian secular (not Islamic) universities like ITB (Bandung Institute of 
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technology), IPB (Bogor Institute of Agriculture), UI (University of Indonesia), and 
UGM (Gadjah Mada University) and other members graduated from Indonesian Islamic 
universities, and overseas universities both in the Middle East and the West.119 It is also 
important to note here that the first PKS President, Nurmahmudi Ismail, holds a PhD in 
Food and Technology from Texas A & M University. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there are connections between 
modernism and revivalism movement in Middle Eastern countries and the emergence of 
dakwah movements in Indonesia and Malaysia, which later on would have an impact on 
the creation of PAS and PKS. Even now, materials from Middle Eastern countries not 
only flow and spread among Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims through translation 
efforts but in a globalized world, thanks to internet development, the doctrinal or political 
views of Middle Eastern scholars are easily read by Indonesians and Malaysians through 
websites as well. 
After discussing the global influence, particularly from Middle Eastern countries, 
on the establishment of PKS and PAS, the next question, then, is how the local political 
contexts in both countries influenced or shaped the emergence of these parties. 
 
The Origin of PKS: Indonesian Context 
The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (originally Partai Keadilan) is an example of a 
political party formed at a time when Indonesia faced a crisis of legitimacy prior to the 
fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime.  
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When Soeharto stepped down, he appointed his Vice President B.J. Habiebie to serve 
as Indonesian president until his term (1998-2003) was over in 2003. This decision was 
made due to the extreme pressure from many powerful sectors of the Indonesian people--
not only politicians and students but also the Armed Forces, which previously always 
backed up Soeharto’s power. The head of Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (House of 
Representatives), Harmoko, himself asked the President to resign. Thus, in a broadcast on 
television seen all over Indonesia, Soeharto finally quit his presidency saying, ”I have 
decided to withdraw from my position as the leader of the Republic of Indonesia, 
effective immediately.”120 The authoritarian, paternalistic rule of the retired general who 
had led Indonesia for thirty-two years was finally over. After seven attempts to hold on to 
power despite weeks of rioting, shifting allegiances within the government, international 
pressure and economic disarray, the Indonesian leader finally conceded that ”I find it 
difficult to carry out my duty as the country's ruler and push ahead with the nation's 
development.”121  
The brief era of Soeharto’s resignation and Habiebie’s government is known by 
Indonesians as Era Reformasi (Reformation Era). Reformasi had become the key word of 
the unceasing struggle by intellectuals, the political elites and university students in the 
movement to oust Soeharto from office. There were many who understood reformation as 
simply the struggle to displace Soeharto. Thus when Soeharto handed over the presidency 
to Habiebie, a section of the people considered the struggle for reformation over. Another 
group, however, defined the target of reformation as the struggle to completely remove 
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corruption, collusion and nepotism by getting rid of the New Order regime altogether; 
hence the key phrase ‘total reformation.’122 
The spirit of reformation during Habiebie’s presidency onwards and his success in 
promoting freedoms of speech, assembly and expression had a great impact on political 
relaxation and liberation in the country. This indication could be seen, according to 
Bahtiar Effendy, from the emergence of an astonishing number of political parties, 
perhaps beyond anybody’s imagination. As reported, between May and October 1998, in 
the midst of social economic and political uncertainties, Indonesia witnessed the birth of 
181 political parties.123 Out of that number, forty-two parties, among them the PKS, 
could be categorized as Islamic, the majority using Islam as their symbol and/or 
ideological foundation. 
The rising number of Islamic political parties following Soeharto’s abdication is 
not an altogether illogical phenomenon. It is appropriate to argue that like other groups 
which were marginalized by Soeharto’s regime, groups associated with political Islam 
saw the downfall of Soeharto as an opportunity to develop their political agenda, and 
particularly to admit syaria (Islamic Law) into the Indonesian constitution. Under 
Soeharto’s regime, political Islam had been marginalized because it demanded the 
official adoption and implementation of the syaria (Islamic law) and tried to change 
Pancasila,124 the state ideology, into one that was more amenable to Islamic law or an 
Islamic state. 
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Moreover, in the social and economic sphere, the way in which Moslems were 
considered minor, was equally amazing. Under Soeharto, non-Muslims--Christians and 
non-Muslim Chinese in particular--played extraordinarily influential roles in a variety of 
fields, both public and private. In the public sectors, according to Zifirdaus Adnan,125 a 
limited circle of urban, westernized, middle-class Christians enjoyed disproportionately 
predominant positions in the bureaucracy, military, educational institutions and numerous 
other state-linked agencies. What is important to note is that this bias was not only due to 
their better educational backgrounds but also to favours granted by the president. 
According to Bachtiar Effendy, the phenomenon of increased number of Muslim 
political parties during the reformasi period, only serves to remind Indonesians 
particularly the non-Muslims, about the re-emergence of political Islam and the move to 
nationalise sharia  in Indonesian society. The Islamic political parties’ thrust into the 
forefront of national politics in the post-Soeharto era has always been perceived as an 
attempt to legally or constitutionally link Islam with politics or establish a state based on 
Islamic principles.126 Moreover, Kuntowijoyo (a well known Muslim scholar in 
Indonesia) reminded Muslims that the entrance of Islam into politics could jeopardize 
Islamically-favourable development in the country.127 Kuntowijoyo’s apprehension could 
be correct--that the establishment of Islamic political parties could harm what Muslim 
intellectuals have achieved in the past three decades in transforming “a new type of 
Indonesian Muslim,” which was commonly perceived as more tolerant and inclusive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
governed by wise policies reached trough deliberation and representation, and (5) social justice for the 
entire Indonesian people. 
125Zifirdaus Adnan, “Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic (Political) Ideology: No! Islam and the State in 
Indonesia,” in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman (Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Monash University, 1990), 441-477. 
126Bachtiar Effendy, 200. 
127Kuntowijoyo, “Enam Alasan Untuk Tidak Mendirikan Partai Politik Islam,” Republika, July 18, 1998. 
 72
However, Kuntowijoyo’s anxiety seemed to be unfounded when the results of the 
Indonesian general elections of 1999 were scrutinized. It was openly known that the 
results indicated that Islamic parties remained unable to marshal majority support. Out of 
twenty-four Islamic parties that participated in the election, only eight Islamic parties, 
including PKS, gained one seat or more in the parliament.128  
 Part of the political distillation following the fall of Soeharto, one of the parties 
that emerged as a moderate force in Indonesian politics that incorporated both democratic 
and Islamic values was the PKS. The success of PKS’s emergence as a major Islamic 
political party in a short period in the late 1990s is mainly due to its ability to attract 
Indonesians who were largely democratic in thinking and Muslims. 
 
PKS Birth through Democratic Process 
Partai Keadilan was founded on July 20, 1998 and was officially declared a party 
on August 9, 1998. The time of its birth of course cannot be separated from what is called 
in Indonesian history the Reformasi after Soeharto stepped down. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that the PKS establishment was a response to national political conditions during 
that time.  
However, different from other new political parties that seem to have been 
instantly established during the reformation era, the PKS’s birth was likely the final step 
or ‘final product’ of a long-term religious and social movement since the 1980s known as 
Kampus Da’wah movement (also seen as Dakwah, or Tarbiyah), which means “Campus 
Proselytizing or Propagation.” Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the first PKS President, argues that 
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the historical and ideological roots of his party go back a very long time - almost twenty 
years.129 
The Tarbiyah movement is a movement that began in Indonesia in the late 1970s 
in major university campuses, as a response to the repressive policy of the Suharto 
regime toward Islamic groups that aspired to the idea of an Islamic political system. The 
movement found university campuses all over Indonesia fertile ground for recruitment 
and the cultivation of members. Students from across the archipelago focused their 
activities in the campus mosques, cultivating through small religious study groups a creed 
that combined the Islamism of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood with the idea of individual 
faith and reform. Based on my observation visiting Salman Al-Farisi mosque located at 
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Tarbiyah student activities still exist. This 
mosque, more than merely a place of religious rituals, has evolved into a centre of 
Islamic society. It provides various services for its members (ITB students) and the 
Muslim community outside the campus, such as education, marriage consultancies and 
even a banking system. In 1980s, one of the founding father of this mosque, Imaduddin 
Abdul Rahim, popularly known as Bang Imad, introduced to the Salman community the 
thought and organizational traditions of Egyptian Al-Al-ikhwan al-muslimun that was to 
influence heavily the way the Salman mosque community organized its activities, which 
up to the present is still maintained by the mosque administrators. This phenomenon is 
also found in other major universities in Indonesia, usually state-owned such as 
Shalahuddin Community in Gadjah Mada University, Al-Huriyyah Community in Bogor 
Institute of Agriculture, and Arief Rahman Hakim Community in University of 
Indonesian (UI). In my interview with the members of parliament from PKS, I learned 
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that many of them were Tarbiyah activists previously. For example, Zulkieflimansyah, a 
PKS parliamentarian, admits that when he was the chairman of University Student Senate 
at UI in 1994, he was actively involved in Tarbiyah activities at the UI mosque. Even 
when his term as Senate chairman ended in 1998, he was replaced by another mosque 
activist student, Rama Pratama, who is currently also a member of parliament from PKS. 
Zulkieflimansyah also believes that student activists in other universities in Indonesia 
continue to be associated with mosque-based activists. Tarbiyah activists in many ways 
dominate the student senate structure at the UI and form part of PKS’s recruitment 
channel. 
 Tarbiyah has also found the campuses to be an excellent arena to train members 
in the art of power politics, which after education is the next step following the discussion 
groups. As the Tarbiyah activists graduated they spread their network beyond the 
campuses. They formed religious study circles in the companies where they worked and 
in mosques, especially in the cities. The Tarbiyah movement had a very unique 
characteristic because their emphasis was upon personal rectitude and group solidarity 
rather than mass involvement. It was a closed movement, whose members were carefully 
selected and inducted into a program designed to ensure pious behaviour. From my 
observation of big cities in Indonesia like Jakarta and Bandung, I noticed that it is 
common to find small religious groups gathering in musholla (small mosque) located at 
big companies’ buildings. These gatherings are particularly held after they practiced 
dzuhur daily prayers or Friday prayer. 
Following the fall of Soeharto, intensive discussion took place among Tarbiyah 
activists on how they should respond to the reformation era in which Indonesian people 
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had a great opportunity to express their opinions, including establishing any type of 
political parties be they religious or secular. There was an intense debate among Tarbiyah 
activists as to whether they should establish a political party or not.  
According to Aay M. Furkon,130 there was a more intensive discussion 
(musyawarah) among the members when the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, 
Indonesian Islamic Predication Council)131 failed to establish a political party based on 
Islam as its ideology. The establishment of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), facilitated and 
supported by DDII, which based its ideology on Pancasila instead of Islam, disappointed 
Tarbiyah activist and some DDII members.  At that time, Abu Ridha (Tarbiyah activist 
and one of PKS founding fathers) said that Tarbiyah activists took an attitude of ‘wait 
and see’ toward DDII’s decision that was believed at that time to be able to generate an 
Islamic party. When the party that was born (the PBB) was not an Islamic-based party, 
this led Tarbiyah activists to carry out their own meeting (musyawarah) to respond to the 
DDII decision. 
This Tarbiyah meeting was then widened by conducting a survey throughout 
Indonesia, both inside and outside universities. These polling questions were 
disseminated to Tarbiyah activists, both campus activists and their alumni that had spread 
out in different fields of activities be they government employees, NGO activists or 
entrepreneurs. The objective of the survey was to know what their ideas and responses 
were to the Indonesian political situation in the reformation era: Should they form a mass 
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organization, a political party, or keep their movement as a Tarbiyah movement focusing 
on dakwah inside and outside universities in Indonesia? 
Some 6000 questionnaires were distributed to the dakwah activists through their 
established networking. The qualification of respondents was chosen from those tarbiyah 
members who had been active in the movement for nearly fifteen to twenty years since its 
establishment, and included both campus activists and their alumni who worked outside. 
This movement has had very effective networking due to their frequent meetings. They 
often met in seminars, conferences, discussions, book launchings, and other programs 
related to religious activities organized by tarbiyah activists. 
The effectiveness of their established network could be seen from the fact that 
from 6000 questioners distributed, there were around 5800 replies. The result of the 
survey was surprising because around 68 per cent of the tarbiyah activists who answered 
the survey wished to establish a political party. Only 27 per cent of them wished to form 
a mass organization and the rest of them neither wished to establish a political party nor a 
mass organization; they wanted to keep their movement as a dakwah movement on 
campus, in Islamic boarding schools and in other non-governmental organizations.132 
Based on the polling result, some 52 Tarbiyah activists met together to follow up 
the poll findings. Furkon notes that these Tarbiyah activists represented groups and 
institutions involved in the Tarbiyah network that had come from different educational 
backgrounds, genders, ethnicities and professions.133 Their professional backgrounds 
were very diverse, ranging from lecturers in universities (both public and Islamic 
universities) to entrepreneurs, businessmen, pesantren leaders, and student activists. 
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However, they all had similar dakwah activities in their backgrounds. Thus, it might be 
assumed that these 52 leaders were those who had been involved in religious activities 
held in campuses in Indonesia. 
After several intensive discussions among these Tarbiyah activists, finally they 
agreed to form a political party, which later came to be known as Partai Keadilan (Justice 
Party). The proclamation of the new party took place in an open area in front of mosque 
Al-Azhar, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta on August 9, 1998 attended by around 50,000 
supporters. The 52 original activists were called the Dewan Pendiri Partai Keadilan 
(Founding Fathers of Partai Keadilan).134 
From the process of its establishment, it is clear that since the party’s birth, the 
PKS founding fathers have implemented democratic procedures to form the party. One of 
the pillars of democracy, which is that votes must be allocated equally among members 
and the expressed preferences of each member taken into account, was successfully 
implemented prior to the party’s establishment. Moreover, this democratic procedure is 
easily identified in the proclamation document written by Hidayat Nur Wahid. The 
charter of declaration says: 
Partai Keadilan didirikan bukan atas inisiatif seseorang atau beberapa orang 
aktivisnya, namun merupakan perwujudan dari kesepakatan yang diambil dari 
musyawarah yang aspiratif dan demokratis. Sebuah survey yang melingkupi 
cakupan luas dari para aktivis dakwah, terutama yang tersebar di masjid-masjid 
kampus di Indonesia dilakukan beberapa bulan sebelumnya untuk melihat respon 
umum dari kondisi politik yang berkembang di Indonesia. Hasil survey 
menunjukkan bahwa sebagian besar mereka menyatakan bahwa saat inilah waktu 
yang tepat untuk meneguhkan aktivitas dakwah dalam bentuk kepartaian dalam 
konteks formalitas politik yang ada sekarang. Survey ini mencerminkan 
tumbuhnya kesamaan sikap di kalangan sebagian besar aktivis dakwah yang dapat 
menjadi sebuah pola dinamis bagi pengendalian partai di kemudian hari. Terbukti 
setelah tekad mendirikan sebuah partai diputuskan maka kesatuan sikap secara 
menyeluruh menjadi kenyataan. 




Justice Party was found to be neither initiated by a person nor by several activists; 
instead its establishment has been decided through a democratic musyawarah 
(meeting) as aspired  to by all its activists. A comprehensive survey that covered 
all dakwah activists in several mosques at universities in Indonesia, had been 
conducted months before to see what their responses to a political situation in 
Indonesia are. The result of the survey showed that a majority of tarbiyah activists 
agreed that it is an appropriate time for them to strengthen their dakwah activities 
by establishing a formal political party. This survey demonstrated a growing 
common vision among dakwah activists, which can become a dynamic asset to 
manage the party in the future. After the strong will to establish a party had been 
decided, integrated visions among them have been proven and become a 
reality.135  
 
From the above charter of declaration, it could be argued that PKS’s 
establishment was a communal effort triggered by a similar vision and mission to 
strengthen dakwah activities among its members. It also indicates the idea of ‘amal 
jama’i (community efforts) in which all components of the community who were 
involved in its party formation have a similar vision, mission and responsibility to 
develop the party as a “vehicle” to expand dakwah activities. Thus, failure to manage the 
party means that they have also failed to expand their dakwah mission. 
 
The Origins of PAS: Malaysian Context 
Similar to the political origins of PKS in Indonesia, the PAS of Malaysia had also 
the twin values of democracy and Islam. The PAS objective was to establish an Islamic 
state through democratic means. To understand PAS and its involvement in the 
democratization process in Malaysia, it would be helpful to understand the context in 
which it operates. One of the central features of Malaysian political life is the state’s 
multi-ethnic character with majority Malays who are predominantly Muslim, comprising 
about 61 percent of the total population, the Chinese being 24 percent and the Indians 7 
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percent.136 However, Malaysia has long been viewed as a model of a ‘moderate’ Islamic 
polity. Muslim and non-Muslims have enjoyed the same civil and political rights, and 
Islamic parties have competed alongside secular ones in periodic elections.137  
Prior to independence, the ethnic Malays, citing their Bumiputra (literally sons of 
the soil) status demanded ‘safeguards’ and ‘special privileges’ to be codified in the 
constitution.138 Accordingly, among the special privileges granted to the Malay 
community by the British, known as the ‘ethnic bargain,’ was a prominent role for Islam 
in the constitution and thus in the political institutions of independent Malaysia. To this 
end, the Federal Constitution article 3 (1) says that Islam is the religion of the Federation, 
but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the 
Federation.139 Since Islam is in fact the religion of all the states of Malaysia except for 
Penang, Malacca and Sarawak, it would seem that Article 3 adds little to what would be 
the case, even if it had not been inserted in the Constitution, that the civil rights of non-
Muslims would not be affected by this provision.  
  Although Islam is the religion of the Federation, there is no Head of the Muslim 
religion for the whole of the Federation. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong continues to be the 
Head of the Muslim religion in his own state and it is provided that he shall be the Head 
of the Muslim religion in Malacca, Penang, in the Federal Territory, and in Sabah and 
Sarawak.140  Each of the other states has its own Ruler as the Head of the Muslim religion 
in that state. According to Ibrahim, the various State Constitutions moreover state that the 
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Ruler of the State may act at his discretion in the performance of any functions as Head 
of the Muslim religion.141 
 Articles 11 and 12 of the Federal Constitution provide that every person has the 
right to profess and practice his religion and to propagate it. They furthermore provide 
that state law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief 
among persons professing the Islamic religion. Every religious group has the right to 
manage its own affairs, to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable 
purposes and to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with 
law. Every religious group also has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the 
education of children in its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the 
ground only of religion in any law relating to such institutions or the administration of 
any such law. 
 Based on the explanation above, it seems undeniable that Islam, as the religion of 
the majority and the religion of the Federation, has a special status, since it is inextricably 
connected with the organ of state. The Constitution of Malaysia, moreover, states the 
Rulers must profess Islam, but provisions requiring the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) to 
be Muslim have been removed in recognition of the fact that the test of a Chief Minister 
must be the confidence of the legislative assembly, and not his religion. Even so, Harding 
states that no non-Muslim has so far succeeded in being appointed Menteri Besar of the 
Malay states.142 Overall, one can express the position by saying that while Islam is the 
religion of the Federation, Malaysia is not an Islamic state. In addition, by the late 1990s, 
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the dominant perspective in Malaysian Islam, according to Weiss,143 “appeared to be an 
inclusive, gradualist and pro-democratic one. Both Muslim and non-Muslim opposition 
parties and activist organizations acknowledged the plural character of Malaysian society 
and clamoured  primarily for a program of enhancements to good governance and civil 
liberties.” 
 Besides Islam, which becomes the factor that most critically impacts upon 
Malaysian politics, several contextual trends of Malaysian politics could be highlighted. 
The first is that ethnicity completely dominates political life in Malaysia.144 Thus 
Malaysians tend to vote for either political parties of their own ethnic group or one of the 
few parties with no official ethnic affiliation.145 This trend is intensified by the fact that 
most of the major political parties have an ethnic or religious identity. 
 The second key characteristic of Malaysian politics is the moderate level of 
political freedom and democratization in the country. Freedom House describes the 
Malaysian political system as ‘free but not fair’, receiving a political rights rating of four, 
which falls in the middle of the spectrum from most free (1) to least free (7).146 This 
characteristic is commonly found in other Muslim countries.  
 Another trend that has featured prominently in Malaysian politics was the conflict 
between Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir Muhammad, followed by the conflict between the 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the former Prime Minister Mahathir. 
Anwar’s dismissal and jailing in 1999 was assumed by political commentators as 
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politically motivated as Mahathir perceived Anwar’s increasing popularity would threat 
his power at that time. The interesting phenomenon in this conflict is that PAS gained a 
huge support from the Malaysian people in the 1999 general election.   
 
Internal Split among UMNO 
Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) was officially established on November 24, 1951, 
as a result of an internal split between the dominant United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO). PAS was initially a branch of UMNO which was established in 1946 by the 
Malay nationalist movement and was intended to unite the Malays-Muslims of the 
country in anticipation of independence. To track back how PAS was divorced from the 
UMNO, it is necessary to look at the historical development of Islamic political parties’ 
development in Malaysia during the British colonial period.  
In my interview with the spiritual leader of PAS, Nik Aziz,147 he admitted that the 
history of PAS could not be separated from the history of Hizbul Muslimin, HM or (the 
Muslim Party), the first Islamic party in Malaysia formed on March 14, 1948. The HM’s 
establishment was a result of the congress of the Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (the 
Supreme Religious Council of Malaya) held at an Islamic School, al-Ihya ash-Sharif, 
Gunong Sumanggol, Perak. Having Islamic and nationalistic elements, the HM identified 
itself with the Malay leftist political parties.148  The three main objectives of the 
movement were as follows: To liberate the land and people of Malaya from colonialism, 
to establish a global Islamic state caliphate, and to turn Malay lands into an Islamic state. 
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The political activities of HM around Gunong Semanggol took place in isolation 
from those of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which was officially 
formed on May 11, 1946. But the ‘rightist’ UMNO, being given greater support by the 
Sultans, their religious functionaries and the Malay masses, was more acceptable to the 
British government. Since its establishment, HM’s political activities were monitored by 
British colonial agents. According to Riduan Mohd Nor, British surveillance of HM’s 
activities could be seen from the following intelligence report: 
The development of this (HM) movement should be very closely watched, for its 
preaching of nationalism as the religious duty of all the believers, and Islam has 
always been a militant creed. There can be no doubt that its propaganda is made 
to appeal to the young Malay intellectuals and progressives, since its strife to give 
scriptural authority to their efforts to modernize their society and economy and to 
their undoubtedly aspirations towards national independence…whether Hizbul 
Muslimin moves to the right or to the left in step with its true parent, the Masyumi 
(Indonesia), it remains a menace to the British authority.149 
 
 The British authorities had a great opportunity to undermine HM’s movement in 
Malaysia when the Communist movement threatened British authority in the Malay 
world. On June 18, 1948, the British authority announced martial law, which legitimated 
them to outlaw all organizations that threatened the government. Several leftist political 
organizations such as Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM), Angkatan Pemuda 
Insaf (API), and Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS) dan Hizbul Muslimin were banned.150 
The UMNO was safe due to its anti-communism and its support of the government’s anti-
guerilla war. Datok Onn’s outspokenness against the leftists contributed much to the 
government’s readiness to accept the UMNO role in undermining or destroying the leftist 
movement. According to Safie bin Ibrahim, the HM actually was not banned but the 
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enforcement of the Emergency Regulations by the British authority and the arrest of its 
several leaders were enough to put an end to the movement.151 
The end of the leftist political parties gave UMNO a great opportunity to deal 
with the British government without being openly harassed by the leftists, some of whom 
joined the UMNO, while others, including former HM members, remained inactive but 
quietly watched the political developments. Perhaps aware of the Islamic movement at 
Gunong Semanggol, though it was outlawed, the 10th UMNO general meeting at Penang 
on April 24, 1948 resolved to appoint a five-member committee to arrange and draft a 
regulation for running the religious department and council in every state in the 
Federation. It seems that UMNO tried to accommodate former HM members and the 
party also was aware of the big influence of ulama (religious scholars) among Malay 
Muslim citizens living in the suburbs. Thus, on May11, and 12, 1946, the UMNO ratified 
its charter which stated, among other things, that one of the departments in the party was 
the Department of Religious Affairs and Education.152 
However, UMNO’s effort to establish Religious Affairs in its internal structure 
seemed to be paving the way for ulama to form their own organization to be later known 
as PAS. This new Religious Affairs department as part of UMNO’s structure evidently 
resolved to sponsor ulama conferences to deal with religious matters, which were usually 
handled by the UMNO Executive Committee.   
The  ulama conference had been held three times prior to the PAS establishment. 
The first conference was held on February 21-22, 1950 which decided several resolutions 
on religious matters. One of its resolutions was to form a liaison religious council with 
                                                 
151Safie B. Ibrahim,  7. 
152UMNO 10 Tahun  (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO Office, 1956), 29-30. 
 85
the objective of consultations on religious affairs among the Muslims so that the running 
of the religious affairs could be unified. It was followed by the second conference held on 
August 23, 1950 at Sultan Sulaiman Club, Kuala Lumpur. Ibnu Hasyim pointed out that 
three important decisions were made by this conference namely:  
1) mendirikan satu persatuan alim ulama yang bebas; 2) melantik jawatan kuasa 
sementara bagi menggubah perlembagaan and 3) meneruskan ikhtiar bagi 
menyatukan pentadbiran agama dalam Persekutuan Tanah Melayu.153 
 
1) to establish an independent ulama’s organization; 2) to introduce a temporarily 
committee to establish organization; 3) continue to fight for the establishment of 
religious organization as part of The Federation of Malaya. 
 
The resolutions of this second conference of ulama showed that they not only 
formed an ulama union, named Persatuan Ulama-ulama Se Malaya, PUSM (Malay Union 
of Islamic Religious Scholars), but also there was an aspiration among ulama to form an 
Islamic party. Nik Aziz, a current spiritual leader of PAS, says that an expectation of 
Ulama to form an Islamic party at that time was caused by two important reasons namely: 
1) “They feel that to form an Islamic party is the only good way to have a centre for 
Islamic affairs; and 2) an independent Islamic party is necessary to gain their 
objectives.”154 Thus, it is not surprising that in the third ulama conference155 held at 
Butterworth on November 24, 1951, the ulama decided to form what is now known as 
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).  
In this conference, the ulama also formulated the basis and the objectives of 
PAS’s establishment. Article 3 of the party says: “Dasar PAS ialah Islam” (the basis of 
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PAS is Islam) and the objective of the party as outlined by its statute article 5 (1) is 
“memperjuangkan wujudnya di dalam negara ini sebuah masyarakat dan pemerintahan 
yang terlaksana didalamnya nilai-nilai hidup Islam dan hukum-hukumnya menuju 
keredhaan Allah (to struggle for an establishment in this state (Malaysia) a society and 
government in which Islamic values and Islamic laws are implemented to achieve Allah’s 
blessings).” 
To achieve its objective, PAS also outlines what it called in its statute as usaha-
usaha (efforts) mentioned in article 6 (2) as follows: 
memperjuangkan Islam sebagai aqidah dan syariah serta menjadikannya sebagai 
panduan berpolitik dan bernegara serta memperkenalkan nilai-nilai ke-Islaman dalam 
usaha menegakkan keadilan dan kemajuan disegenap bidang termasuk pemerintahan 
dan pentadbiran, ekonomi dan social serta pelajaran dan pendidikan. 
 
struggle in order to make Islam as people’s faith as well as make Islam as the 
guidelines for political and governmental life and introduce Islamic values in their 
struggle to uphold justice and progress in all aspects including governing activities, 
economics, social and education. 
 
Since Islam is their basis of the party, PAS believes that the holy book (Al-Quran) 
should be the highest law they should refer to. Article 7 of the party’s statute says: 
“adapun hokum yang tertinggi sekali dalam pegangan PAS ialah Kitabullah dan Sunnah 
Rasul serta Ijmak Ulama” (the highest sources of laws according to PAS are the Holy 
book, the practice of the Prophet (hadith) and the consensus of the ulama). 
Based on the explanation above, it is clear that PAS is a religious party that 
struggles for the comprehensive implementation of Islam in Malaysia. PAS believes that 
Islam is a total way of life, which covers religion, politics, economic, culture, etc. Thus, 
all activities and programs carried out by PAS are to implement Islamic teachings from 
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the small matters up to the biggest matter leading to an establishment of an Islamic state. 
Hadi Awang, the current President of PAS says:  
Seluruh ajaran Islam itu diwajibkan kepada manusia bagi membetulkan segala 
urusan mereka, dimana ianya mesti dihayati sepertimana ianya diturunkan, sama 
ada berbentuk aqidah yang menjadi pegangan hati atau syariah yang merupakan 
hokum yang mesti dipatuhi secara individu dan masyarakat, dan nizam yang 
memungkinkan segala-galanya berjalan dengan cara yang menyeluruh tanpa 
gangguan dan penyelewengan.156 
 
All Islamic teachings are compulsory for human being to correct every aspect of 
human life in which these Islamic teachings should be apprehended as they were 
revealed by the God; be they related to the faith (aqidah) or syariah (law) in which 
this Islamic law should be abided by both by people as individuals and by society; 
and be they government (nizam) in which government activities are running 
comprehensively without any disruptions and deviations. 
 
  Awang’s statement above strengthens the argument that the establishment of PAS 
was due to their disappointment with UMNO, which did not struggle for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia and UMNO’s belief that Islam and state 
should be separated.  Hadi Awang further states: “Walaupun UMNO disifatkan sebagai 
parti Islam oleh beberapa kalangan, tetapi ia tidak benar-benar committed untuk 
menubuhkan sebuah negara Islam, berdasarkan Al-Quran dan Sunnah (Although some 
scholars consider UMNO as an Islamic party, they are not truly committed to establishing 
an Islamic state that follow the Quran and hadith).”157 For Awang and PAS, the 
establishment of Islamic state is compulsory for every Muslim. He says; “Siapa yang 
mengatakan bahawa Islam tiada hubungan dengan negara atau menegakkan negara Islam 
tidak perlu pada zaman ini adalah mendzalimi dirinya sendiri (Whoever says that Islamic 
state is not really needed in a contemporary situation is a liar to himself).”158 In the 
                                                 
156Abdul Hadi Awang, Islam: Fikrah, Harakah and Daulah (Selangor: Dewan Pustaka Fajar, 2003), 10. 
157Abdul hadi Awang, ibid. 
158Abdul Hadi Awang, ”Konsep dan Matlamat Negara Islam,” (paper presented at Simposium Negara Islam 
Kuala Lumpur, 1985). 
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context of an Islamic movement (harakah Islamiyyah), the objectives of the movement 
should be directed towards three important points, namely:1) Membentuk Syakhsiyyah 
Islamiyyah (Shape an Islamic personality), 2) Membentuk Jamaah Hizbullah (Build a 
God’s party) and  Menegakkan Daulah Islamiyyah (Establish an Islamic state).159 
  These three objectives above, according to Awang, are interconnected and cannot 
be achieved in separate ways.  The first objective, that is to create an Islamic identity, 
could not be achieved perfectly without the establishment of an Islamic state and to 
establish an Islamic state requires an Islamic party, while to establish an Islamic party, it 
is important to have an integrated Islamic identity.160  
  Awang further elaborates that because the Islamic party should be directed to 
implement all Islamic teachings, Allah has mentioned in the holy Quran about the 
characteristics of hizbullah (God’s party) in several Quaranic verses as follows: 
O ye who believe! if any from among you turn back from his Faith, soon will 
Allah produce a people whom He will love as they will love Him,- lowly with the 
believers, mighty against the rejecters, fighting in the way of Allah, and never 
afraid of the reproaches of such as find fault. That is the grace of Allah, which He 
will bestow on whom He please. And Allah encompasses all, and He knows all 
things.161 
 
Your (real) friends are (no less than) Allah, His Messenger, and the (fellowship 
of) believers,- those who establish regular prayers and regular charity, and they 
bow down humbly (in worship).162 
 
As to those who turn (for friendship) to Allah, His Messenger, and the (fellowship 
of) believers,- it is the fellowship of Allah that must certainly triumph.163 
 
You will not find any people who believe in Allah and the Last Day, loving those 
who resist Allah and His Messenger, even though they were their fathers or their 
sons, or their brothers, or their kindred. For such He has written Faith in their 
                                                 
159Abdul Hadi Awang, Islam: Fikrah, Harakah and Daulah (Selangor: Dewan Pustaka Fajar, 2003),157. 
160Abdul Hadi Awang, ibid. 
161Quran Chapter 5: 54 
162Quran Chapter 5: 55 
163Quran Chapter 5: 56 
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hearts, and strengthened them with a spirit from Himself. And He will admit them 
to Gardens beneath which Rivers flow, to dwell therein (for ever). Allah will be 
well pleased with them, and they with Him. They are the Party of Allah. Truly it 
is the Party of Allah that will achieve Felicity.164 
 
  Based on these verses above, Awang argues that the Islamic party that Allah has 
promised to obtain the victory should fill these requirements: 
1. Berjuang untuk menegakkan syariat Allah di dalam negaranya dan 
mengumpulkan tenaga kearah itu secara berorganisasi (Struggle to implement 
Allah’s law in the country and collect all efforts to this objective by establishing 
an organization) 
 
2. menghayati Islam di dalam diri dengan mengerjakan perintah Allah dan berakhlaq 
islam disamping usaha menghayati secara menyeluruh menurut cara diatas 
(Apprehend Islamic teachings in their soul by doing all that Allah has commanded 
and uphold Islamic ethics beside a personal effort to understand God’s 
comprehensive command as mentioned above) 
 
3. Sikap permusuhan dengan musuh Allah dan mengeratkan kasih sayang dengan 
mereka yang sama-sama melaksanakan perintah Allah (Enmity to the enemy of 
Allah and strengthen the love with those who at the same time who follow the 
command of Allah).165 
 
  Although the establishment of an Islamic state had been decided as the main 
objective of PAS, since its early establishment in 1951, the blueprint of the PAS Islamic 
state was not produced until 2003. In his preface to the document on an Islamic state, the 
President of PAS, Hadi Awang explaines the objective of the publication of this 
document. He says: 
Adalah diharapkan dengan tersebarnya dokumen Negara Islam ini, akan jelaslah 
kepada masyarakat Malaysia konsep Negara Islam yang diperjuangkan oleh PAS 
selama ini, sekaligus dapat menjelaskan tasawwur Negara Islam yang hakiki 
(tulen) bukan taqlidi (saduran). Seandainya PAS diberi mandate untuk 
memerintah Malaysia, Insya Allah, sebuah Negara Islam seperti yang digariskan 
dalam dokumen ini akan dilaksanakan sebaik mungkin.166 
 
                                                 
164Quran Chapter 58: 22 
165Abdul Hadi Awang, Islam: Fikrah, Harakah and Daulah (Selangor: Dewan Pustaka Fajar, 2003), 16. 
166Parti Islam Se Malaysia, Negara Islam (Selangor: Angkatan Edaran ent. Sdn. Bhd., 2003), 14. 
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It is expected that the circulation of this Islamic state document of the party will 
make clearer for Malaysians what an Islamic state promoted by the PAS is, as 
well as to explain that this kind of PAS’s Islamic state is original, not an 
imitation. If PAS was mandated to become a ruling government in Malaysia, an 
Islamic state as outlined in this document will be implemented accordingly. 
 
Based on the understanding of universality of Islamic teaching in which Islam and 
state cannot be separated or the integral concept of Al-Diin Wa Al-Daulah (religion and 
state), PAS believes that the Islamic state is a state that complies with Islamic teaching in 
all aspects of governance. In its blue print, PAS defines the Islamic state as a state which 
implements Islamic teachings completely to achieve happiness in the world and in the 
hereafter and the state should be led by people who are most God-fearing among the 
member of society and Islamic laws should become the main sources of the state.  The 
Islamic state document of PAS says: 
• Negara Islam adalah sebuah negara kebajikan yang diasaskan diatas prinsip 
syara demi mendaulatkan Islam sebagai Al-diin yang lengkap sempurna, 
menuju kebahagiaan dunia dan akhirat. (Islamic state is a gracious state which 
based on Islamic legal principles to implement religion completely to achieve 
happiness both in this world and in the hereafter) 
 
• Negara Islam dipimpin oleh seorang ketua negara yang bertaqwa kepada 
Allah dan yang terbaik dikalangan ummah. Dengan kepemimpinannya, negara 
tersebut tunduk patuh kepada perintah Allah dan Rasul-Nya dalam segenap 
bidang kehidupan (Islamic state is headed by the most committed and best 
leader among the community. Under this leadership, the state obeys to the 
commandment of God and his messenger in all aspects of life). 
 
• Syariat Islam menjadi pegangan utama pemerintah dalam menjalankan segala 
aktiviti pembangunan negara (Islamic laws should become the main reference 
of the government in carrying out governmental activities).167 
 
Shortly after PAS issued this Islamic state document, other parties in Malaysia 
namely DAP (The Democratic Action Party) and UMNO criticized this document.  
                                                 
167Parti Islam Se Malaysia, 21-22. 
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According to DAP, this document on Islamic state contradicts the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia, which states that Malaysia is a secular, democratic and not an Islamic state.168 
DAP also argued that the concept of Islamic state would lead Malaysia to become a 
theocratic state and anti-democratic.169 Meanwhile UMNO, the ruling party in Malaysia, 
criticized the concept of PAS Islamic state as only political rhetoric and imitated what has 
been done by UMNO. Shamsul Najmi Shamsuddin, a member of Pergerakan Pemuda 
UMNO says: “dokumen negara Islam PAS hanyalah retorik semata-mata selain 
mendedahkan ketidakfahaman sebenar PAS berhubung konsep negara Islam” (the 
Islamic state document of PAS is only rhetoric and shows that PAS members do not 
understand what the real concept of an Islamic state is). For UMNO, without 
implementing the PAS’s Islamic state documents, Malaysia could be considered as an 
Islamic state in which the government has followed Islamic values in implementing their 
policies and the Federal Constitution has put Islam as an official religion of the state. 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi says: “kebanyakan perkara didalamnya sudahpun dilaksanakan 
Kerajaan Barisan Nasional (most of policies outlined in the documents have been 
implemented by the ruling government).”170  
From the criticism of UMNO above, one could argue that there are different 
opinions about the concept of the Islamic state between UMNO and PAS. For UMNO, as 
long as the state guaranteed Muslims to implement Islamic teachings and the government 
did not break Islamic values such as justice and equality among the citizens, a 
government could be considered as an Islamic state. While PAS, on the other hand, 
                                                 
168See footnotes numbers 45 and 46 of this chapter. 
169Mimbar Ulama, Negara Islam antara Realiti dan Cabaran (Bandar Baru Bangi: Dewan Ulama PAS 
Pusat, 2004), 61. 
170Mimbar Ulama, 65. 
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believes that to be called as an Islamic state, a government should follow all Islamic 
teachings as stated in the Quran and Hadith; the head of state should be the most 
committed Muslim, admitting the sovereignty of Allah, and implementing Islamic laws, 
as Hadi Awang says: 
Adapun negara Islam itu ditegakkan ianya dengan perintah Allah yang terkandung 
di dalam Al-Quran Al-Karim dan Sunnah Rasulullah sama ada didesak oleh 
manusia ataupun tidak namun menegakkan negara Islam itu mesti dilaksanakan 
(the Islamic state should be built under Allah’s command outlined in the Quran 
and hadith of the Prophet unconditionally; be it pushed by the people or not, it is 
compulsory to implement Islamic laws).171   
 
In addition, for PAS, it is not enough to call Malaysia an Islamic state only because the 
Federal Constitution puts Islam as an official religion in the country. To be called an 
Islamic state, all Islamic laws including the criminal law (hokum hudud) in a country 
should be based on the Quran and Hadith. Hadi Awang further says:  
Syariat islamiyyah hendaklah menjadi aqidah Negara, dan dari aqidah itulah 
ditegakkan perlembagaan dan perundangan dan segala nizamnya (Islamic laws 
should be come the guidelines or ideology of the state and under this ideology, 
government, laws and other matters are held).172 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that PAS originated inside another party, 
UMNO. PAS is a splinter group attempting to pronounce its Islamic ideological elements 
and to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia. This kind of a splinter party is commonly 
known in the historical development of political parties in the world. For example, the 
origins of the Party Socialiste Unifie (PSU) founded in 1958 in France is a splinter group 
occupying an ideological middle ground between Communists and Socialists and its 
close relative in Italy, the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) also follows 
this pattern. Some splinter parties, according to K. Lawson, achieve semi-permanent 
                                                 
171Abdul Hadi Awang, Sistem Pemerintahan Negara Islam (Petaling Jaya: Dewan Muslimat Sdn. Bhd., 
1995), 24. 
172Abdul Hadi Awang, Islam: Fikrah, Harakah dan Daulah (Selangor: Dewan Pustaka Fajar, 2003), 339. 
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status; others, like the Bull Moose party in 1912 in the United States, make their point (or 
fail to) and are reabsorbed by either the parent party or by another major party in the 
system.173  
Although the PAS is a splinter party, it is clear that the process of its 
establishment seems to follow a democratic process, which was through the ‘legal’ 
conference among the ulama in Malaysia. Although the conference was reported not to 
be under the UMNO administration and the organizations which sent delegates were 
responsible for their own expenditure, it was held at Butterworth which is the UMNO 
headquarters and it was attended by more than 200 delegates and observers, including 20 
women, from throughout Malaya and Singapore.174 The PAS struggle for its Islamic 
ideology through a democratic process is expressed in a circular issued by the party’s 
Publicity Secretary as follows: 
The PAS will fight for the implementation of its aspirations, according to the 
political condition, as its members wanted….The PAS does not take account of 
group or race, leftism or rightism, shafii or hanafi, but, by fighting for its 
aspirations, it is solely as a real Islamic union demanded by Allah. The PAS does 
not distinguish the classes of human life to be based on language, nation, racial 
origin and even on religion…The independence of the Malay land will actually 
release the people from foreign rule and slavery. It is a genuine independence 
based on democracy. The PAS is certain that only with a government founded by 
the people, from the people and for the people that democracy will fully be 
realized…The Islamic ummah by uniting themselves in a real Islamic union.175 
 
The above statement was also admitted by current PAS president Abdul Hadi 
Awang who says that up to the present PAS not only follows democratic processes since 
its early establishment, but has also accepted democratic values such as not to 
                                                 
173Kay Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975), 70. 
174Safie B. Ibrahim, 25. 
175Safie B. Ibrahim, 33. 
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differentiate human beings based on language, nation and even religion.176 Here, one 
could assume that PAS gives equal rights for Malaysian people of all kinds to join the 
party, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, female or male, and Malays or any other ethnic 
groups that live in Malaysia.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, it is clear that the establishment of PKS and PAS cannot be 
separated from both international and domestic political factors. Modernist and revivalist 
movements in Middle Eastern countries have influenced both PKS and PAS leaders 
directly or indirectly to establish the parties. However, the domestic political contexts in 
which PKS and PAS found themselves also triggered the establishment of these parties. 
While PKS was established in the context of political euphoria in Indonesia following 
Soeharto’s ouster from office, PAS emerged due to a political split among the UMNO 
leaders. Some Muslim leaders, particularly ulama, seem to have been unsatisfied with 
UMNO’s policy and that paved the way for ulama to create the Islamic party, PAS. After 
this discussion of their historical development, the question is how these two parties have 
followed the democratic process in recruiting their members and leaders. As Islamic 
parties, do they have special methods in recruiting and maintaining their members? This 
will be discussed in the chapter that follows. 
 
                                                 
176Interview with Abdul Hadi Awang in Terengganu, August 9, 2006. 
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Chapter 4 
PKS and PAS: Membership and Leadership 
 
 
This chapter discusses the recruitment process of the members and leaders of PKS 
and PAS. It shows how the party implemented the concept of shura in the recruitment of 
party leaders and candidates for Member of Parliament. This is followed by a discussion 
of PAS recruitment showing that they followed democratic principles as the PKS did. A 
comparison is then made of both parties’ recruitment styles focusing in particular on 
whether they used Islamic or secular principles in the process.  
Since rank-and-file memberships as well as leadership are very significant factors 
in the existence of a party, it is necessary to know comprehensively about why 
individuals join PKS and PAS and what they do as party members. Are they given equal 
opportunities in selecting their leaders, and how do they do so? It is also necessary to 
look at whether there are restrictions for members to be nominated as leadership 
candidates of the parties. Is the process of candidates’ selection inclusive or exclusive? 
How is a candidate nominated? And to what extent is there a degree of 
institutionalization in the selection process? By answering these questions, we can 







PKS: Cadre Party? 
PKS declares itself as a dakwah177 and party of cadres.  In an official document of 
the party, the first PKS President, Nur Mahmudi Ismail states: 
PKS didirikan, selain untuk menjalankan misi dakwah, juga dimaksudkan 
menjadi wahana pendidikan politik kaum Muslimin khususnya dan bangsa 
Indonesia umumnya. Pengorganisasian yang baik, disiplin perkaderan yang ketat, 
dan pendekatan kepada masyarakat yang simpatik menjadi ciri utama partai ini.178 
 
PKS was established not only for dakwah mission but also proposed to be a 
vehicle for political education for Muslim and other Indonesians. Well organized, 
a disciplined and strict cadre training and sympathetic approaches to the 
community are main characteristics of the party. 
 
Ismail’s statement above shows that PKS is not only a party of cadres as was claimed by 
Fealy, who says that PKS is the only true party of cadres in Indonesia.179 Anis Matta, the 
current Secretary General of PKS comments on the characteristics of his party saying 
that: “PKS adalah gabungan antara apa yang kita sebut dengan Nukhbawiyah 
Jamahiriyah, gerakan elit dan massa (PKS is a combination of what we call an elite and a 
mass movement).”180 This means that PKS is a combination of cadre and mass party at 
the same time. PKS believes that in the process of the resurgence of the Islamic 
community, Muslims need a qualified, collective leadership. In this context, an Islamic 
party in Indonesia, like PKS, can play a role to train cadres to become qualified leaders 
trusted by the community to lead the country in the future. Matta says: 
                                                 
177Dakwah or Islamic preaching literally means invites people. This is mainly intended to deliver Islamic 
teachings like Quranic interpretations, Hadith (Prophet Muhammad’s speech and acts) and Islamic laws to 
the people. 
178Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik 
PK dan PKS Periode 1998-2005 (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2007), 122. 
179See Fealy’s argument in his preface of book written by Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: 
Wajah Baru Islam Politik Indonesia (Bandung: Harakatuna, 2005), vi.  
180Aay Muhamad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim 
Indonesia Kontemporer (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), 206. 
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PKS memegang prinsip bahwa pemimpin akan bagus kalau dia didukung oleh 
basis massa yang kuat. Jika hubungan antara elit dan massa pendukungnya kuat 
maka tidak mudah nanti kohesi elit dan massa ini diputus oleh sebuah konspirasi 
politik. Karena pada suatu ketika dalam proses penyelenggaraan negara bisa 
menghadapi tantangan dalam berbagai bentuk.181 
 
PKS holds a principle that a leader will perform well if he is supported by a strong 
mass base. If the relationship between elites and mass supporters is strong, it is 
hard for a political conspiracy to break cohesiveness between elites and their 




As the party prepares qualified cadres to become leaders in the future, PKS’s members 
must know the ideology of the party and cannot buy their way through a patronage 
network. PKS also has its own special cadre recruitment, training and selection process. 
This liqo (weekly ideological gathering) training has resulted in a loyal and committed 
membership. This typology of party as dakwah and a cadre-based party is also confirmed 
by the former president of PKS, Hidayat Nur Wahid. Wahid also insists that although 
PKS is a cadre party, it is a non-sectarian and open party, which allows all Indonesian 
people, whatever his or her religious beliefs, to be eligible to become party members. He 
further says: 
I should add one point.  When I talk about the Indonesian people, I don’t think 
only about Muslims.  PK(S) is an open party.  I have been on panels with various 
kinds of people: Catholic philosophers such as Franz Magnis-Suseno, Romo 
Mudji Sutrisno, and Muslim scholars like Cak Nur [late Nurcholish Madjid] and 
Hasyim Muzadi [Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama] and others.  Many Christian 
fellows have told me that they like PK(S).  Some have even asked if they, as non-
Muslims, can join PK(S).  I’ve replied that PK(S) has never required its members 
to be Muslims.  All it requires is that they are Indonesians and that they are over 
17 years old.  So, if Christians are interested they can join us.  But they should 
realize that we are a cadre-based party, in which we have cadre programmes for 
our members.  We will give them training.182 
 
                                                 
181Ibid. 
182Hidayat Nur Wahid, “Power Means Serving Others,” Van Zorge Report (March 18, 2002): 7. 
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 Wahid’s argument that his party is open and non-sectarian could also be seen 
from the party’s official platform. In its Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Partai Keadilan 
(before transforming itself to PKS) Chapter 2, article 8 about its membership, it explains 
seven requirements to become PKS members. None of these requirements restrict its 
members to only Muslims, or only males or only certain ethnic groups. The requirements 
to be party members are stated to be: (1) Indonesian citizens: male or female, (2) over 17 
years old or married, (3) of good behavior, (4) in agreement with the party’s objectives, 
(5), officially apply to became a party member to its headquarter office through Dewan 
Pimpinan Daerah (District Officers), (6) practicing and concern with membership 
obligations and (7) who declare to be loyal to the party’s principles and platforms.183 
After PK was transformed into PKS, the party’s Anggaran Dasar Chapter 3, article 7, on 
memberships also says: “All Indonesian citizens who have fulfilled requirements and 
agreed with the party platform are eligible to become members of Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera.” 
 Non-Muslim members and supporters are also well accommodated by PKS. This 
argument could be seen from the significant numbers of supporters who voted for PKS 
during the 2004 general election. According to a voter survey during the 2004 election 
period made by an Indonesian NGO, the Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan 
Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES),184 PKS supporters then were mostly young, 
middle-income, educated Muslims. Nearly 99 per cent of the PKS voters were Muslim, 
                                                 
183DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Sekilas Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, (Jakarta: 1998), 64. 
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Its formation was sparked by the felt need for developing alternative thinking for national development. For 
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though the one percent of Hindu and Christian voters was a notable achievement for a 
party once so defined by its Islamist goals. With regards to a minority group, it is 
important to note here a statement from the current PKS President, Tifatul Sembiring 
when he was asked his opinion on minority groups: 
Kalau suatu saat diberi wewenang oleh masyarakat untuk memimpin negara 
Indonesia, PKS tetap akan menyejahterakan semua golongan. Tidak hanya umat 
Islam. Nabi Muhammad pernah menyatakan, barang siapa yang menzalimi 
seseorang yang beragama lain yang tunduk di bawah kekuasaan, dia akan menjadi 
musuhku di hari kiamat. Seluruh warga negara mendapat hak yang sama. Kalau, 
misalnya, umat non-Islam terpilih menjadi presiden pun, itu tidak masalah. 
Silakan saja, asalkan dipilih masyarakat. Tapi, jumlah penduduk kita kan 
mayoritas Islam. Dengan sistem pemilihan langsung, sangat mungkin orang 
muslim yang terpilih. 
 
If once PKS was given an opportunity to rule the country (Indonesia), PKS would 
shelter and protect all ethnic groups, not only Muslim. Because the prophet 
Muhammad has always said that whoever offends a person of a different faith will 
become my enemy in the hereafter. All citizens will have equal rights. It is even 
not a problem for PKS to have a non-Muslim president if he/she was elected 
democratically by Indonesian people. Since most of Indonesian people are 
Muslim, and through a direct presidential election, it is more likely that Muslim 
would be elected as president.185 
 
Another surprising finding of the LP3ES survey above was that nearly 20 per cent 
of voters categorized their occupation as “housewife,” a larger proportion than student 
voters. Evidently, the PKS platform for a clean and caring government, combined with 
the party’s large percentage of female politicians, hit home with women voters. From 
these findings one also could argue that women’s political interests are well 
accommodated by this PKS Islamic party. My direct observation as a participant in the 
protest rally held by PKS convinced me of the survey findings of LP3ES. It can be seen 
from the fact that more than half of the protestors were females who even brought their 
                                                 
185See Jawa Pos, July 26, 2005.  
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children. These mothers said that their children are the next generation of political 
activists. 
The LP3ES survey above also showed that nearly 50 per cent of PKS voters were 
between the ages of 23 and 35, and the majority had a significantly higher level of 
education than the average supporter of other Indonesian parties. On one occasion, 
Tifatul Sembiring (a current PKS President) stated that more than eighty per cent of PKS 
cadres hold university degrees. Yet, what was missing from Sembiring’s statement was 
the fact that, based on my interviews with the members of PKS in the district levels like 
Depok, Bogor and Kuningan, I found that almost one hundred percent of the party’s 
‘generators’ were university students who actively build their network with students from 
the Senior High Schools in Indonesia. This party’s core groups with their own style also 
influenced their parents and other family members to become PKS supporters in the 
election  
The PKS believes that its future political success stems from today’s younger 
generation. The quality of the cadres and their integration into the party are very 
important for PKS development. Thus, the selection of individuals is based on two main 
criteria: the ability to adapt to a concept of ‘life-long education’ and continual personal 
development, and on the ability to maintain a spiritual and truly Islamic dimension in 
political activism.  An important part of the process of life-long education is the ability to 
accept constructive criticism and feedback from others as a way towards personal 
improvement. This means that in the PKS, every member is given equal opportunity to 
become the best members of the party and at the end they will be chosen as top 
candidates from the party for either national or local parliamentary elections. Because of 
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the process of life-long education and training of the cadres in internal organization, the 
PKS could be seen as a party that initiated the transmission of democratic values into its 
constituents.  
In the process of cadre training and recruitment, the PKS plays its role as a 
political party that educates its members on how the political and democratic rules should 
be followed to achieve their goals. In this matter, it could be argued that PKS functions as 
an agent of transmission of democracy’s values to Indonesian people, or at least to their 
cadres and constituents. The PKS believes that integrated and well educated cadres, who 
understand the party platform, and the nature of political rules in Indonesia, might help to 
influence the Indonesian people in general to follow democratic rule.  For PKS, to build 
Indonesia as a prosperous, developed and democratic country, it is necessary to start with 
the smallest unit of community that is the person as an individual. A good individual will 
lead to establish a good family. A good family will produce a good community and 
finally will create a good nation. Thus it could be argued that for PKS, the smallest unit 
of a nation or state is a person as an individual not villages-community as was commonly 
perceived by philosophers such as Aristotle. The official document of PKS says: 
Untuk mendapatkan kader yang tangguh maka diperlukan suatu pembinaan yang 
secara khusus dengan cara bertahap. Adapun pentahapan tersebut yaitu dengan 
membangun kekuatan pribadi, sebab pribadi yang baik dapat melahirkan keluarga 
yang baik. Keluarga yang baik dapat pula melahirkan masyarakat yang baik. 
Keluarga dan masyarakat yang baik akan menciptakan lingkungan yang baik. 
Mengingat pembangunan sebuah Negara memerlukan pribadi dan masyarakat 
yang shalih, yang layak memikul amanah yang dibebankan kepadanya, maka 
pembangunan pribadi menjadi sesuatu yang niscaya.186 
 
To have a qualified cadre, it is necessary to have a special and step by step 
training. Step by step training started with creating a strong individual because it 
will produce a good family. Good family will lead to create a good community. 
Good family and community will produce a good life environment. Because to 
                                                 
186DPP Partai Keadilan, Sekilas Partai Keadilan (Jakarta: 1998 ), 12. 
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establish a good state require good individuals and society that can be trusted to 
take responsibility to govern, creating a good and strong individual is necessary.  
 
PKS believes that to create a good nation should start from a small structure that is an 
indididual then a family. This argument seems to be based on the Quranic verse that says: 
Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts. 
But when (once) Allah willeth a people's punishment, there can be no turning it 
back, nor will they find, besides Him, any to protect.187 
 
The success of PKS in recruiting and training its cadre could be seen from the 
increasing number of its loyal cadres from only 33,000 in 1999 to 500,000 -controllable 
cadres in 2004. Tifatul Sembiring (current president of PKS) says that his party’s target is 
to have 2.5 million loyal cadres prior to the general election in 2009. This target is 
realistic because PKS has a very intensive cadre training and recruitment whose success 
has been proven.188   
 
Models of Cadre Recruitment  
To achieve its target of 2.5 million cadres in 2009, a number of initiatives have 
been taken by PKS leaders, ranging from intensifying cadre training and recruitment, 
issuing ‘letters of instructions’, publishing a book entitled Profil Kader Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, 2009 (The Profile of PKS Cadres, 2009), and broadening their international 
network through  PKS members who are studying overseas. I easily discovered the solid 
Indonesian international students’ network of PKS members when I interviewed several 
PKS cadres during my field research in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
 
                                                 
187
 Quran Chapter 13: 11. 
188See Media Indonesia, July 26, 2005. 
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Intensive Cadre Training (Liqo and Muqoyyam) 
As previously mentioned in chapter 3, the history of PKS’s establishment cannot 
be separated from early dakwah and tarbiyah movements in Indonesia back in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The dakwah movement in its early stage was only popular among university 
students and was known as the tarbiyah movement. However, it quickly spread among 
middle-class Indonesians, particularly after the alumni of tarbiyah groups in leading 
universities got their permanent jobs. They kept up their tarbiyah activities and 
recruitment in the places where they worked. One of the characteristics of this movement 
was the creation of a small discussion group (halaqoh) consisting of five to twelve 
members, to study Islamic teaching intensively. This kind of group was very popular not 
only in Islamic universities or Islamic institutions like Institute Agama Islam Negeri 
(State Institute for Islamic Studies) or Universitas Islam Negeri (Islamic State 
University), but also in leading secular universities in Indonsia such as Universitas 
Indonesia (UI Jakarta), Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi Negara (STAN Jakarta), Universitas 
Gadjah Mada (UGM Yogyakarta), Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB Bandung), Institut 
Pertanian Bogor (IPB Bogor), Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (IKIP now UNJ 
Jakarta), Trisakti University Jakarta and other universities in Indonesia. The halaqoh has 
succeeded in attracting university students to join the group. Students mostly with a non-
Islamic studies background seem to find spiritual guidance in the halaqoh. Their 
transitional personality from teenagers to becoming adult seems to encourage them to 
join this type of group. The halaqoh groups approach university students, both male and 
female alike, persuasively and politely and this enables the groups to have big followings 
and become a mainstream movement in the universities mentioned above. 
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When the tarbiyah movement was transformed into the Islamic party called PKS, 
both university students and alumni actively involved in the tarbiyah movement now 
became the active members of the party and continued to use the halaqoh style in 
recruiting and maintaining their members. They even further created what it called Multi 
Level Dakwah (MLD) which seems to be similar to the Multi Level Marketing (MLM) 
approach in business. The principle of this MLD was that each member should 
intensively approach their families or friends to participate firstly in halaqoh activities 
and in the end attract them to join the party. This approach is also known as the cell 
theory of recruitment. 
Strategies have been applied by PKS not only to spread out and recruit new 
members but also to maintain and develop their members’ loyalty to the party by making 
regular cadre training such as liqo and muqoyyam as part of halaqoh and tarbiyah 
movements. Further, the PKS has implemented two pillars of their tarbiyah movement, 
which are straight manhaj189 and qualified murobbi.190 While a leader of halaqoh is 
called murabby, the members themselves are called mutarabby (guided students). Liqo 
and muqoyyam have been selected as good training to create solid and qualified cadres of 
PKS. 
 
Liqo or Ta’lim 
Liqo () literally means 'meeting'. This term is taken from the Arabic and used 
by PKS members to refer to weekly gatherings consisting of small groups (5-12 persons) 
                                                 
189Manhaj is taken from Arabic word literally meaning systematic steps to be followed to achieve an 
objective. Straight manhaj here refers to steps or programs that have been done and exemplified by the 
prophet Muhammad in his dakwah. 
190Murabby is taken from Arabic literally means a dakwah speaker. It then refers to a leader in a group 
discussion (halaqoh) who guides their members in Islamic teachings. 
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to learn Islamic studies under the guidance of more senior and qualified Islamic teachers 
of PKS members called murabbi. Although generally they discuss Islamic teachings in 
this gathering, it is also used as a tool to strengthen cadre relationships among the party 
members. 
The liqo weekly gathering is usually held in one of the houses of the members, or 
if it is held in campuses or schools, in mosques or mushola (a small place provided for 
Muslims to pray) located in the campuses. It is then very common to find small 
gatherings of students at Arief Rahman Hakim mosque in Depok, University of Indonesia 
or at Salman Mosque in Bandung Institute of Technology. Their gatherings are easily 
recognized because the members sit in a semi-circle with a leader (murabbi) positioned in 
front of them. 
Based on my interviews with the liqo groups, direct observation and active 
involvment in several liqo activities during my fieldwork in Jakarta, I found that the liqo 
gathering seems to be an effective method of cadre recruitment for PKS because this 
activity can make the members more integrated and loyal to the party. Interpersonal 
relationships among the members can be effectively maintained by the party because of 
the frequent meetings among the members. With their systematic method of gathering, 
each member who has attended liqo for quite a long period and is considered to be 
capable enough to transform knowledge gained during the liqo, is urged to create another 
new liqo group and try to recruit new members. This liqo method is clearly influenced by 
the method used by the Al-Al-ikhwan al-muslimun movement in Egypt to recruit their 
members. While the PKS uses the term liqo for this method, Al-Al-ikhwan al-muslimun 
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calls their method an usrah.191 Damanik argues that liqo and usrah have similarities in 
style, objectives and principles of performing the liqo gathering. There are three 
principles of liqo or usrah activities that should be fulfilled by the members, namely, 
taaruf (knowing each other), tafahum (understanding each other), and takaful 
(responsible to each other). Through these principles, interpersonal relationships among 
the members are really established.192 Damanik is correct that between them, liqo and 
usrah have similarities not only in term of their small number of groups but also in terms 
of the curriculum they teach. During my direct observation while involved in liqo 
activities, I found that there are not more than ten members in each group and among the 
liqo members; the interpersonal relationships are very strong. When I was firstly 
introduced to attend the liqo group meeting in Mampang Prapatan, South Jakarta, the 
murabby (liqo leader) explained the objective and principles of liqo gatherings as the 
same as mentioned by Damanik above. Fortunately, I was able to easily join in the liqo 
gathering because I stayed in a shared rental house in Mampang (the PKS headquarter 
also located in this place) in which all the members are also liqo groups’ activists and 
they approached me in person and asked about my religious and educational backgrounds 
before I could join their liqo activities.  
The leader of the liqo that I attended explained the principles of liqo that each 
member should be aware about: taaruf, tafahum and takaful. Taaaruf is the first principle 
of liqo activities. Each member involved in the same liqo group should know each other 
                                                 
191Literally meaning family in Arabic, the term usrah, used to describe a type of Islamic education group 
can be tracked back to Muslim Brotherhood (Al-ikhwan al-muslimun) movement in Egypt. According to 
Hasan al-Bana, the founder of this movement, usrah is a family which binds Muslim into brotherhood on 
the basis of Islam. For more explanation see Rifki Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam: A Study of Islamic 
Resurgence Movement Among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia (Canberra: Australian University Press, 
2006), 51-55. 
192Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 128. 
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well so as to develop interpersonal ties with the others. My experience in being involved 
in such a gathering showed me, for example, the importance of pretending to be a close 
relative of a liqo member in order to be easily accepted as a group member. Liqo 
members should establish close relationships in the sense of ukhuwah (brotherhood), by 
knowing the name, address and status of others in their family. Even among the 
members, each should know each other’s psychological state, way of thinking, self-
capability, and economic condition. After the principle of taaruf is embedded in the 
psyche of the members, the second principle, which is tafahum, should be upheld by 
them. This principle of tafahum or “understanding” consists of three factors that can 
strengthen relationships among the members. They are, (1) strengthening love and 
compassion for each other, (2) negating hatred that can break relationships and, (3) 
avoiding dispute among the members. And the last principle which is considered to be 
the result of the process of taaruf and tafahum, is that of takaful (responsibility to each 
other). This principle implies that each member secures each other, particularly when one 
of the members faces difficulties. 
To extend halaqoh or liqo membership, which implies creating more numbers of 
PKS cadres and members, each liqo member has to undertake two types of compulsory 
recruitment: fardi recruitment and jama’i recruitment. Fardi recruitment means that a 
member of PKS initiates himself or is recommended by his murabbi to recruit one or two 
persons to become a member of his liqo or halaqoh group. Several steps should be 
followed by a member to recruit new members, which are: 1) Each halaqoh member 
firstly should find a candidate to be recruited; 2) the candidate is introduced to other 
members and given information on what is taught and done in halaqoh; 3) the candidate 
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is observed confidentially whether he is capable enough to become a member; 4) the 
result of the observation is discussed among halaqoh members; and 5) a candidate is 
approved to become a halaqoh member.193 From this process of recruitment one could 
argue that there are enough bases for determining that a cadre or member of PKS is now 
fully integrated and loyal to the party.  
Jamai’i recruitment is a collective recruitment of tarbiyah or halaqoh members 
and at the same time recruitment of PKS members through formal and informal activities. 
Several activities are considered to be part of jama’i recruitments, as follows: 1) 
recruitment through party activities, 2) recruitment through Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah 
(School Dakwah Institution) or Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (University Dakwah 
Institution, and 3) recruitment through other institutions such as Majlis Ta’lim, 
Ramadhan activities and Bakti Sosial. The recruitment through party activities method is 
a recruitment of a tarbiyah member arranged officially by a member of the party through 
both Training Orientasi Partai Satu (The First Party Orientation Training) and Training 
Orientasi Partai Dua (The Second Party Orientation Training).  
The PKS also recruits their tarbiyah members through active involvement in 
dakwah institutions available both in schools (high schools) and universities. This means 
that PKS members have actively promoted their programs to recruit party members not 
only among university students but also among students in high schools. At the high 
school level, PKS members have tried to approach students to actively involve them in 
dakwah activities in their schools while in fact cadres of the PKS would become their 
mentor in their activities and indirectly invite them to become halaqoh and PKS 
                                                 
193DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula (Jakarta: Syaamil Cipta Media, 
2004), 11-12.  
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members. PKS programs have thus been introduced to the high schools students, so that 
when these students enrol later at universities, they tend to continue to actively be 
involved in the dakwah movement at the university level as PKS cadres. At the high 
school level, PKS members influence students to actively get involved in Rohaniawan 
Islam (Rohis) activities. Rohis is an institution of dakwah in high schools in Indonesia. 
Almost all high schools in Indonesia, except Christian or Catholic schools, have this kind 
of institution. Coordinated by the students with the help of teachers of religion subjects, 
this institution regularly performs Islamic activities such as religious discussion, 
celebrating Islamic festivals and coordinating Islamic ritual activities like daily prayer 
and Qurban (slaughtering animals during Iedul Adha celebrations). 
In the halaqoh or liqo program, PKS provides special curricula consisting of 
planning activities and materials that should be taught by murabbi to halaqoh members. 
This curriculum was set up by the party, particularly by their division on cadres called 
Departemen Kaderisasi. For new members of PKS, a halaqoh guideline is called 
Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula (Tarbiyah Management for Beginner Members). 
In this guideline, the party set its tarbiyah curriculum as well. The curriculum covers four 
materials, which are 1) basic teachings of Islamic studies; 2) basic teachings of skills and 
self empowerment, 3) dakwah and Islamic thoughts, and 4) social sciences. The materials 
given during the halaqoh activities can be listed as follows: 
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Table 1: Halaqoh Materials 
No. Materials Times of 
Meetings 
1. Hadits Arbain (the forty hadith of the Prophet) 20 
2.  Marifah Diinil Islam (Understanding of Islamic religion) 1 
3. Pokok-pokok Ajaran Islam (Main tenets of Islamic teachings) 1 
4. Marifatullah (Understanding of God) 1 
5. Tauhidullah (Oneness of God) 1 
6. Tauhidul asm’ was shifat (Oneness of name and characteristics of God) 1 
7. Ma’na Syahadatain (The Meaning of two declarations of syahadat) 1 
8. Syarat-syarat diterimanya syahadat (requirements of Syahadat acceptances) 1 
9. Beberapa hal yang membatalkan syahadat (factors that cancel syahadat) 1 
10. Arti Laa ilaaha illallah (meaning of there is no God but Allah) 1 
11. Siksa Kubur (A grave illness) 1 
12. Ihsan (Gracious) 1 
13. Menjadikan Syaiton sebagai musuh (Make an evil as an enemy) 1 
14. Kebutuhan manusia terhadap Rasul (the need of community to the Prophet) 1 
15. Ta’rif ar-Rasul (meaning of messenger) 1 
16. Makanatur Rasul (the position of messenger in religion) 1 
17. Shifatur Rasul (characteristics of messenger) 1 
18. Wazhifatur Rasul (the duty of messengers) 1 
19. Khasaishu risalah Muhammad (the specifications of Muhammad teachings) 1 
20. Wajibatul Muslim Nahwa rasul (Muslim obligations to the Messengers) 1 
21. Nataiju Risalah Muhammad (the excellence of Muhammad’s Messeges) 1 
22. Aurat dan Pakaian (Aurat, private parts of body in Islam and the clothes) 1 
23. Akhlak kepada sesame Muslim (show the ethics to another Muslims) 1 
24. Memenuhi janji (Fulfill a promise) 1 
25. Menundukkan pandangan (Keep the eyes from sins) 1 
26. Tidak berteman dengan orang buruk (Avoid be friend with wrong doers) 1 
27. Menjaga kehalalan harta (keep the property halal) 1 
28. Birrul Walidain (being good to the parents) 1 
29. Ghirah pada keluarga (Protect family) 1 
30. Memilih Pasangan (Choose the partners) 1 
31. Ta’rif Al-Quran (Meaning of the Quran) 1 
32. Hidup bersih dan sehat (Live clean and healthy) 1 
33. Makan dan minum (Eat and drink) 1 
34. Ghirah Agama (Protect the religion) 1 
35. Ahamiyatut Tarbiyah (the importance of education) 1 
36. Marhalah makiyah dan Karakteristiknya (to know Mecca and its life characteristics) 1 
37. Ahwalul Muslimin (Behave as a Muslim) 1 
38. Perjalanan gerakan dakwah pemuda (the dakwah of the Youth) 1 
39. Dakwah di negeri-negeri Muslim (Dakwah in Muslim countries) 1 
40. Ghazwul Fikri (the war of toughts) 1 
41. Zionis Internasional (International Zionism) 1 
42. Gerakan terselubung yang memusuhi Islam (Hidden movement to attack Islam) 1 
43. Lembaga-lembaga yang menentang Islam (Organizatios that oppose islam) 1 
44. Berpartisipasi dalam kerja-kerja jama’i (Participate in the Community activities) 1 
45. Sistim politik dan hubungan internasional (Political systems and international 
relations) 
1 
46. Ilmu Allah taala (the knowledge of God) 1 
47. Saluran politik (Political aspiration) 1 
Source: DPP PKS, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula (2004): 23-24. 
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From the above table, it is clear that almost all materials taught in the tarbiyah or 
halaqah activities are based on Islamic teachings. This means that although the PKS 
claims that its membership is open to all Indonesian people whatever their religious 
beliefs are, it is most likely impossible for non-Muslim members to be involved in 
halaqoh activities. However, it could be assumed that for the non-Muslim members, they 
might participate and be involved in other party activities, which are not related directly 
to Islamic or dakwah activities, such as social activities. 
  
Muqoyyam Activities 
Muqoyyam (	) literally means to inhabit or camp. This term is used by PKS to 
refer to cadre training activities in which the cadres are trained for about three to five 
days living in an open space (field), jungle or mountains. In this training, the cadres are 
not only trained in physical activities like mountain climbing but are also taught Islamic 
studies and related activities like performing midnight prayer and Quranic reading 
collectively to strengthen their communal relationship. The book of guidelines for PKS 
cadre training defines muqoyyam as: “Sarana tarbiyah jasadiyah melalui latihan fisik dan 
simulasi ketaatan agar peserta siap menjadi prajurit dakwah dan siap menerapkan nilai 
Islam di tengah masyarakat” (a medium of personal dakwah through a physical training 
and a loyalty simulation to make a member ready to be a dakwah soldier and ready to 
implement Islamic teachings in the centre of the community).194  
 
From the above definition, it is clear that moqoyyam is not only focused on 
physical activities but also spiritual teachings to create a PKS cadre who is loyal and 
                                                 
194
 DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 42. 
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ready to become a dakwah activist. The objectives of muqoyyam as written in the book of 
guidelines of the party are to, 1) make PKS cadres accustomed to live in an open space 
with very simple facilities; 2) to create a mentality among PKS cadres of loyalty to their 
leader; 3) to improve the discipline of the cadres and firm adherence to the party’s rules; 
4) to make PKS cadres accustomed to living under comprehensive Islamic guidance; and 
5) to train PKS member to be aware of living healthily and being aware of their 
surroundings.195 To achieve these goals, activities during muqoyyam have been set up by 
PKS. They are divided into forty percent of programs comprising physical activities to 
improve cadre’s endurances; twenty five percent of programs to improve members’ 
loyalty; twenty percent to improve the spiritual capability of the members, which at the 
end motivates them to be ready as dakwah and party activist; ten percent to improve their 
awareness of Islamic civilizations; and five percent as entertainment for the members. 
This moqoyyam activity is coordinated and held at every level of the PKS 
organization from the DPRa (Dewan Pengurus Ranting, office of the party at the village 
level) to DPP (Dewan Pengurus Pusat, office of the party at the national level). DPRa is 
the lowest level of the official structure of the PKS at the kelurahan/desa level, while 
DPP is the highest at the national level. The cadres of PKS at every level should 
participate in this muqoyyam activity at least once a year. Even the cadres of PKS who 
become members of parliament should get involved in this activity at least once a year.196 
Besides these two main programs (liqo and muqoyyam), to strengthen the 
communal relationships among the cadres, the PKS also has several other irregular 
                                                 
195DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 43.. 
196Interview with Umung Anwar Sanusi (a parliament member from PKS) in, Jakarta, April 21, 2006. 
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programs such as daurah, mabit, and rihlah.197 These programs for cadre training are 
very unique if compared to other parties or even other Islamic parties in Indonesia like 
the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembanguan, The United Development Party) and PBB (Partai 
Bulan Bintang, The Crescent Star Party), which lack such cadre training activities. This 
uniqueness can be attributed to the fact that the establishment of the PKS was originally 
initiated by dakwah or tarbiyah activists who were very active in the universities in 
Indonesia, as explained in the previous. 
 
Student Networking Overseas 
To maintain the integrity of the members who are living or studying overseas and 
to expand its cadre membership, the PKS also maintains an international network. It is 
very common to see how PKS cadres, who are studying overseas, keep up their halaqoh 
or tarbiyah activities. Different from other parties in Indonesia, the PKS has their branch 
overseas called PIP-PKS or Pusat Informasi dan Pelayanan PKS (The Information and 
Service Center of PKS). The PIP-PKS is not only involved in maintaining their cadres’ 
mutual relations by performing liqo and other such activities, but is also active in 
disseminating PKS programs and ideas to Indonesians--students and workers alike--
living overseas. The PIP-PKS can be found in Australia and New Zealand, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Egypt, United Kingdom and South America.198 
The PIP-PKS is part of the centralized network of the party that keeps the 
members interacting with each other and promotes PKS ideas, activities and programs to 
                                                 
197Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 129-133. 
198Based on my observation in Kuala Lumpur during my fieldwork and in Singapore, these international 
networks are solid and have several activities to promote PKS’s programs and to attract overseas 
Indonesian voters. 
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Indonesian people overseas. The organization has not only held party activities prior to 
election campaign but has also routinely held weekly liqo meetings among the members. 
This overseas network of PKS has also set up websites which are well maintained and 
regularly updated.  
For example, the PIP-PKS website for Australia and New Zealand 
(http://www.pks-anz.org/) consists of several main menus such as Berita Kita (Our 
News), Artikel Tarbiyah (Articles on Tarbiyah), MP3 Ceramah (MP3 on Religious 
Speeches), Bayan dan Fatwa Dewan Syariah (Explanation and Fatwa of Dewan Syariah), 
Kisah Anggota Legislative (Story of Parliament Members), Radio Chat and Forum 
Diskusi (Discussion Forum). Berita Kita (Our News) contains information related to PKS 
events and activities of PKS leaders in Indonesia. For example, under subheading Tifatul: 
Akhiri Bencana dengan Muhasabah dan Bertaubat (stop a disaster by introspection and 
repentence), it covered PKS President Tifatul Sembiring when he delivered a speech to 
welcome Islamic New Year 1 Muharram 1429 (10 January 2008) at Pondok Indah 
mosque in Jakarta. It also reported how the head of MPR (House of Representative) from 
PKS Hidayat Nur Wahid advised PKS cadres and members not to be influenced and 
provoked by negative news of PKS in the media when he attended a meeting of PKS 
cadres in South Jakarta on 6 January 2008. This news can be found under the subheading 
Hidayat Nur Wahid: Dampak Fitnah, PKS Bisa Ditinggalkan (Hidayat Nur Wahid: the 
impact of calumny, PKS could be left behind).199 Other news related to current PKS 
activities are regularly posted under this heading. From this, one could argue that the PIP-
PKS Australia and New Zealand have been actively involved in disseminating 
                                                 
199See www.pks-anz.org  (accessed January 21, 2008). 
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information related to PKS not only for their members but also for the public who visit 
this website. 
The second and third main headings of the website are called Artikel Tarbiyah 
(papers related to Tarbiyah teaching) and MP3 Ceramah. These headings are collections 
of both Islamic articles and MP3 files written by Muslim scholars mainly from PKS. 
These headings seem to propose to enrich PKS members’ knowledge of Islamic 
teachings. Examples of articles and MP3 files on these headings are Sekali Shaum Tetap 
Shaum (Once fasting, you should fast forever), Masalah Khilafiyah (the problem of 
difference of opinions), Kriteria Ulama dan Ilmunya (The Criteria of Muslim scholars 
and their competences), Ciri-ciri orang Bertaqwa (the characteristics of a Gods fearing 
person) and Pendidikan Dini (Early childhood education).200 By uploading Islamic 
articles and MP3 files on Islam in this website, PIP-PKS helps not only PKS members in 
New Zealand and Australia, where this website was set up, but also readers around the 
world affiliated with PKS who visit this website, to understand Islamic teachings, which 
of course is in line with the PKS’s vision and mission.  
The forth main heading of the website is called Bayan dan Fatwa Dewan Syariah 
Pusat PKS (Explanation and fatwa of Syariah Central Board of PKS). This heading 
consists of formal PKS’s responses and explanation on Islamic issues in Indonesia, such 
as the explanation on when Iedul Adha and Iedul Fitri should be celebrated; the PKS 
fatwa on natural disasters and how PKS members should react to it; PKS responses to the 
insults against the Prophet Muhammad in the Denmark media; and the position of PKS in 
regard to increasing fuel prices. The information under this heading not only can help 
PKS members or supporters to understand their party’s responses to policies on both 
                                                 
200See www.pks-anz.org (accessed January 21, 2008). 
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Islamic and national issues in Indonesia, but also can inform non-PKS members about the 
party’s position on certain issues which, in the end, might make them support the PKS if 
they have come to believe that the PKS responses on certain issues represent their 
interests.  
Another heading of this website is Kisah Anggota Legislative (Story of 
Parliamentarians). This heading reports and explains what have been done by parliament 
members from the PKS. This is a good example of how the PKS explains, not only to 
their constituents but also to the public, the performance of parliament members from the 
party. Knowing how parliament members actually perform helps the public to judge 
whether these politicians are capable enough to be again nominated in the next election. 
This PIP-PKS website also provides information on PKS networking by citing website 
addresses related to PKS, such as the websites of Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (PKS office at 
National level), Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah (PKS office a provincial level)t, Dewan 
Pimpinan Daerah(PKS office at district level) and Dewan Pimpinan Ranting (PKS office 
at subdistrict level). A complete list of websites related to PKS can be seen in the 
appendices of this thesis.201 
 
PKS cadres intensively use the internet as a medium to promote their party. 
Looking at the huge number of websites related to PKS , one could argue that, compared 
to other parties in Indonesia, the cadres of PKS are more aware of how to use internet 
media as an effective tool to make their party more known by the public. These internet 
websites also make the cadres of the party easier to contact each other and coordinate 
their members. The struggle of PKS cadres to set up websites in promoting party 
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activities and programs, is not only actively done by PIP-PKS Australia and New Zealand 
but also PIP-PKS institutions in Japan, Malaysia and other countries, as can be seen from 
the appendix 1 of this thesis.  
 
Big Family and Polygamy 
Based on my interviews with members and cadres of PKS during my visit to 
several PKS offices at district levels in Depok, Bogor and Kuningan, clearly they believe 
that it is good for Muslims to have many children. They back up their argument by saying 
that the prophet of Islam Muhammad encourages Muslims to have a lot of children 
because the Prophet will be proud in the life hereafter to see that his followers are much 
bigger in number compared to other Prophet’s followers. Having a lot of children, then, 
could be seen as a typical characterstic of PKS cadres. It is commonly known in 
Indonesia that not only cadres but also PKS members would have more than three or four 
children in the family. 
Let us look more closely at their arguments in support of many children. PKS 
members cite the following hadith narrated by Anas bin Malik, which states: 
sا = d sا ل5ر نآ لO 8	 1S أ 16  اIو@ لو ا . >$ا 16 =.+و ةء$S 	W  5و / 6
دودا  B% داl	 	ا م ء$Cا 
Narrated from Anas bin Malik, the Prophet Muhammad commanded his followers 
to marry and forbade them to be unmarried (to be single all life). He says, you 
should marry and have lot of children because I will be proud to have many 
followers in front of other Prophets in the hereafter.202 
 
 
                                                 
202Ibnu Hibban, Shahih Ibnu Hibban: Chapter Marriage, No. 4028. For a detail explanation of this book, 
see http://www.almeshkat.net/books/open.php?cat=8&book=426 (accessed February 10, 2008) 
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Believing that as Muslims they should obey and follow the Prophet’s 
commandments, members take the literal meaning of the above hadith to support their 
argument. Although I cannot find any official documents of the party stating that PKS 
cadres should have a lot of children to increase the numbers of cadres and members, it is 
clear from almost all members of PKS I have met and interviewed, that they have or are 
planning to have as many children as they can. During the rally protests that I attended, as 
is also well known by the Indonesian public, PKS members would happily bring their 
children or even babies to come along with their parents, attending the rally protest 
organized by the party. 
The following data on the number of children that parliament members from PKS 
have, seems to support the argument that PKS members are more likely to have big 
family to fulfill their agenda of enlarging the numbers of cadres and members:  
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Table 2: 
Parliament Member from PKS (2004-2009) and Number of Children 
No. Name of Parliament Members Number of Children 
1. Aan Rohanah (born 1959) 8 
2. Abdi Sumaithi (born 1949) 8 
3. Abdul Aziz Arbi (born 1955) 7 
4. Abdul Ghani Kasuba (1957) 4 
5. Abdul Hakim (1963) 4 
6. Aboe Bakar Al-Habsy (1964) 4 
7. Agus Purnomo (1968) 4 
8. Ahmad Chudori (1971) 2 
9. A. Najiyulloh (Born 1957) 4 
10. Almuzammil Yusuf (1965) 5 
11. Ami Taher (1963) 5 
12. Andi Rahmat (1975) 2 
13. Andi Salahuddin (1971) 1 
14. Anshory Siregar (1965) 2 
15. Chairul Anwar (1963) 6 
16. DH Al Yusni (1968) 3 
17. Djalaluddin Asy Syatibi (1952) 7 
18. Fahri Hamzah (1971) 2 
19. Hilman Rosyad Syihab (1969) 4 
20. Irwan Prayitno (1963) 10 
21. Jazuli Juwaini (1968) 4 
22. Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq (1961) 11 
23. M. Hidayat Nur Wahid (1960) 4 
24. Ma’mur Hasanuddin (1959) 6 
25. Mahfudz Siddiq (1966) 8 
26. Muhammad Anis Matta (1968) 7 
27. Muhammad Idris Luthfi (1965) 5 
28. M. Nasir Jamil (1970) 4 
29. Mustafa Kamal (1969) 4 
30. Mutammimul Ula (1966) 11 
31. Nursanita Nasution (1961) 7 
32. Rama Pratama (Born 1974) 2 
33. RB Suryama (1961) 2 
34. Refrizal (1959) 7 
35. Suripto (1936) 7 
36. Suswono (1959) 4 
37. Syamsu Hilal (1965) 4 
38. Tamsil Linrung (1961) 4 
39. Umung Anwar Sanusi (1954) 4 
40. Untung Wahono (1959) 5 
41. Wahyudin Munawir (1959) 7 
42. Yoyoh Yusroh (1962) 13 
43. Yusuf Supendi (1958) 5 
44. Zuber Safawi (1962) 6 
45. Zulkieflimansyah (1972) 4 
 
Sources: (Adopted from Bastoni and Anwar, 2006 and 
http://www.indopolitik.com/tokoh/anggota_dpr.php (Accessed  January 22, 2008) 
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From the above table, it is clear that eighty two per cent (thirty seven out of forty 
five parliament members) from PKS have four children or more and only eighteen 
percent have two children or less.  The general norm in Indonesia for numbers of children 
is having no more than three children. The above table also shows that the highest 
number of children of any PKS parliament member is thirteen, and this record is held by 
a female member, Yoyoh Yusroh. There are three female parliament members from PKS, 
namely, Yoyoh Yusroh (thirteen children), Aan Rohanah (eight children) and Nursanita 
Nasution (seven children). For PKS members, it is important to have huge numbers of 
children because they believe that family members could become the main pillar of 
cadres of the party.  
Besides the idea of having big families, it is commonly assumed by Indonesian 
people that one of the PKS strategies to expand their membership is through polygamy. It 
is publicly known that practicing polygamy is popular among PKS cadres. According to 
Darol Mahmada, “Sementara sudah jadi rahasia umum kalau ikhwan partai ini (PKS) 
lazim melaksanakan praktek polygamy dengan tujuan untuk perluasan dakwah Islam.”203 
(It is no secret that it is common for PKS member to practice polygamy in order to 
expand their Islamic dakwah activity.) Although it is hard to get an official PKS 
document which states that polygamy is one of their strategies to expand their 
membership, the practice of polygamy among members of PKS particularly among 
leading figures of the party, is well known publicly. Several leading figures of the party 
who practiced polygamy are, for example, Tifatul Sembiring (President of the party), M. 
Anis Matta (Secretary General of the party), Hilmi Aminudiin (Head of Majlis Syuro 
                                                 
203N. Darol Mahmada, “Nabi Itu Monogami,” Gatra, December 5, 2007. 
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PKS), Didin Amiruddin (Deputy Treasury of PKS) and Zulkieflimansyah (Parliament 
Member from PKS). 
 Moreover, the negative reaction of PKS members to an anti-polygamy book 
publication under title Bahagiakan Diri Dengan Satu Isteri204 (Make Yourself Happy 
with One Wife) could also be seen as proof that the PKS encourages its members to 
practice polygamy. Although this book is written by Cahyadi Takariawan, who is known 
as a member of Majlis Syuro of PKS, negative reactions of PKS members could not be 
avoided. Cahyadi says that he is quite shocked by the reaction of PKS members to his 
book. He argues that many PKS members have misunderstood his book: 
Banyak yang salah faham dengan buku tersebut, bahkan ada yang mengatakan 
saya anti-poligamy. Padahal jika dicermati, buku itu hanya memposisikan 
pemahaman atas disyariatkannya polygamy dan memberi ‘rambu-rambu’ 
pertimbangan bagi yang hendak menempuhnya.205  
 
Much is misunderstood with this book, there are even [PKS members] who say 
that I am anti-poligamy. In fact, if this book was scrutinized, it only describes my 
understanding of polygamy law in Islam and gives ‘traffic signs’ of 
considerations for those who will perform polygamy. 
 
As a member of PKS, Cahyadi is not anti-polygamy as he claimed above. His objective 
in writing the book is to explain how hard the requirements of polygamy are. In this 
book, he describes people who are unsuccessful in a life of polygamy because of weak 
preparations. So, Cahyadi warns his colleague from PKS to be careful before deciding to 
practice polygamy.The reaction of PKS members to this book are extensively covered by 
Indonesian media such as Koran Indopos (Ketika Buku Antipoligami Membikin Kader 
PKS Terbelah, When the book of Anti-Poligamy Divided PKS’s Cadres), Gatra Magazine 
                                                 
204This book is published by Era Intermedia, Solo, 2007. 
205Suryama, “Buku Cahyadi Takariawan Tidak Anti-Polygamy,” see http://suryama.multiply.com (accessed 
February 16, 2008). Suryama is a Member of Parliament from PKS who publishes his activities and 
opinion on political issues in his personal website. 
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(Nabi Itu Monogami, The Prophet is Monogamous), Jurnal Perempuan (Ustadz PKS Tulis 
Buku bahagiakan Diri dengan Satu isteri, PKS’s Teacher Wrote a Book entitled Make 
Your Self Happy with One Wife), and other newspapers.  
Most PKS leading members criticized Cahyadi for publishing this book because it 
could be misunderstood by PKS members and be counterproductive for the PKS policy 
of promoting the idea of polygamy among the party’s members. Didin Amirudin (Deputy 
Treasurer of PKS) comments on this book, saying: “Buku ini memang harus segera 
ditarik. Hati saya membara membacanya” (This book should be withdrawn immediately. 
My heart is painful reading the book).206 Didin argues that Cahyadi’s book could change 
a common belief among female PKS members who support polygamy. In line with 
Didin’s statement, Mudhofar (Head of Dewan Syariah PKS East Java) admits that he 
received many complaints from the member of PKS in his area. Commenting on the 
book, Mudhofar argues that some arguments proposed by Cahyadi in his book are 
invalid. For example, he criticizes Cahyadi’s account of the total period of the Prophet 
Muhamad’s married life. According to Cahyadi, Muhammad only practiced polygamy 
after his monogamous marriage with his first wife, Khadizah, for twenty-five years. 
Muhammad only practiced polygamy for ten years and this was done by the Prophet after 
his first wife passed away. Mudhofar’s criticism is supported by Rofi’ Munawar 
(Parliament member at provincial level from PKS at East Java) who says: “saya 
membatalkan meneruskan membaca buku itu sampai tuntas karena ada yang gak sreg 
dalam buku itu” (I did not finish reading the book because I do not agree with the 
contents).207 
                                                 
206
“Ketika Buku Antipoligami Membikin Kader PKS Terbelah,” Koran Indo Pos, August 2, 2007. 
207Koran Indo Pos, August 2, 2007. 
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From the above explanation it is clear that most PKS leaders and members 
support polygamy instead of monogamy. It seems that the PKS is most likely to back up 
the argument for polygamy by making reference to the literal meaning of the Quranic 
verse, which says: 
If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphan, marry women 
of your choice, two or three, or four. But if you feel that you shall not be able to 
deal justly with them, then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess. 
That will be more suitable to prevent you from doing injustice.208 
 
PKS leaders try to negate other Muslim scholars’ opinions based on interpreting Quranic 
verses in different ways, by looking at the situation in which this verse was revealed and 
not just taking its literal meaning of the text. For example, in the light of the modern 
enthusiasm to review and analyse the Quran, with its principles of social justice and 
human equality, several Muslim scholars examine the Quranic verse above differently. 
For example, Haifa Jawad, quoting Abduh’s interpretations, believes that although taking 
more than one wife is permitted in Islam, this permission is conditioned by the fact that 
the husband should deal with them justly. If he cannot do this, he is to be satisfied with 
one wife only. Abduh says: “The Muhammadan Law allows man to take up to four wives 
at a time if he thinks he is capable of treating them justly. But if he feels he is unable to 
fulfill this condition then he is forbidden to have more than one wife”.209  
 After discussing the PKS style of recruiting their members, in the following sub 
chapter I will examine the way of PKS select their leaders to show how this Islamic party 
tries to reconcile between democracy and Islamic values at the same time.  
   
                                                 
208Quran Chapter 4:3 
209H. A. Jawad, The Rights of Women in Islam: An Authentic Approach (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1998), 45. 
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PKS Leadership Recruitment 
 
In discussing PKS recruitment, my discussion will now be focused on how the 
PKS selects their leaders (Majlis Shura) and how recruitment processes have been set up 
to select the party’s candidates for parliament members. By discussing these two 
components, how the PKS implemented and followed democratic processes can be made 
clear. 
 
 Majlis Shura Selection 
Hidayat Nurwahid (the former PKS President) argues that one of the pillars of 
democracy in Islam is the concept of shura. For him shura is one of the four main 
principles, along with justice, equality, and human dignity, of a political organization in 
Islam. Shura is based on three perspectives. One is that all persons in a society are equal 
in human and civil rights. A second is that the majority view is best in deciding public 
issues. The third is that justice, equality and human dignity can best be obtained through 
shura governance.210 Thus, it would be reasonable to look at why PKS put Majlis Shura 
as their highest institution in the party structure. 
According to Anggaran Dasar of PKS chapter 5, article 10, Majlis Shura is the 
highest institution in the party structure and functions as an Ahlul Halli wal Aqdi. It 
consists of at least 35 members, according to the PKS constitution, and has full authority 
not only to articulate the party’s vision and mission, but also to select the president of the 
party and decide other strategic party decisions. Due to its important position and 
strategic role in the party structure, one might ask what the process of the PKS in 
                                                 
210The Jakarta Post, September 9, 2005. 
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selecting its Majlis Shura members is. Does the PKS implement democratic rule - that is, 
giving equal opportunity to its members around Indonesia to select its Majlis Shura 
members? 
The implementation of internal democracy in the PKS could be seen from the 
selection of 50 Majlis Shura members for the period 2005-2010. These Majlis Shura 
members are directly selected by the all Kader Inti (Core cadres) of the PKS around 
Indonesia. All the Kader Inti or core cadres in a district level have an equal opportunity to 
choose Majlis Shura members freely and fairly, without restrictions. The question, 
however, is why is it only the Kader Inti that have an opportunity to select Majlis Shura 
members? Why don’t all cadres and constituents of PKS have equal rights to vote for 
selection of Majlis Shura members?  
According to Sapto Waluyo (a member of PKS), although not all PKS members 
and constituents have a voice in choosing Majlis Shura members, the PKS’s effort to 
implement its internal democratization process in the process of Majlis Shura election 
should be appreciated when compared to that of other political parties in Indonesia. For 
Waluyo, it is understandable why the PKS still limited this selection participation to only 
Kader Inti. To accommodate all PKS cadres and constituents in the Majlis Shura election, 
the PKS needs infrastructure, human resources and, of course, a lot of financial 
resources.211 As a new party with a small funding resource, the PKS effort to hold an 
internal general election to choose Majlis Shura members could be seen as a starting 
point to educate their cadres on how democratic rule should be implemented in the party. 
It is not impossible to look to a future in which this internal general election will be 
                                                 
211Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah: Konsep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera di 
Masa Transisi (Bandung: Harakatuna, 2005), 180. 
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attended by all PKS members and constituents. The experience of the PKS to mobilize its 
cadres in selecting the members of Majlis Shura has surprised political activists from 
other parties such as Golkar, PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) and 
Indonesian people in general since PKS is a new party compared to thes two big parties. 
In the history of political development in Indonesia, one would argue that it is very rare 
to see a political party that could mobilize its cadres and constituents in the way the PKS 
has done in choosing its Majlis Shura members. Usually, in terms of choosing top leaders 
of political parties like Golkar and PDIP, only political elites were involved in the 
process, not cadres and constituents as have been experienced by PKS. 
After the selection of 50 Majlis Shura members, these members held another 
internal democratic election to select the head of Majlis Shura and also to select the 
president of the party. For the period of 2005-2010, after an intensive musyawarah 
(discussion and debates) among Majlis Shura members, they appointed KH. Hilmi 
Aminudidin as the head of this institution and selected Ir. Tifatul Sembiring as the 
President of PKS. The decision of Majlis Shuro to choose Tifatul Sembiring as the 
president of PKS for 2005-2010 was totally accepted by all party cadres and constituent. 
This smooth process of ‘succession’ of party leaders from Hidayat Nurwahid to Tifatul 
Sembiring could be seen, on the one hand, as a sign of the kedewasaan berpolitik 
(political maturation) of PKS members, and on the other hand, as an indication that the 
process of internal democratization in the party was running well. As commonly known 
in Indonesian political development, the succession of party leaders sometimes could lead 
to an ‘internal conflict of the party’ as can be seen from the conflicts within the Partai 
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Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and Partai Demokrasi 
Perjuangan (PDIP). 
The process of musyawarah and democracy among Majlis Shura members can 
also be seen from the PKS decision to support Amien Rais as candidate for president in 
the 2004 first round presidential elections. In connection with this, Zulkieflimansyah, a 
parliament member from PKS, has this to say:  
Internally, the PKS has also begun to learn the art of democratic practice. For 
example, in the run-up to the presidential election in 2004, PKS leaders had to 
decide on which candidate to support. A segment of the party advocated support 
for Gen. (ret) Wiranto for pragmatic reasons, chiefly the calculated chance of 
Wiranto winning the election. The majority, however, supported Amien Rais. In 
the end the Majelis Syuro (religious council) voted in favor of Amien Rais, 
despite strong pressure for the party to throw its weight behind Wiranto.212  
 
Selection of Parliament Candidates from PKS 
The PKS internal general election was not only held to select the head of Majlis 
Shura and President but also to nominate the candidates from the party to be choosen as 
parliamentarian from PKS in the 2004 Indonesian general election. Almuzammil Yusuf 
(parliament member from PKS) says that internal general elections in PKS were held to 
respect the cadre’s voice in selecting representatives to be parliament members. Through 
the internal election process, the PKS hoped that the party’s solidarity would be 
strengthened and public accountability for the parliament’s candidates could be 
realized.213  The names of prospective candidates were proposed by all PKS cadres in 
Indonesia and abroad and the ranking of its list was determined based on the cadres’ vote.   
                                                 
212The Jakarta Post, December 13, 2005. 
213Interview with Almuzammil Yusuf in Jakarta, May 17, 2006 and see also Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan 
Politik Dakwah: Konsep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera di Masa Transisi (Bandung: 
Harakatuna, 2005), 186. 
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This PKS internal general election is very significant for the development of 
democracy among the party’s members. This event is also important because through it, 
the candidates of parliament members from PKS were directly voted by all members of 
the party. Here, we can see how the process of internal democracy among PKS members 
works, which is different from other political parties in Indonesia. It is commonly known 
in Indonesian politics that the candidates for parliament proposed by a political party are 
usually decided by the political elites in Jakarta. Thus, whoever wants to be nominated as 
a parliament candidate, if he or she comes from the district level, should fulfill very strict 
requirements, the most important of which is money.    
In PKS, to be nominated for parliament, a candidate should be placed in the 
highest rank among the members and be chosen by the party’s cadres directly. The 
criteria for one’s candidacy are not based on how much money he/she has and how close 
he/she is to the party’s elites. The PKS has set criteria for selection as a candidate of 
parliament members based on integrity, capability, basis massa (mass base) and lobbying 
strategy, as can be seen from the table below. 
Table 3: Criteria for the Candidates of Parliament Members from PKS 
1. Integritas (Integrity) Kebersihan ideology dan moral, komitmen terhadap visi dan misi partai 
tidak tercemar (Clean ideology and morality, committed to the mission 
and vision of the party) 
2. Kapabilitas 
(Capability) 
Manajerial, kepemimpinan, dan teknis legislasi, budgeting, legal drafting 
dan pengawasan public (Managerial, leadership and legislation technique, 
budgeting, legal drafting, and public accountability) 
3. Basis Massa 
(Mass Base) 
Dukungan konstituen yang konkrit dari daerah asal, dan komunitas yang 
jadi target kerjanya (Concrete constituents support from the area in which 
the candidate was originally from) 
4. Lobi Strategis 
(Strategic Lobbying) 
Mempengaruhi media massa dan tokoh penting di masyarakat yang 
menjadi pembentuk opini dan pemutus kebijakan (Influence mass media 
and a public figure who has a capability to form public opinion and to 
decide policy) 
Source: Sapto Waluyo (2005), 188. 
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The criteria above were strictly implemented in choosing the legislative 
candidates from the PKS not only at the national level but also at the levels of Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat I (Parliament Member at Provincial Level) and 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat II (Parliament Member at District Level). 
This means that the PKS is really concerned with the democratization process in its 
internal structure and gives equal opportunity to its cadres at every level of the party 
structure to become parliament members representing the PKS. 
The PKS’s democratic struggle for the public interest and not for the party’s 
benefit can also be seen from PKS figures who initiated the transfer of leadership once a 
party leader began to hold an important position as a government officer. For example, 
when the former president of PKS, Nurmahmudi Ismail, was chosen as Menteri 
Kehutanan dan Perkebunan (Minister of Forestry and Plantation) under Abdurrahman 
Wahid’s presidency, Nurmahmudi resigned as the president of PKS. He states that his 
resignation as the President of PKS was to prove his commitment as a government officer 
to be unaffiliated formally to any group or any party. Thus, he could fully dedicate 
himself to the interests of the people and the country and can concentrate on his work as a 
public official. Although his resignation surprised political elites in Indonesia, 
Nurmahmudi believed that his resignation as the PKS President would not influence the 
party’s performance because the PKS has a unique leadership characteristic, which they 
call a collective leadership.214 The PKS does not solely rely on the individual leadership 
figure as other parties do. 
Nurmahmudi’s resignation was finally bequeathed by the PKS after the party held 
a collective meeting between Majlis Shura, Majlis Pertimbangan Partai, Dewan Syariah 
                                                 
214Kompas, May 4, 2000. 
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dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan on 16 April 2000. This again shows how 
democratic decision through musyawarh has been taken by PKS leaders to decide upon 
such an important matter. After the decision was made by the party, the PKS then 
appointed its vice president, Hidayat Nur Wahid, as acting president of the party until a 
Musyawarah Nasional (National Party Meeting) in which Nur Wahid was again officially 
selected to become the president of the party. In his comment on Nurmahmudi’s 
resignation, Nur Wahid says: “…kita ingin mengingatkan bangsa ini bahwa my loyalty to 
my country not my party kita buktikan… (We want to remind Indonesians that the slogan 
of ‘my loyalty to my country not to my party’ is implemented by PKS).”215 
The case of Nurmahmudi’s resignation when he became the Minister under 
Wahid government was also followed by Hidayat Nur Wahid when he was chosen as the 
speaker of Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (House of Representatives) or MPR. Before 
being elected the head of the MPR, Nur Wahid was the party president of the PKS, a post 
he had held since 2002. He handed over leadership of PKS to Tifatul Sembiring in a 
gesture he explained as an effort to “prevent the conflict of interest between state and 
party.216” The tradition of transferring leadership among PKS elites breaks with the 
tradition of previous Indonesian leaders, like former president Megawati Soekarnoputri 
who maintained party leadership (as a head of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, 
PDIP) once in power, or the former president Abdurrahman Wahid who maintained his 
position as the leader of Dewan Shura of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) once he 
became the president. Though leadership of the MPR is said to be more ceremonial than 
                                                 
215Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 293. 
216See, The Jakarta Post, October 23, 2004. 
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functional, if there was an effort to impeach the current president, Nur Wahid would be 
one of the politicians with the final say.217  
The above discussions on PKS’s recruitment of members and leaders show that 
this Islamic party has a very solid cadre training, which more or less was inspired by the 
al-ikhwan al-muslimun style in Egypt but modified to suit the Indonesian context. They 
also implemented democratic rules in choosing their leaders. The way they recruited the 
members shows that they not only used Tarbiyah and family connection to enlarge their 
membership but also use international student networks to recruit Indonesians overseas to 
become a members.  
 
 
PAS Membership  
As a party that was also influenced by the Islamic parties in the Middle Eastern 
countries, does PAS in Malaysia have the same method in recruiting its members as its 
counterparts in the Middle East and PKS in Indonesia? If not, how does PAS modify the 
recruitement of members to adapt to the Malaysian political context?  
Farish A. Noor, a Malaysian political scientist, argues that although the 
establishment of PAS was much influenced by the Islamic movements in the Middle 
Eastern countries like al-ikhwan al-muslimun (Egypt) and Jamaat al-Islami (Pakistan), 
PAS has a different style from its predecessors in term of membership recruitment and its 
                                                 
217Before 2004, and the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
People Consultative Assembly) was the highest governing body in Indonesia. With the President and Vice 
President thereafter elected directly by the people and with the constitutional amendments, MPR no longer 
be the highest governing body but stand on equal terms with the DPR (People’s Representative Council, the 
Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. In dealing with the President and Vice President, the MPR 
would be responsible for the inauguration ceremony and, should the occasion call for it, the impeachment 
of the President or Vice President, or both. The MPR would elect a President and Vice President only if 
both positions were vacant. See Tim Redaksi Kawan Pustaka, UUD 45 dan Perubahannya (Jakarta: Kawan 
Pustaka, 2006).  
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approaches to constituents and members. While some Islamist movements like Jamaat al-
Islami preferred a top-down approach and others practiced the bottom-up approach to 
build their solid political base, PAS has always tried to combine both approaches. Noor 
explains that “being a political party born and bred in the climes of traditional Malay neo-
feudal politics, PAS has exploited both established notions and values of leadership as 
well as modern modes of recruitment, mobilization and indoctrination.”218 In my direct 
observation in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, I found that Noor’s argument above is correct. The 
party keeps maintaining its potential assets like Ulama as party generators to attract 
members while at the same time adapting to a modern situation in which madrasah 
(Islamic schools) and campuses are used by PAS as places to recruit members. PAS 
currently is even not only maximizing its ulama’s role in recruitment of  members (ahli) 
through pengajian (Islamic teaching gathering), which is routinely held around Kelantan 
both in the mosques and in the open fields, but also intensifiying recruitment by using the 
internet as a medium to promote the party to the public. What is missing from Noor’s 
findings, however, is that the party’s activists particularly the young members 
represented by the Dewan Pemuda PAS, used modern educational institutions, like 
PASTI, and also the internet as tools to recruit members.219  
 In its manner of recruiting members and sympathizers in the early days of its 
establishment, PAS tried to maximize the ulamas’ role as leading figures and potential 
party assets in recruiting members and promoting their ideas and programs as an Islamic 
political party. During the period 1950s and 1970s, PAS leading figures like Dr. 
                                                 
218Farish A. Noor, PAS post-Fadzil Noor: Future Directions and Prospects (Singapore: Institute of South 
East Asian Studies, 2002), 5. 
219For more details explanation of PASTI and internet as media to promote the party programs, see pages 
142-149 of this chapter. 
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Burhanuddin and Asri Muda promoted PAS’s influence through face to face meetings 
and communication with village grassroots people. Different from the style of the Jamaat 
al-Islami, which seemed to be elitist in recruiting its members, PAS tried to send its 
political message directly to people in the streets and villages. Thus, the favorite meeting 
place for PAS leaders during the early period of its establishment would be the coffee 
shop. They preferred to directly listen to what grassroots people wanted PAS to do in 
their political activities. This approach was likely to have been effective in attracting 
Malay Muslims in the villages to be sympathetic to the new Islamic party, PAS. 
 In the 1980s, when the PAS had become familiar to Malaysians, the party tried to 
expand its recruitment. Although the leading figures still kept up their face to face 
approach, during this era PAS also concentrated its efforts on recruiting members from 
the madrasahs, Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), mosques and campuses of the 
country. Particularly when PAS was led by Yusof Rowa, it tried to develop itself into a 
cadre party with internal cells and an organic structure. During his muktamar speech in 
1984, Rowa encouraged PAS members to form smaller cells among themselves. Rawa 
believed that through the practice of the tarbiyah study circle, PAS could easily intensify 
its missionary and propaganda activities. Rawa says: 
Usaha-usaha kita meningkatkan kesedaran ummah kian memperlihatkan 
natijahnya yang bermakna. Usaha-usaha ini mestilah diteruskan menerusi 
program-program ceramah, kursus, ijtima, usrah dan halaqah yang telah 
disusun…melihat kepada keperluan harakah yang penting ini, ternyata sekali 
pentingnya tarbiyah…karena orang-orang yang kita kehendaki tidak akan muncul 
dengan sendirinya tanpa latihan dan pendidikan yang dirancang secara teliti dan 
dilaksanakan dengan penuh kegigihan.220 
 
Our efforts to improve communities’ awareness have shown meaningful results. 
These efforts should be continued by intensifying the programs of religious 
                                                 
220Yusuf Rawa,”Ucapan Dasar Muktamar Tahunan April 13, 1984, Alor Setar Kedah,” in Memperingati 
Yusof Rawa, ed. Jaffar Kamaruddin, (Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS Sdn., Bhd, 2000), 73. 
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speeches, courses, gathering usrah and structured halaqah…seeing the importance 
of the movement, it is clear that tarbiyah is very important…because the people 
we need (cadres) will not appear by themselves without training and education 
that are well planned and implemented with intensity. 
 
 This new style of membership recruitment and caderization to form smaller cells 
within the party seems to be identical to what PKS did in Indonesia. While PKS had 
started its recruitment of cadres through this method many years before it became a 
political party, PAS on the other hand promoted this method thirty years after its 
establishment. PAS gave the name usrah to its recruitment meetings, while PKS used the 
word liqo for its weekly meetings to recruit new cadres. However, it is very clear that the 
recruitment methods proposed by Rowa were likely influenced by the method which was 
used by Al-Al-ikhwan al-muslimun movement in Egypt. This usrah meeting was 
intended to bring PAS members together and encourage them to understand, develop, and 
propagate the ideology of the party. Noor explains that PAS divides the usrah meeting 
into two different types of sessions: one usrah meeting especially for the leaders of the 
party and other usrah for ordinary members.221 Noor further explains: 
On some occasions the usrah would be accompanied by a kenduri (feast) held in 
the homes of the members themselves where non-members (non-party members) 
would also be invited. These meetings helped to generate a sense of common 
belonging and fellowship (ukhwah) among the members of the Islamist party and 
bring them closer together.222 
 
Noor’s explanation above is correct in that the usrah gathering sometimes would 
be accompanied by kenduri to attract more people to come. However, it is necessary to 
add to Noor’s point that from my experience staying in Kota Bharu, I found that the PAS 
expands its target of dakwah and recruitment of the members into three categories: 
                                                 
221Farish A. Noor, “Blood, Sweat and Jihad: The Radicalization of the Political Discourse of the Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) from 1982 onwards,” Contemporary Southeast Asia (August 2003), 208. 
222Ibid. 
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leaders and members of the party, Muslima in general and non-Muslims. PAS not only 
provides training to maintain the integrity of the members to the party but also works to 
attract people, both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to become party members. As a 
party that holds a strong ideology and sees itself not only as a political machinery but also 
as an Islamic movement to spread Islamic teaching through dakwah, PAS holds the idea 
that it is compulsary for the party to explain to Muslims in Malaysia the 
comprehensiveness of Islam and the need to establish an Islamic state, which they call 
Negara Islam Kebajikan yang Diridhai (baldat toyyibat wa rabbun ghapur, a prosperious 
state, endorse by the God). To implement this dakwah for both Muslims and non-
Muslims alike, the Party holds a weekly Friday gathering in front of its headquarters in 
Kota Bharu Kelantan in which all people can come.  With regard to non-Muslims, PAS 
argues that those living in Kelantan could be considered as the kaffir zimmi (non-Muslims 
who live in harmony with Muslims and should be protected) and these groups should be 
allowed to become members of the party as well. PAS’s treatment of the non-Muslims 
follows the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad who says: “Sesiapa yang menyakiti 
zimmi, maka ia telah menyakiti aku (whoever offends the zimmi means he has offended 
me at the same time). Yaacob Yusoff (member of PAS) explains: 
Pendekatan PAS dalam hal ini ialah dengan dialog (mujadalah al-hasanah) 
sebagaimana yang dituntut oleh Quran sendiri. Dialog secara langsung dengan 
bukan Islam sekarang sudah tentulah mengenai politik dan pemerintahan Islam. 
Jika tidak ada yang menghasut dan menakut-nakuti mereka, mereka orang-orang 
bukan Islam itu dipercayai akan terbuka untuk dialog karena mencari kebenaran 
dan keadilan adalah naluri.223 
 
PAS’s approach in this case (non-Muslim) is through a peaceful dialogue as 
commanded by the Quran itself. A direct dialogue with the non-Muslims is of 
                                                 
223See Yusoff Yaacob, “Pendekatan Dakwah Dalam PAS-Agenda Era Kepemimpinan Ulama,” in Dakwah 
Gerakan Islam: Alaf Baru Yunus, ed. Ahmad Redzuwan, Badlihisham M. Nasir and Berhanudin Abdullah, 
(Selangor: PercetakanAsni Sdn. Bhd, 2000), 132. 
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course on politics and Islamic state. If there are no provocators who frighten 
them, they (non-Muslims) will have open minds to dialogue because seeking truth 
and justice is a part of human nature. 
 
In my interview with Nasharuddin Mat Isa, (the current Timbalan Presiden of 
PAS), he explains that the regular attendance of members for the party training like usrah 
has been insisted on by the PAS. Mat Isa says:  
Penglibatan serius kita di medan politik terbuka tidak menjadi alasan untuk kita 
abaikan tarbiyyah.  Kesibukan berpolitik bukanlah sebab untuk kita tidak 
menghadiri usrah di Cawangan, Kawasan, Negeri dan Pusat.  Kesibukan  
memegang portfolio sebagai Ahli Parlimen (MP) atau Ahli Dewan Undangan 
Negeri (ADUN) bukanlah lesen bahawa tarbiyyah sudah tidak perlu lagi. Malah 
sebagai MP dan ADUN-lah, jamaah perlu pertingkatkan tarbiyyah mereka supaya 
memahami dan mematuhi arahan pimpinan parti!224   
 
Our serious involvement in an open political arena cannot become our excuse to 
neglect tarbiyah. Political activities are not reasons for us to absent from the 
usrah activity in the sub district, district, provincial and national levels. Our 
activities as local and national parliament members cannot become reasons that 
tarbiyah is not important anymore. Even as parliamentarians, people should be 
more active in tarbiyyah in order to understand and follow party leaders’ policies.  
   
 The style of recruitment like usrah above initiated by Yusof Rowa has been 
continued by PAS leaders until the present time. In 2001, PAS published the guidelines 
of its membership recruitment and development, in a handbook entitled Manhaj Daurah 
Tadribiyah: Himpunan Kertas-kertas Kerja Pembinaan Ahli Parti Islam se-Malaysia 
(The Methode of Training: A Collection of Papers on the Development of PAS Members). 
Abdul Hadi Awang (current PAS President) in his preface to this book clearly states the 
purpose of its publication, saying: 
Saya mengharapkan Manhaj Daurah Tadribiyah menjadi suatu rujukan untuk 
mewujudkan standard tarbiyah yang lebih terarah di dalam jamaah. Komitment 
daripada semua pihak amat saya harapkan untuk memastikan usaha 
memperkemaskan tarbiyah menjadi agenda utama disemua peringkat sama ada di 
                                                 
224Interview with Nasharuddin Mat Isa in Kelantan, July 10, 2006. 
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peringkat cawangan, kawasan, negeri, pusat, dan di semua pusat pengajian yang 
wujud pada hari ini.225  
 
I hope this book (Manhaj Daurah Tadribiyyah, The Method of Training) becomes 
a reference to establish a more focused standard training in the group. The 
commitment of all involved is expected in order to make tarbiyah a main agenda 
for the party in all levels such as the sub-district, district, provincial, and  central 
levels as well as in all existing religious centers of today. 
 
Awang says that this book should become a formal training standard (tarbiyah 
guidelines) for PAS members and cadres at every level from the lowest (cawangan) to 
the highest at the national level. This tarbiyah guideline is also introduced in several 
religious ceremonies (pengajian), which are commonly held in the villages around the 
country particularly in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, where PAS has a lot of 
supporters.  
Another PAS leader, Harun bin Taib (the former head of Dewan Ulama PAS), 
also comments on the background and objectives of this guideline publication. He says: 
Manusia dalam PAS terdiri dari pelbagai peringkat, latar belakang. Kadang kala 
pendidikan atau tarbiyah awal yang sedikit berlainan dengan tradisi dan system 
dalam PAS menjadikan latar belakang itu lebih rencam. Dalam konteks ini kita 
percaya tiada ahli yang tidak mahu diurus dan ditarbiyahkan. Inilah semangat dan 
idea berjemaah yang perlu kita perluas dan perkembangkan. Dan dengan itu, PAS 
perlu mengagendakan aspek tarbiyahnya tersusun dan strategic…226  
 
People in PAS came from different backgrounds. Sometimes, previous education 
or tarbiyah could be different with tradition and education system of PAS. In this 
context, we believe that there is no single member who does not want to be 
trained and taught by PAS. These are the spirit and communal ideas that we 
should extend and develop. Thus, PAS should have an agenda to make its training 
structured and strategic. 
 
 
                                                 
225Lajnah Tarbiyah dan Latihan Kepemimpinan PAS Pusat, Manhaj Daurah Tadribiyah: Himpunan 
Kertas-kertas Kerja Pembinaan Ahli Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) (Selangor Darul Ehsan: Angkatan 
Edaran,  2001), 7. 
226Lajnah Tarbiyah dan Latihan Kepemimpinan PAS Pusat, 8. 
 138
Taib points out that due to the different educational backgrounds of new PAS 
members, it is important for PAS to make them, through integrated and strategic tarbiyah 
training, understand the party’s ideology and platform. With these tarbiyah and usrah 
approaches, Taib believes that PAS as a jamaah (community) would become a very 
strong party with loyal and integrated members.  
Usrah, taken from the Arabic which literally means “family,” is the main 
component of PAS’s tarbiyah membership training. The usrah meeting is the medium in 
which members of PAS can be trained together to become very loyal and integrated 
members through the spirit of Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah islamiyyah). Here the 
members are trained and indoctrinated in the comprehensive teachings of Islam including 
an idea of Islam as a very complete way of life (syamil wa mutakamil). Usrah insists 
upon its members to understand the comprehensive platform of PAS as an Islamic party. 
Thus usrah is intended to mold PAS cadres not only as mufakkirin (cadre who is ready to 
think), but also amilin (cadre who is ready to act and struggle). According to tarbiyah’s 
book of guidelines, Usrah has several special characteristics, which are: 
1) Usrah hendaklah bersipat mutawasil (berterusan), 2) merangkumi keseluruhan 
ahli pengikut, pekerja maupun pimpinan, 3) mempunyai perancangan (al-takhtit) 
yang rapi, 4) kesunggguhan semua pihak yang terlibat samada nuqaba (teacher) 
mahu pun ahli, and 5) mempunyai keberkesanan dengan bisa menjawab 
sejauhmana penghayatan Islam, sejauhmana konsep taawun (kerjasama antar ahli) 
dan sejauhmana ikatan ukhuwah (persaudaraan) dan sejauhmana amal jama’i 
(pekerjaan kelompok) dapat dibentuk.227 
 
1) Usrah should have continous training, 2) cover all members both grassroot and 
elites, 3) have an orderly plan, 4) commitment of all actors both teacher and 
members and 5) have impacts, shown by members’ ability to answer to what 
extent their understanding of Islam, concept of cooperation among the members 
and brotherhood and to what extent community works can be implemented.   
 
                                                 
227
 Lajnah Tarbiyah dan Latihan Kepemimpinan PAS Pusat, ,45-46. 
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From the above characteristics, it is clear that usrah training of PAS is held 
regularly and all PAS members including political elites of the party have been actively 
involved in this. In the end this has brought about very strong ties among the party’s 
members. Tarbiyah as a medium to recruit members and promote PAS programs and 
activities has been done not only in the PAS offices but also other places like pondok-
pondok (Islamic boarding school), madrasah (Islamic schools), universities and mosques. 
These tarbiyah activities would be held more intensively prior to general elections.  
PAS believes that education (tarbiyah) is the most important factor in their 
movement (harakah) to prepare qualified members and leaders who understand their 
Islamic vision and mission. They also believe that amal jama’i (voluntarily community 
services) is the core principle of their struggle, as Nasharudin Mat Isa explains: 
Prinsip-prinsip ‘amal jamai’iyy harus diperkasakan terutamanya oleh kalangan 
pemuda selaku barisan pelapis pimpinan. Amal jama’iyy adalah asas dan teras 
(main core) pergerakan jamaah kita. Tujuan dan matlamat jamaah boleh tersasar 
jika ahli dan pimpinan tidak teguh berpegang kepada prinsip ‘amal jama’iyy. Ahli 
dan pimpinan mesti ditarbiyyahkan supaya memahami dan menghayati ‘amal 
jama’iyy.228 
 
The principles of amal jama’i should be robust particularly among young 
members as the rear guard of the leaders. Collective work is basic and the main 
core of our movement. The objective and aim of our community could be 
misleading if the members and leaders do not hold firmly the principles of 
collective work. Members and leaders should follow tarbiyah in order to 
understand and apprehend collective work. 
 
As the party’s main engine of growth and, as mentioned by Mat Isa above, to 
participate in this amal jama’i, Dewan Pemuda PAS (Youth PAS Council) has its own 
program that is targeted at Muslim children. This organization believes that Muslim 
                                                 
228Nasharudin Mat Isa, “Pemerkasaan Wasilah Tarbiyah,” (paper presented at Perasmian Muktamar Dewan 
Pemuda PAS, Ipoh, November 11, 2008). 
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children should be introduced to the principles of Islamic tarbiyah and harakah as early 
as possible. Thus, they ask the members of the party to send their children to pre-school 
institution organized by Dewan Pemuda PAS, called PASTI (Pusat Asuhan Tunas Islam, 
the Care Centre for Islamic Kids). This PASTI institution was officially declared on April 
10, 1987 during the 28th muktamar (annual meeting) of Dewan Pemuda PAS. Before its 
official establishment, as early as 1980s, in collaboration with Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM), PAS had its pre-school institution called TASKI (Taman Asuhan 
Kanak-Kanak Islam, Childcare for Muslim Children). In Terengganu, TASKI was 
organized by Dewan Pemuda PAS Terengganu while in Kelantan, in 1988, they had the 
Putra Islam (Islamic Children) school. In its official document, it says: 
Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Kerja Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat yang bersidang pada 6 
Mei 1988 telah memutuskan penggunaan nama PASTI untuk semua institusi 
prasekolah milik ahli PAS.229 
The general meeting of working committee of Dewan Pemuda PAS held on May 
6, 1988 has decided to use name of PASTI for all preschool institutions belong to 
PAS. 
The philosophical base of this pre-schoool institution is the continuity of activities 
and amal jama’i (communal effort) to create excellent young Muslim generations with 
good personality and good understanding and practice of Islamic teachings in their life. 
Looking at this pre-school curriculum suggests that their main target is to give basic 
knowledge of the tarbiyah of the party. When they grow up, they are expected to be eager 
to become actively involved in the usrah or tarbiyah training. The official curriculum of 
these PASTI institutions clearly states: 
                                                 
229See official website of PASTI http://pastipusat.wordpress.com/ (accessed February 9, 2009). 
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Kurikulum PASTI adalah mengikut susunan kandungan yang diajar secara 
tersusun dan sistematik bagi memenuhi serta mencapai matlamat Tarbiyyah 
Islamiyyah. Pada dasarnya kurikulum ini adalah pancaran konsep Insaniyyah dari 
Manhaj Al-Hayah Al-Rabbani yang berpaksikan Iman, Islam, dan Ihsan. 
Fungsinya ialah bagi mengawal dan memelihara fitrah manusia supaya potensi-
potensi rohaniah, aqliah, dan jasmaniyah tidak dirosakkan oleh pengaruh alam 
sekeliling yang merendahkan kualiti iman manusia. Selain itu, kurikulum PASTI 
juga berfungsi untuk memperkembangkan fitrah serta potensi-potensi 
kemanusiaan selaras dengan kehendak matlamat Pendidikan Islam.230 
The PASTI’s curriculum follows structured and systematic contents that are 
addressed to achieve the objective of Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education). 
Actually, this curriculum is an implementation of the concept of humanity taken 
from Manhaj Al-Hayah Al-Rabbany (Method of God’s Life) which is based on 
faith, Islam and goodness. Its function is to guard and maintain human nature in 
order that their spiritual, intellectual and bodily potentialities are not destroyed 
and influenced by their surroundings that will reduce the quality of faith of the 
human being. Besides that, the PASTI curriculum has a function to develop the 
natures and potencies of human beings to be in accord with the objective of 
Islamic education. 
The above curriculum suggests that students since early age have been introduced 
to the style of tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic education), which is of course in line with the 
PAS vision and mission. Five tarbiyah varieties such as tarbiyah imaniyah (faith), 
tarbiyah ruhiyyah (soul), tarbiyah khuluqiyyah (ethics), tarbiyah aqliyyah (intellect) and 
tarbiyah jasadiyyah (body) are among tarbiyah’s activities that they focused on. 
Although it is hard for me to see to what extent this kind of pre-school program is 
effective as a medium to influence young children with the political ideology of PAS, 
during my visit to Kelantan, I found more than one hundred PASTI pre-schools. The 
students are mostly the children of PAS members, but the schools are also open to non-
PAS members.231  
                                                 
230
 See official website of PASTI http://pastipusat.wordpress.com/ (accessed February 9, 2009). 
231
 A list of PASTI preschool in Kelantan can be seen in the appendix 2 of this thesis. 
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The significant number of PASTI institutions, teachers and students can make a 
significant impact in spreading PAS ideologies to the students since the early years of 
their education. This also means that PAS not only used a traditional approach to recruit 
their members as had been done in the early stage of its establishment through the 
dakwah and face-to-face meetings, but also currently use modern institutions like these 
pre-school programs. This pre-school institution is currently spreading in almost every 
state in Malaysia. Some PASTI offices even intensively promoted their programs through 
the internet in their website as can be seen from the table below: 
Table 4: List of PASTI’s Offices around Malaysia 
No Name of PASTI Website Address 
1. PASTI Pusat in Kuala Lumpur http://pastipusat.blogspot.com/ 
http://pastipusat.wordpress.com/ 
2. PASTI in Kedah http://pastikedah.blogspot.com/ 
3. PASTI in Kelantan http://pastikelate.blogspot.com/ 
4. PASTI in Perak http://pastiperak.blogspot.com/ 
5. PASTI in Pulau Pinang http://pastipenang.com/ 
http://pastipmtgpauh.blogspot.com/ 
6. PASTI in Sabah http://jpastisabah.blogspot.com/ 
7. PASTI Sholehah in Melaka http://pastisolehah.blogspot.com/ 
8. PASTI in Pahang http://pastipahang.blogspot.com/ 
9. PASTI in Selangor http://assyifaa.blogdrive.com/ 
10. PASTI in Terengganu http://tunasislam.blogspot.com/ 
11. PASTI in Johor http://generasigemilang.blogspot.com/ 
 
Besides tarbiyah, usrah, and PASTI programs discussed above which are more 
focused upon training and recruiting members, the PAS also approaches people through 
direct dakwah activities. Dakwah or Islamic preaching is mainly intended to deliver 
Islamic teachings like Quranic interpretations, Hadith (Prophet Muhammad’s speech and 
acts) and Islamic laws to the people. This carried out by PAS’s leading figures and 
members. Although dakwah is meant mainly to promote Islamic teachings, it is 
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commonly known by Malaysians that these activities were used by PAS to promote its 
political programs and platforms to the audiences. It also has been used to criticize 
governmental political policies. This means that tarbiyah and dakwah activities could be 
considered as tools not only to promote the party but at the same time also to educate 
people to be aware of political issues in the country. 
Take for example the dakwah activity which has been conducted in Kelantan. 
From my experience staying in Kelantan during my field work, I saw how PAS used 
dakwah activity as a vehicle to develop people’s political awareness. As a state that has 
been struggling to implement Islamic values in every aspect of human life, Kelantan has 
tried to turn itself into a model state for applying Islamic values in the economic, 
political, and social aspects of life. 
In the political sphere, Kelantan state tries to turn itself into a place to provide 
political education for the people, a program commonly known as ‘Kelantan open 
political university’. In Kelantan, it is very common to see the egalitarian relationship 
between political elites and their constituents particularly during the Friday gathering. To 
facilitate political communication between the elites and their grassroots constituents, 
Kelantan through PAS has a routine and a unique political-religious program. Based on 
my direct observation during my field work in Kota Bharu, I saw that every Friday 
morning, in front of PAS headquarters in the middle of Kota Baru, a large number of 
people consisting of the elderly, youth, and children come to this place to listen to Islamic 
and political speeches from PAS leaders like Nik Abdul Aziz. In this event, Nik Aziz 
delivers not only Islamic teachings but also comments on contemporary political issues in 
front of Khota Baru people. Every one can come to hear this speech, whatever one’s 
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ethnic, religious, or political affiliation. This is not limited to only PAS members or 
constituents. In this event, I could see how an intensive personal relationship between 
members of the party and their leaders was built. This event shows how political elites of 
the PAS directly or indirectly build a political awareness among the people because 
everybody can understand contemporary political developments and issues in Malaysia. 
The PAS’s responses to issues are openly displayed to the public. This Friday gathering 
not only functions as a political tool to promote the political agendas of the party but also 
serves to attract new members through religious speeches delivered by a type of party 
elites commonly known as ulama (religious leaders). In this gathering, I also found that 
collections of speeches of Nik Aziz  and other PAS leaders, compiled in Compact Disk 
(CD), are sold and people from outside Kelantan who visit Kota Bharu can easily buy the 
CD, which later can be used to promote PAS programs, activities and policies among 
their relatives and friends. Since the CDs are packed as pengajian (religious speeches), it 
is a very effective tool to promote PAS views and policies not only regarding Islamic 
issues but political matters as well. 
 145
Table 5: Contents of Compact Disks Sold in the Friday gathering in Kelantan 
No. Title of the CDs Speakers 
1.  Melayu Islam, Islam Melayu (Melayu’s Islam, Islam of 
Melayu) 
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat 
2.  Sidang Dun Terengganu 2006 (Meeting of Local Parliament 
of Terengganu 2006) 
Mutalib Embong, Harun Taib and 
Wahid Endut 
3.  Ceramah Sempena penyerahan Borang Kemasukan Ahli 
UMNO kedalam PAS (Religious Speech during the 
submission of form of UMNO member converted to become 
PAS member.  
Hassan Muhammad Ali 
4.  Dunia Hingga Akhirat: Pemimpin dan Pengikut Masing-
masing Lepas Diri (QS: 2: 166-169) (From the World to the 
Hereafter: Leader and Follower are responsibles for 
themselves).  
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat 
5. Kempen Bantuan Palestin: Satu Ringgit Untuk Palestin 
(Campaign to Help Palistine: One Ringgit for Palestine) 
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and 
Palestine Representatives 
6.  Apa Sebab Sertai PAS? (Why Join PAS?) Wan Fuad (former UMNO 
members) 
7. Ceramah Muktamar PAS Ke 52 (Kedah): Sengap Anwar 
Ibrahim (Speech on PAS Annual Meeting 52nd  (Kedah): 
Anwar Ibrahim’s Speech 
Anwar Ibrahim 
8. Yahudi Tidak Iktiraf Kemenangan HAMAS (Jews Do not 
Acknowledge HAMAS’s Victory) 
Mohammad Sabu 
9. Kritikan Panas Buat Pak Lah (Serious Criticism for Pak 
Lah) 
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and 
Salahuddin Ayub 
10. Penyerahan Borang Ahli Umno Masuk PAS (The 
Submission of Form, Umno Member Converted to Become 
PAS Member) 
Mohd Anwar and Nik Abdul 
Aziz Nik Mat 
 Source: Personal Collection of Researcher 
 
From the above table it is clear that the Friday gathering in front of the PAS 
headquarters in Kota Bharu is used effectively by PAS political leaders not only to 
deliver religious speeches but is also used to promote PAS political policies and 
responses to contemporary political issues in Malaysia and in the Muslim world, such as 
how PAS responds to the issue of Palestine in the Middle East conflict. 
In this Friday gathering, information about the ruling government’s policies and 
criticisms from the PAS as an opposition party is provided to the public as well. Here the 
people can know what the policy of the ruling government is and what the response from 
PAS as an opposition party is. In this forum, Kelantan people of whatever religion, ethnic 
and political affiliations, are indirectly educated to have an open mind in political 
choices. They will know what federal government policies on issues are and also 
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understand how the opposition responds to such issues. Thus, the people of Kelantan are 
provided political alternatives and choices of political policies for their benefit. Since this 
forum is organized by PAS, it is unavoidable that the forum will reflect PAS’s viewpoint 
more. 
Besides the forum above, in Kelantan I also found political religious gatherings 
held in an open field almost every night, from one place to another interchangeably. In 
this gathering, there are usually at least two or three speakers being listened to by huge 
crowds of Kelantan people. The first speaker usually delivers a talk on religious matters 
such as Quran and Hadith studies and this is followed by other speakers who discuss 
contemporary political issues both at the local and federal government levels and even on 
international Islamic issues such as Palestine. 
The above events are very unique because, commonly, political speeches or 
gatherings are held during campaign periods, but this is not the case in Kelantan. 
According to PAS political leaders that I met in PAS office in Kelantan, the religious and 
political gatherings as discussed above are very important for the party. Because PAS 
does not have sufficient electronic or mass media resources to promote their programs 
and political policies, this gathering could function as the arena for the political education 
of the people in the country. Although PAS has a newspaper, Harokah, as a medium to 
promote its political activities, it is believed to be not enough to cover political issues in 
Malaysia because it is only allowed to be published fortnightly by the federal 
government. The experience of PAS political communication could be seen as a model 
on how a party communicates with its constituents. Political information, programs and 
policies need to be known by the constituents and the party’s supporters, not only during 
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campaign periods prior to the election time, but also after elections. Programs, policies 
and activities of a party should be consistently and comprehensively known by the people 
in order to help people to easily choose the party that accommodates their political 
preferences. Moreover, thanks to the advancements of modern information technology, 
particularly the internet, the PAS, like its counterpart PKS in Indonesia, uses internet 
media as a tool to promote the party, covering its programs, policies and activities. The 
huge numbers of websites used both by the PAS central working committees and 
members can be seen in the table below: 
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Table 6: Examples of Websites Related to PAS 
No Name of PAS Institution Website Address 
1. PAS Pusat (PAS National Level) http://www.pas.org.my/ 
 Dewan Ulama PAS Pusat http://ulamak.pas.org.my/ 
 Dewan Pemuda PAS http://pemuda.pas.org.my/ 
 Dewan Muslimat PAS http://muslimat.pas.org.my/ 
 Ahli Parlimen PAS http://mppas.wordpress.com/ 
   
2. PAS Negeri  
 PAS Negeri Kelantan http://kelantan.pas.org.my/ 
 PAS Negeri Terengganu http://www.terengganukini.net/v2/ 
 PAS Negeri Selangor http://selangor.pas.org.my/ 
 PAS Negeri Pahang http://paspahang.org/ 
   
3 Pimpinan PAS (PAS Leaders)  
 President PAS, Abdul Hadi Awang http://presiden.pas.org.my/ 
 Timbalan President PAS, Nasharudin Mat Isa http://nasharudin.com/index.php 
 Naib President PAS, Husam Musa http://www.husammusa.com/ 
 Naib Presiden PAS, Ahmad Awang http://usahmadawang.blogspot.com/ 
 Kamarudin Jaffar http://kjtumpat.blogspot.com/ 
 Hatta Ramli http://hattaramli.blogspot.com/ 
 Mahfuz Omar http://gemasuara.blogspot.com/ 
 Idris Ahmad http://idrisahmad.wordpress.com/ 
 Mohamed Hanipa Maidin http://peguampas.blogspot.com/ 
   
4 Pimpinan Pemuda PAS (PAS Youth)  
 Salahuddin Ayub http://budakkampung61.blogspot.com/ 
 Sabki Yusof http://kompashidup.blogspot.com/ 
 Nasrudin Tantawi http://ustaznasrudin-tantawi.blogspot.com/ 
 Nik Abduh http://nikabduh.wordpress.com/ 
 Zolkhornain http://bongkarsauh.blogspot.com/ 
   
5 PAS Kawasan  
 PAS Kawasan Jeranut http://pasjerantut.wordpress.com/ 
 PAS Kawasan Kuantan http://pusatkhidmatpaskuantan.blogspot.com/ 
 PAS Tanjung Lumpur http://mtdpastglumpur.blogspot.com/ 
 PAS Kawasan Pekan http://suarapaspekan.blogspot.com/ 
 
From the above explanation it is clear that the party has intensively approached its 
constituents in particular and the Kelantan people in general to get to know PAS. The 
PAS through its activities not only delivers Islamic teaching or dakwah to recruit 
members, but also at the same time provides political awareness to constituents and 
people in general, at least in the case of Kelantan. This style of recruitment and dakwah 
activities is not specific to Kelantan, although this is its main political base in Malaysia, 
but can also be observed in other states like Kedah and Terengganu. By providing 
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political education to the people, it is clear that PAS has indirectly spread and promoted 
democratic rule to the people. 
 
PAS Leadership  
A better way to know how PAS is committed to democracy is to understand the 
party’s implementation of democratic rule in its internal functions, particularly in 
selecting its leaders. Since its early establishment up to today, PAS has been committing 
to implementing democratic rules in selecting its leaders. The PAS commitment to hold 
muktamar (party annual meeting) both in national and district (cawangan) levels can be 
proof of how democratic procedures have been implemented internally. A PAS official 
document states that all Jawatan Kuasa Kerja (working committee members) at the 
national level consist of 35 people that are elected through muktamar. Candidacies are 
easily put on, requiring only that aspirants gain two nominations from among PAS’s 
branches around the country. This means that PAS gives an equal opportunity for 
members to be nominated as national working committee members, such as becoming the 
president or vice president of the party. Article 22 (1) of the PAS constitution states: 
Adapun jawatan kuasa kerja PAS pusat itu ialah (a) seorang presiden, (b) seorang 
timbalan presiden, (c) tiga orang naib presiden, (d) tiga orang ketua-ketua dewan, 
(e) seorang setiausaha agung, (f) seorang bendahari, (g) seorang ketua 
penerangan, dan (h) duapuluh empat orang ahli jawatan kuasa biasa PAS pusat.232 
 
The working committee member of PAS in the national level consist of (a) a 
president, (b) a vice president, (c) three deputy presidents, (d) three heads of the 
wing organizations, (e) a secretary, (f) a treasurer, (g) a speaker of the party, and 
(h) twenty-four ordinary members. 
 
                                                 
232Pejabat Agung PAS Pusat, Perlembagaan Parti Islam Se Malaysia Pindaan 2001 (Selangor Darul 
Ehsan, 2002), 29. 
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The national muktamar as the arena to elect the party’s top leaders has been 
designed to accommodate as many as possible of the members to participate in the 
process of election. The constitution of the party article 16 (2) further states: 
Muktamar tahunan adalah mengandungi ahli-ahli yang berikut: (a) pengurus tetap 
dan timbalannya, (b)ahli-ahli majlis syura ulama, (c) pesuruh jaya-pesuruh jaya 
PAS negeri, (d) yang dipertua-yang dipertua PAS kawasan, (e) tidak kurang dari 
empat orang dan tidak lebih dari sepuluh orang wakil daripada sebuah kawasan, 
(f) lima belas orang wakil daripada muktamar dewan ulama PAS pusat, (g) lima 
belas orang wakil daripada muktamar Dewan Pemuda PAS pusat, dan (h) lima 
belas orang wakil daripada muktamar Dewan Muslimat PAS Pusat.233 
 
The annual muktamar consist of members as follows: (a) working committees and 
their deputies, (b) members of Majlis shura ulamak, (c) working committees from 
all branches at state levels, (d) head of PAS from all branches at district levels, (e) 
minimum four and maximum ten representatives from all branches at subsdistrict 
level, (f) fifteen representatives from the Dewan Ulama, (g) fifteen representatives 
form Dewan Pemuda, and (h) fifteen representatives form Dewan Muslimat. 
 
Prior to the national muktamar, the PAS’s many branches and divisions around 
the country hold their election each year to elect not only their working committee 
members at cawangan level but also to elect their delegate for the party’s annual 
muktamar at the national level.234 At least four and a maximum ten representatives from 
every level of branches of the party around the country are given the opportunity to vote 
in the national muktamar. This suggests that democratic procedures of selecting party 
leaders have been implemented both at the national and local levels, which allow all the 
party members to have the same opportunity to be a leader of the party. 
Moreover, the leaders of party’s several wings like Dewan Pemuda, Dewan 
Muslimat and Dewan Ulama are elected through muktamar, which are held every year as 
                                                 
233Ibid, 19. 
234Up to 2008, PAS has 6332 branches at cawangan (sub-district level) and 175 branches at kawasan 
(district) level. See Abdul Hadi Awang, Ucapan Dasar Presiden PAS, Muktamar Tahunan ke 54, Perak, 
2008. 
 151
well. This also suggests that the party has several muktamar which in turn give more 
opportunity for the members to participate in this democratic election of its leaders. The 
party’s constitution further says: 
Muktamar Dewan Ulama PAS Pusat (Article 38), Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat 
(Article 44) dan Dewan Muslimat PAS Pusat (Article 57) hendaklah diadakan 
sekali dalam setahun, seboleh-bolehnya dalam bulan April atau mana-mana masa 
atau tarikh yang terdahulu sedikit daripada muktamar tahunan PAS, atau pada 
bila-bila jua masa yang ditetapkan oleh Jawatankuasa kerja dewan.235 
 
The muktamar of Dewan Ulama PAS at national level (Article 38), Dewan 
Pemuda PAS at national level (article 44), and Dewan Muslimat PAS at national 
level (article 57) should be held once a year on the month of April or anytime as 
long as it is held earlier than annual muktamar of PAS central office or whenever 
it is needed that is decided by the working committees of each Dewan. 
 
 
Besides being tasked with electing the working committee of the party, the annual 
muktamar is also used as an arena to strengthen relationships between members and the 
elites of the party through face to face meetings. As discussed above, one of the 
recruitement styles of the PAS members is direct interaction between ulama and their 
ummah (followers), with the former being the main generators of party recruitment. The 
audience who come to the muktamar are usually there not only to follow the party’s 
official meetings (such as the the election of the president) but also to know the response 
of the ulama as religious scholars to contemporary Islamic issues in the country. The 
ulamas’ responses, thus, are the party’s as well.  
Since the president of PAS is the ex-officio member of Majlis Syura Ulamak, the 
President’s speech in the opening ceremony of the every muktamar would become one of 
the most closely-watched speeches as well. This speech would be considered by the 
                                                 
235Pejabat Agung PAS Pusat, Perlembagaan Parti Islam Se Malaysia Pindaan 2001 (Selangor Darul 
Ehsan, 2002), 72, 89 and 118. 
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audiences not only as that of the PAS president but that which represents the ulama’s, 
and therefore the party’s, opinion on contemporary issues. The importance of the speech, 
popularly known as Ucapan Dasar Muktamar (Foundation Speech of Muktamar), could 
be seen from the fact that during muktamar there are several meetings held to discuss the 
contents of this speech. For example, during the Muktamar 52nd  in Kedah, I found that 
during two-day muktamar, several meetings were focused on a discussion of the 
president’s speech,  such as Usul terima kasih dan Perbahasan Ucapan Dasar Presiden 
(Proposal’s Appreciation and discussion of President’s Foundation Speech) , 
Menyambung perbahasan Ucapan Dasar Presiden (Continued Discussion of President’s 
Foundation Speech), Perbahasan Usul-Usul and Pimpinan menjawab dan menggulung 
perbahasan (Discussion of the Proposals and President Answers and Conclusion). 
Muhammad Yasin, from PAS’s Working Committee in Kelantan says that the importance 
of these speeches, for example, could be seen from the enthusiasm of the PAS members 
in asking the party to publish the collection of the Ucapan Dasar Muktamar of the former 
PAS president Fadzhil Mohd Noor when he passed away on June 23, 2002.236 The book 
edited by Nasir Ahmad was finally published in 2003 entitled Koleksi Ucapan Dasar 
Muktamar PAS Kali Ke 36 Hingga 48 Selama 13 Tahun, and it consists of thirteen of 
Noor’s speechs during his thirteen years as PAS president. Nasir Ahmad, the editor of the 
book writes: 
Ucapan dasar beliau yang padat dengan idea-idea merupakan penjana minda 
kearah pembentukan pemikiran serta penyelesaian terhadap banyak permasalahan 
berkaitan pelbagai isu seperti pendidikan, ekonomi dan masalah social. Begitu 
juga tentang pandangan beliau semasa pertemuan dengan pemimpin luar negara 
                                                 
236Interview with Muhammad Yasin in Kelantan, July 6, 2006. 
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berhubung isu yang melibatkan arena antarbangsa terutama penindasan terhadap 
umat Islam diseluruh dunia.237 
 
His speeches are filled with the ideas that generated thoughts in solving problems 
related to issues such as educational, economic and social problems. It also 
consists of his views on international issues, during his interaction with overseas 
leaders, particularly in regard to the Muslim’s oppression all over the world. 
 
The above discussion shows the position of the working committee members, led 
by the president of PAS elected in the muktamar, to be the most important in PAS. 
However, starting from Yosof Rowa’s leadership (1983-1989), the ulama’s faction 
obtained a stronger position in the party. This can be seen from the fact that under 
Rowa’s leadership, the party introduced the Majlis Shura Ulamak (Consultative Council 
of Ulama), which has very significant power and authority in the party. This new 
organizational body, according to the party constitution, has the right to interpret party 
policies, to officially swear in members of the PAS working committee at the national 
level, and to conduct background checks of party candidates. The party constitution 
article 7 (3) states several functions of Majlis Shura Ulamak as follows: 
(a) Menghurai, menjelas dan mentafsirkan dasar PAS dan mana-mana peruntukan 
didalam perlembagaan ini yang menimbulkan kesamaran mengenai maksud dan 
tujuannya dan membuat ketetapan mengenainya,  
 
(a) To elaborate, explain and interpret PAS constitutions should 
incomprehensibles articles be found in this constitution which lead, to 
misunderstanding of its objective, and they can make a decision on it. 
 
(b) Mengeluarkan arahan dan perintah supaya dasar dan ketetapan itu dipatuhi 
dan dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana pihak atau badan didalam PAS dan mengawasi 
serta memelihara supaya dasar dan ketetapan serta kehendak-kehendak dalam 
perlembagaan ini dipatuhi dalam kegiatan, gerakan dan pentadbiran PAS. 
 
(b) To give guidance and instruction in order that this constitution is followed and 
implemented by any person or institution involved in PAS and to keep watching 
                                                 
237Nasir Ahmad, ed. Koleksi Ucapan Dasar Muktamar PAS Kali Ke 36 Hingga 48 Selama 13 Tahun 
(Johor: PAS Kawasan Ledang, 2003), iii. 
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and maintaining in order that the administration activities and movements of PAS 
follow this constitution.  
 
(c) Memelihara, menjaga dan mengawal tatatertib PAS dan melantik ahli-ahli 
jawatankuasa.238 
 
(c) To maintain, defend and guard PAS’s guidelines and to officially appoint 
members of working committee of the party.  
 
The party constitution also states that this ulamak institution in the party should consist of 
fifteen members and be led by a spiritual leader known as a Mursyidul ‘Am and one 
deputy known as Timbalan Mursyidul ‘Am, who are selected through a musyawarah 
meeting among the Majlis Shura Ulamak members. Among the fifteen of the Majlis 
Shura Ulamak members, four of them are appointed by the Central Committee and the 
Dewan Ulama respectively, who then select the remaining seven members.239 Due to its 
central position in the party, the constitution of the party demand rigorious requirements 
for the party’s members to be elected as this Majlis Shura Ulamak as the article 7 (4a) of 
the constitution states: 
Seseorang yang hendak dilantik menjadi ahli Majlis Shura Ulamak itu hendaklah 
seseorang yang mengetahui masalah-masalah pokok (al-usul) dalam syariat Islam 
dan hukum-hukumnya atau/dan dapat merujuk masalah-masalah itu kepada al-
Qur’an, as-Sunnah, Ijmak dan Qias dengan faham akan maksud dan maknanya 
yang muktabar dan hendaklah seseorang yang adil yakni tidak melakukan dosa 
besar atau terus menerus melakukan dosa kecil dan hendaklah terpelihara 
maruahnya serta hendaklah seorang ahli PAS.240 
 
A person who will be officially elected as a member of Majlis Shura Ulamak 
should be someone who knows main tenets of Islam and sharia Islamic laws and 
understand how Islamic laws should refer to the Quran, the Hadith of the Prophet, 
the Ulama’s agreement (ijmak) and analogical reasoning (qiyas) if there are some 
problems occur on Islamic matters. The person also should be adil (a just people) 
                                                 
238Pejabat Agung PAS Pusat, Perlembagaan Parti Islam Se Malaysia Pindaan 2001 (Selangor Darul 
Ehsan, 2002), 5. 
239Ibid.,6. 
240Pejabat Agung PAS Pusat, Perlembagaan Parti Islam Se Malaysia Pindaan 2001 (Selangor Darul 
Ehsan, 2002), 6. 
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who never done big sins or does not practicing wrong deeds continuously and 
he/she should protect his/her dignity and should be a member of PAS. 
 
 Although the Majlis Shura Ulamak seems to have a very strong position even 
when compared to the position of the president of the party as discussed above, it is 
important to note that the eminence of the Majlis should not be exaggerated because with 
its membership drawn equally from the Central Working Committee (4 persons) and 
Dewan Ulama (4 persons), the elected members may prevail in the body’s consensual 
dealings. The discussion above also shows that PAS has followed democratic procedures 
in selecting its leaders and at the same time inserted Islamic values during the process as 
can be seen from the requirement that PAS members have to be elected as Majlis Shura 
Ulamak members. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
From the above discussion, it is very clear that both PKS and PAS have practiced 
democratic rule in their internal party affairs. The style of their members’ and leaders’ 
recruitment shows that both parties have tried their best to implement democratic 
processes. Although they have different names for their membership’s recruitment and 
training, like liqo and halaqoh for PKS and usrah activities for PAS, the core of the 
training programs remains similar, that is, to create a very loyal and integrated 
membership with Islamic values as their basic ideology. It is also clear that training 
programs held by PKS and PAS are more or less influenced by the style of Al-ikhwan al-
muslimun’s Hasan Al-Bana in Egypt. The existence of Majlis Shura in case of PKS and 
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Majlis Shura Ulamak in the case of PAS also could be seen as demonstrations of the fact 
that both parties’ structures are almost the same. 
Different from their counterpart PKS in Indonesia, PAS does not rely on 
polygamy, and the resultant larger families, as a tool to enlarge membership. None of the 
PAS political elites that I met practiced polygamy, unlike PKS leaders. Another 
difference between PKS and PAS in recruiting their members is their overseas members’ 
recruitment. While PKS has intensively recruited Indonesians who are living overseas to 
become party member through international students abroad, there are no PAS offices 
overseas. This could be understood as stemming from the fact that the main generators of 
both parties as discussed above are different. While on the one hand, PKS was founded 
by young middle class tarbiyah activists, PAS on the other hand, is mainly dependent on 
the ulama’s efforts in recruiting members. However, one of the similarities between PKS 
and PAS is that they both try to utilise modern instruments like the internet to promote 
their activities and recruite their members. 
 In addition, due to the different political contexts in Indonesia and Malaysia, PAS 
has its own style of promoting its ideology and programs in Kelantan through open 
dakwah activities in the centre of Kota Bharu, which is held weekly to educate people 
and promote policies. This cannot possibly be imitated by the PKS in Indonesia. This is 
because Malaysia is a federal state in which an opposition party like PAS can become a 
ruling party in any state in Malaysia such as Kelantan, while PKS cannot enjoy such 
dominance in Indonesia as the constitution does not recognize federalism.  
After a discussion of PKS and PASs’ implementation of democracy in their 
internal party structures and activities, the next question is how both parties participate in 
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the democratic processes in Indonesia and Malaysia. How did they perform in the 
Indonesian and Malaysian elections? In the following two chapters, I will analyze PKS 
and PAS involvement in democracy and their performances during the 1999 and 2004 
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PKS, PAS and the 1999 Election 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the PKS and PAS’s practice of democracy in the 1999 
elections in Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. Statements of leading figures, the 
political situation in each country leading up to the elections, and the electoral 
performance of the two parties, are discussed and compared.  
PKS and the 1999 General Election  
Political Situation Prior to Indonesian 1999 General Election 
A discussion of the Indonesian political situation prior to the 1999 general 
election (the first election in the post-Soeharto era) should begin with the success of 
President Habiebie to in calling for a relatively fair and democratic election. As 
commonly known, from the moment of being sworn in as President to replace Soeharto at 
the Merdeka Palace, President Habiebie came under attack from various quarters which 
opposed his presidency. Some argued that since Soeharto and Habiebie were elected as a 
package, as president and vice-president, both should resign and the People’s 
Consultative Assembly, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) should elect a new 
president and vice-president. Many also questioned the legitimacy of Habiebie’s 
presidency, as he took his oath of office not at the MPR’s building, as stipulated by 
article 9 of the 1945 Constitution, but rather at Merdeka Palace with the Supreme Court 
officiating. However, the question of the constitutionality of Habiebie’s presidency 
eventually died down after constitutional experts affirmed that the swearing-in ceremony 
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was legal, as an MPR decree stipulates that, in order to avoid a power vacuum, the 
president can be sworn in by a Supreme Court judge if the MPR cannot assemble.1 
Although Habiebie came to power at a most inauspicious moment in Indonesian 
history, he was successful in his reform agenda, particularly in economic, political and 
legal reform. Pushed by both political necessity and personal conviction, according to 
Anwar, “Habiebie unhesitatingly carried out the dismantling of the authoritarian structure 
that had maintained Soeharto in power over thirty years, putting in its place a much more 
open and free socio-political system which has greatly curtailed the power of the 
president.”2   
The second-biggest challenge for President Habiebie was to transform the 
authoritarian New Order political framework into a more democratic one, as demanded 
by the reform movement. Despite the general skepticism concerning Habiebie’s 
commitment to democracy, there was no doubt that the Habiebie government’s 
achievement in terms of political liberalization, in the short time it was in power, was 
quite remarkable.   
Habiebie government sucessfully revoked the laws that had restricted freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press. Next to the freedom of expression, Habiebie 
promoted freedom of assembly. During the New Order of Soeharto, only three political 
parties were allowed to exist, and soon after Soeharto stepped down, the new government 
permitted political parties to choose their political platform as long as they remained 
committed to Pancasila as the sole foundation of the state. Furthermore, in terms of 
                                                 
1Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “The Habiebie Presidency,” in Post Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, ed. G. 
Forrester, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 35. 
2Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia’s Transition to Democracy: Challenges and Prospects,” in Indonesia: 
The Uncertain Transition ed. Arief Budiman and D. Kingsbury (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 
2001), 7. 
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political reform, Anwar notes that Habiebie was successful in conducting a fair and free 
general election, accepting the principle of separation of powers, promoting regional 
autonomy, and withdrawing the military from politics.3  The general election of 1999 was 
watched closely by domestic as well as international institutions and organizations. 
Although some protests occurred during the electoral process, the ballot itself was 
generally seen as democratic and fair. According to Sulistyo, even some international 
organizations monitoring the election immediately issued statements that the election was 
democratic and fair, even before the counting had been completed.4 
 
1999 General Election 
The 1999 Indonesian general election which was held following Soeharto’s 
resignation was considered by commentators and political scientists, both Indonesian and 
foreign, as more democratic compared to previous elections under the New Order 
government. Saifullah Ma’shum5 pointed out several differences between the 1999 and 
previous elections under Soeharto’s presidency. First, in term of its organizer, the 1999 
election was not arranged by the ruling government but by the political parties that 
cooperated with the independence institution, Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National 
Election Commission). Second, in term of its contestants, it was a multiparty election in 
which forty-eight parties participated. During Soeharto’s era, only three political parties 
were allowed to participate in the election. The third difference between 1999 and the 
                                                 
3Ibid, 8-12. 
4H. Sulistyo,  “Electoral Politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy,” in Electoral Politics in 
Soetheast and East Asia, ed. Aurel Croissant, (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 2002), 82. 
5S. Ma’shum, KPU dan Kontroversi Pemilu 1999 (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2001), 32-33. 
 161
previous election was that the people and non-Governmental Organizations, both 
domestic and foreign, were freely allowed to become observers. Another difference was 
for the first time, members of the civil services (Pegawai Negeri Sipil/PNS) and armed 
forces were banned from playing an active role in the campaign. In previous elections, 
government employees and their families were expected to, and did, vote for and in many 
cases worked on behalf of Golongan Karya (Golkar).  
These differences above were the results of the implementation of a new 
legislation on general election (UU No. 3/1999) which was enacted during Habiebie’s 
reformation era. This new 1999 election law was supplemented by the establishment of 
the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) or National Election Commission. Although 
important details remain to be worked out by the KPU and other bodies, the new 
arrangements are basically in place and seem to provide a valid basis for the election. 
Most importantly, the system has been accepted by the major parties and players as the 
basis for the elections. 
Based on the 1999 election law, the election was then decided to be held on 7th 
June 1999 and followed the proportional system.6 Forty-eight political parties 
participated in the elections with myriad political forces and supporters. According to Al-
Chaidar, in general, there were five political forces that contested the 1999 election, 
namely, 1) the forces of Islamic political parties, 2) the forces of political parties with the 
                                                 
6As stated in this new law, the proportional system can be described as follows: 1) voters choose political 
party symbols, not candidate names, 2) electoral district was determined in the provincial level (Daerah 
Tingkat I), 3) parliament seats was divided proportionally, and 4) list of parliament candidates was not 
mentioned in the ballot paper, but openly published in Tempat Pemungutan Suara (TPS) or Ballot Places. 
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Muslims as their main political basis, 3) nationalist-secular political forces, 4) socialist-
democrat political forces and 5) Christian political forces.7 
Among the contestants, only six parties passed the electoral threshold of 2%, to be 
eligible for future elections. The order of these six parties in terms of votes gained is as 
follows: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP or Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Struggle, Partai Golkar (Golkar Party), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB or National 
Awakening Party), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or United Development Party), 
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN or National Mandate Party) and Partai Bulan Bintang 
(PBB or Crescent and Star Party). The PKS was the seventh largest party in the 1999 
election and failed to pass the 2 percent electoral threshold. 
Although no single party had a clear majority in the election, the PDIP, which was 
led by Megawati Soekarno Putri and had the Pancasila as its ideology became the leading 
party, which gained 33.8 % of the vote. Golkar led by Akbar Tanjung was no longer the 
dominant party during that election. Golkar gained 22.3%, PKB 12.7%, PPP 10.7%, PAN 
7%, PBB 1.9%, PKS 1.4% and other 41 parties collectively secured 10.2% of the vote. 
This simple statistical data, according to Aris Ananta, may show that there was no 
religious loyalty in the 1999 election. Muslims formed the majority (88.22%) of the 
population of Indonesia in 2000. Yet the three largest parties that emerged from the 
election were not those officially claiming to be an Islamic party. The PDIP, Golkar and 
                                                 
7Al-Chaidar, Pemilu 1999: Pertarungan Ideologies Partai-partai Islam Versus Partai-partai Sekuler 
(Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1998). 
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PKB, which declared themselves Pancasila-based and hence secular, won with a 
combined vote of 68.77% of the total.8  
Anies Baswedan has a different opinion from Ananta’s above in looking at the 
1999 election result. Baswedan agrees that Islamic political parties combined (the PPP, 
PBB and PKS) won only 14% of the vote; but to argue that political Islam was 
represented only by this 14% is empirically misleading. For him, given the colorful 
spectrum of political Islam at that time, any analysis of parties representing political 
Islam in 1999 should also include Islam-inclusive parties, the PKB (12.6%) and PAN 
(7.1%) and the secular-inclusive party Golkar (22.4%).9 This opinion can be understood 
through a different perspective in looking at Muslim political cleavage in Indonesia. 
While on the one hand, Ananta’s analysis is based on simple differentiation in analyzing 
the political ideologies of secularist and religious parties (the perspective seems to be 
black and white), Baswedan’s perspective, on the other hand, also looks at the 
constituents of the party in which Muslim supporters are commonly found, such as in 
Islam-friendly parties like PAN and PKB. 
PKS’s Performance in the 1999 Election 
The result of the 1999 election indicated that only seven parties were major 
players in the political arena. One of them was Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) which 
                                                 
8Aris Ananta,  E. N. Arifin and L. Suryadinata, Indonesia Electoral Behaviour: A Statistical Perspective, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 4. 
9Anies Rasyid Baswedan. “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,” Asian Survey 44, 
no. 5 (2004): 681. 
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was at that time known as Partai Keadilan (PK) or Justice Party.10 The ability of PKS to 
stand out as one of the seven major players in the election could be seen as a positive start 
for the party for continuing its involvement in democratization. Compared to the other six 
parties that became big players in the 1999 election, it was quite surprising for PKS to 
gain quite significant numbers of supporters because the party was very young when the 
election was held. However, the PKS’s achievement in 1999 election actually was still 
short of their target of 10 percent of the voters. 
At the beginning of its establishment in 1998, PKS claimed that the party had 
representatives in almost 21 provinces and 200 branches at the district level around 
Indonesia. The party also claimed that up to its establishment, the PKS had no fewer than 
200,000 cadres around Indonesia. Based on its real cadres, PKS targeted to achieve at 
least 10 percent of the voters during 1999 elections. This target was not without reason 
for a cadre party. If the party’s claim to have recruited 200 thousand cadres prior to its 
establishment could be believed, and every cadre can recruit ten to twenty members due 
to its ‘solid network’, it means that PKS should gain at least 2 million voters from the 
party’s cadres. But this was not the case.11  
With regard to the ‘solid network’, the PKS leader Anis Matta explains that prior 
to the election, several strategies had been put forward by the party to consolidate its 
network during the campaign period. First, the party provided intensive training for their 
Juru Kampanye or (campaigners) to provide them with the skills on how to interpret and 
                                                 
10The Justice Party (PK) controlled only 1.4 percent of the seats and, therefore, on July 3, 2003 was 
renamed the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) or the Prosperous and Justice Party, passed the verification 
process, and was eligible to compete in the 2004 election. Anies Rasyid Baswedan, Ibid, 672. 
11Interview with Anis Matta in Jakarta, April 10, 2006. See also Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai 
Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 274. 
 165
deliver the party’s visions and programs effectively to the constituents during the 
campaign. Second, the party intensified its promotions to more ‘educated’ voters in 
several universities in Indonesia. And another party’s strategy was to activate its branches 
and networks overseas, which targeted Indonesian students abroad as their main cadres.12 
Compared to other parties, PKS could be seen as the party that seriously concerned itself 
with the overseas cadre networks. PKS overseas networks would be easily found in 
several countries, with their main constituents being young and well educated.13 These 
well-educated and informed overseas cadres could be easily mobilized to support the 
party’s mission, visions and programs and to some extent to support the party’s financial 
matters. 
PKS success in building its effective networks particularly among young, well 
educated members and the party’s performance in the 1999 election reflects the success 
of the party in actively involving those concerned to disseminate democratic values 
which were commonly believed to have been mushrooming in the post-Soeharto era. 
PKS’s performance was also appreciated by several commentators as a promising party 
which would gain big support from Indonesian people in the future. For example, in the 
run-up to the 1999 elections, Martin van Bruinessen notes that many observers were 
struck by the fact that the PKS was the only party with a clear program. Its performance 
in the following years has only strengthened these perceptions: the party was not plagued 
by the internal difficulties, infighting and corruption that most parties experienced; it 
                                                 
12Ibid, 266. 
13Up to the present, for example several overseas branches could be found in Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, 
United Kingdom, United States of America, New Zealand and Australia. For a detail explanation of this 
international overseas network see Chapter IV of this thesis. 
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remains a small party but showed itself a reliable and predictable actor.14 Although  the 
PKS shares with other Islamists the objective of turning Indonesia into an Islamic state as 
commonly perceived by Western commentators, the party does not believe there is a 
shortcut to that distant objective. It has to be reached through disciplining of the 
individual and gradually transforming society, not through violent rebellions. In this 
sense, one could argue that as an Islamic party, PKS follows democratic rules and 
believes that elections as a pillar of democracy should be fully respected and abided by. 
In his comment to how PKS was involved in the democratization process, Bruinessen 
moreover says: 
…the Partai Keadilan (Sejahtera) is one of the very few forces in the political 
arena that may seriously contribute to a gradual democratization of the country. 
One reason for believing this is that, unlike other jamaah based movements, it 
believes in participation in the existing political system and in changing society 
through persuasion of individuals rather than through grabbing power.15 
 In line with Bruinessen’s comments, R. William Liddle, a veteran Indonesianist 
and political scientist from the United States, also appreciated what the leaders of PKS 
have done to actively participate and support democracy in abiding by democratic rules. 
Liddle says: 
In supporting democracy and the rule of law, PKS leaders have explicitly 
differentiated themselves from Islamist groups that use or condone 
violence….PKS cadres are instructed to demonstrate peacefully, to underscore the 
                                                 
14Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democracy” (paper 
presented at the Third International Conference and Workshop Indonesia in Transition, organised by the 
KNAW and Labsosio, Universitas Indonesia), Jakarta, August 24-28, 2003, 16. 
15Ibid, 18. 
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party’s claims that it is different from other Islamist groups and that Islam is 
rahmatan lil’alamin, a blessing for the whole world.16 
Liddle’s appreciation of the party as a peaceful movement was strengthened by 
the fact that PKS during the campaign periods was commonly known as the party that 
could manage its constituents by presenting a peaceful campaign image. Although huge 
numbers of participants and constituents of the party attended the campaigns, they 
successfully portrayed themselves as very polite and very peaceful. This peaceful 
campaign actually was instructed by the party’s leadership as pointed out in the party’s 
campaign guidelines. The party also encouraged other parties to maintain a very peaceful 
campaign as noted in the following pronouncement:  
PKS mengajak seluruh partai politik peserta pemilu untuk melaksanakan 
kampanye secara tertib, edukatif, antraktif, aman dan damai. Untuk itu maka para 
pemimpin partai politik peserta pemilu harus peduli dan mengerahkan massa 
pendukungnya agar tidak menjurus pada provokasi permusuhan, melanggar 
hokum dan tindak kerusuhan lainnya terutama ketika masa kampanye dimulai.17 
PKS encourages all political parties that participate in the election to hold an 
order, educative, attractive, safe and peaceful campaign. For this to be achieved, 
all leaders of political parties participate in the election should inform their 
constituents not to break election laws and not to provoke other parties’ 
supporters which lead them to violence when the campaigning period begins.  
In its official document, PKS further provided ethical guidelines for the campaign 
that all their cadres should commit to these rules as follows: 
(a) ikhlas dan membebaskan diri dari motivasi rendah, (b) menampilkan partai 
dan menyampaikan program-programnya dengan cara yang sebaik-baiknya 
(ihsan), (c) tidak memaksa, (d) tidak jatuh pada dusta/bohong, (e) tidak 
mengucapkan janji secara berlebihan (f) tidak jatuh dalam ghibah, caci maki dan 
                                                 
16R. William Liddle, “Indonesian Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules,” in The Architecture of 
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2003), 34, http://www.oup.com/online/oso/ (accessed May 14, 2007). 
17Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik 
PK & PKS Periode 1998-2005 (Bandung: Harakatuna, 2007), 109. 
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cemooh, (g) tetap menjaga rasa ukhuwah islamiyah, (h) tidak memuji-muji diri 
sendiri, (i) memberikan kemaslahatan bagi bangsa, (j) dilakukan secara tertib dan 
tidak mengganggu pihak lain, (k) selalu ingat akan kewajiban utama (l) memberi 
keteladanan yang baik (uswah hasanah).18  
(a) Act sincerely and free oneself from bad motivation (b) show the party to the 
people and deliver its programs with a good manner, (c) do not force people to 
vote (d) do not lie in campaign (e) do not promise excessively (f) do not swear (g) 
keep Islamic brotherhood (h) do not be arrogant (i) give benefit for the nation (j) 
campaign peacefully and do not disturb other people (k) always remember the 
main duty (l) give a good example for others. 
The positive attitude of PKS’s supporters during the campaign and the positive 
comments from the foreign political commentators above could have a significant impact 
not only on the PKS’ s image as a new Islamic political party but also on Muslim 
movements in Indonesia in general, showing that Islam and democracy could work side 
by side. The image of Islamic movements, which are commonly portrayed particularly in 
the western media as undemocratic and full of violence, could be improved by 
highlighting peaceful Islamic political parties like PKS. Based on my direct observation, 
the positive attitude of PKS’s members can be easily seen not only during campaign 
periods but also during the protests concerning political issues that have been coordinated 
by the PKS. 
Although PKS was a new party which did not have previous political experience, 
its presence in the 1999 general election was quite surprising particularly if we look at the 
party’s strategy in mobilizing huge but polite and peaceful supporters during the 
campaign. Unfortunately, the performance of the party during the campaign did not have 
sufficient impact to attract Indonesian voters in general. This can be clearly seen from the 
percentage of votes gained by the PKS. The party only gained 1.4 % of the vote at the 
                                                 
18Ibid. 
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national level. There was not a single province where the PKS won a majority. Only in 
Jakarta did the PKS perform better at the provincial level, and even better in all districts 
in Jakarta. It was number five, surpassing PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) and PBB 
(Partai Bulan Bintang) in all districts in Jakarta, except PKB in North Jakarta.  
The poor performance of the party at the national level could be understood if we 
look at the electoral behavior of Indonesian voters in general. It is commonly believed in 
Indonesia that the voters still tend to vote for ‘the figure of the party’ rather than to look 
at a party’s vision, mission and programs.19 During the 1999 election, the PKS relatively 
lacked a national party figure known to the Indonesian grassroots people in general. The 
national public figure was very important during the election as a vote getter. Thus, such 
figures as Megawati Soekarno Putri (PDIP), Akbar Tanjung (Golkar), Abdurrahman 
Wahid (PKB), and Amien Rais (PAN) have had a significant impact on the success of 
their parties in the election. It was reasonable and very common then for some parties in 
Indonesia to put even artists/actors as the party’s vote getter. However, the PKS, since its 
establishment, has avoided reliance on a specific leader to appeal to the public. In the 
long run, according to Baswedan20 that dependence on a prominent party leader or key 
figures may not be helpful, as support for the party may simply be a response to personal 
charisma and may not be sustainable. Party support that relies less on a prominent figure 
may be more sustainable in the long run. Baswedan’s argument could be right when we 
see that other parties in Indonesia like PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional), which relied 
heavily on charismatic figure like Amin Rais in 1999, dropped in popularity after Rais 
                                                 
19Kompas, May 19, 2000, 7. 
20Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,” Asian Survey 44, 
no. 5 (2004): 686. 
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was replaced by Soetrisno Bachir in 2005 and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) also 
dropped in popularity after Abdurrahman Wahid, a charismatic Nahdhatul Ulama leader, 
did not support a current PKB leader, Muhaimin Iskandar.   
The PKS best performance was in Depok municipality where the party gained 
6.8% of the vote. This was followed by Bogor municipality with 6.4%. Including Depok 
and Bogor municipalities, there were fourteen districts (mainly municipalities) with more 
than 4% of the vote for PKS. They are the municipalities of Depok, Bogor, East Jakarta, 
South Jakarta, Central Jakarta, North Jakarta, Bekasi, Padang Panjang, Tanjung Balai, 
Bandung and Banda Aceh; and the regencies of Pidie, Central Hulu Sungai and Bogor. In 
general, according to Aris Ananta, the PKS gained more than 1% of the vote in forty 
percent of all districts. These districts are mostly geographically located in Java and 
Sumatera.21  
Finally, looking at PKS performance during the 1999 general election, one would 
argue that although the party did not get a huge voter as predicted, the PKS’s first 
participation in an election was quite promising. In his analyses of seven major political 
parties during the 1999 election, Baswedan notes several advantages the PKS held over 
other major parties in Indonesia.22 First, the PKS had been able to contain its internal 
differences and prevent internal schism since its establishment. Baswedan is right that 
prior to the 1999 election, there was no conflict among PKS political elites. However, 
this is understandable because the PKS was a new and still-small party in which it was 
easier for them to manage the differences among the political elite compared to other 
                                                 
21Aris Ananta,  E. N. Arifin and L. Suryadinata, Indonesia Electoral Behaviour: A Statistical Perspective, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 292. 
22Baswedan, 686-688. 
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major and older political parties. Since 1999, it is commonly known by Indonesians that 
almost all big parties have experienced some degree of conflict. Second, compared to 
other big parties such as Golkar and PPP, PKS does not carry a negative baggage of past 
political power. The PKS emerged without much historical or political baggage, which 
may have boosted its appeal. As new generations of Indonesians emerged, parties of the 
past may have become less attractive. Third, the PKS, compared to other parties was 
unaffiliated with any major religious group in Indonesia. The party has the advantage of 
being perceived as unrelated to or not representing one of the two mainstream Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia: Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama. 
Fourth is that the PKS, compared to other parties, puts emphasis on its own 
activities. While almost all parties emphasize the importance of the legislative process, 
the PKS uses a different strategy in its activities. Given that the party controls only a 
small number of legislative seats, it highlights not legislative procedures but public 
services instead. In many crises such as ethnic/religious conflicts or natural disasters, the 
party set up a Pos Keadilan (Justice Post) from which its members could provide 
assistance. In December 1999, this was instituzionalized into the Pos Keadilan Peduli 
Umat (PKPU, Justice Post Concerning Muslim Society). It included assistance to farmers 
in selling their under-priced crops. Although this organization has now officially become 
independent, many still believe that all the organizational committees of PKPU are 
members and cadres of PKS. In expanding its activities, PKPU has been known by 
Indonesians as an active organization that was involved in many disasters like Aceh’s 
tsunami tragedy and conflict areas relief works in many parts of Indonesia, including 
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Ambon and Poso. Other than relief works, it keeps ummah (Islamic community) 
economics and welfare development as its main priorities.23 
The fifth strength of PKS compare to other parties is its members’ engagement 
with the party. The party successfully maintains year-round activities for its members. 
The PKS and the Tarbiyah movement are inseparable. The tarbiyah movement engages 
its members through hundreds, if not thousands, of regular, often weekly gatherings that 
usually draw only a few party faithful. These are not meetings of party elites: They are 
attended by ordinary members. This means the party has access to thousands of its 
members and cadres regularly.24 
Based on the above five strengths of the party, one would argue that after the first 
experience of involvement in the democratic process through its participation in the 1999 
general elections, the success of PKS in the 2004 election was just a matter of time. The 
performance of PKS in the 2004 general election will be examined in Chapter VI. In the 
following section, we shall look into how the PAS in Malaysia performed in the 1999 
election. A comparison between PKS and PAS will then follow. 
PAS and the 1999 General Election  
The commitment of PAS to a doctrine that religion and politics could not be 
separated has influenced its leading figures and members to struggle for their Islamic 
aspirations through a political institution, an Islamic political party, and not through a 
‘street parliament’. This doctrine is one of the reasons why PAS has been involved in the 
democratization process in Malaysia since its establishment in 1951. 
                                                 
23For a detail explanation of this organization, see http://www.pkpu.or.id/. 
24For a detail explanation of its cadres regular meeting programs, see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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Political Situation prior to 1999 Election: Anwar’s Case 
Throughout the last decades, Malaysians have enjoyed regular elections and 
political stability. Up to 2006, the Malaysian government has held general elections 
eleven times of which the 1955 election was the first in the country’s history and the 
2004 election was the last. Federal elections are held at intervals no longer than five 
years. The federal parliament holds 193 members, who are elected from territorially 
delimited single-member constituencies with plurality voting. Each of the states has a 
unicameral State Legislative Assembly, whose members are elected at the same time as, 
and in similar manner to, the federal elections. 25 
The PAS, as an Islamic party which respects democratic values and follows the 
democratic rules to achieve its political objectives, has participated in all the elections 
held by the Malaysian government. Since its participation in the 1955 election, the PAS 
has experienced ‘up and down’ support from Malaysian voters, particularly Malay-
Muslims who are their main constituents and supporters. 
The Asian financial crisis that started in 1997 has led to political crisis in 
Southeast Asian countries particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. For Suharto’s Indonesia, 
for example, the crisis led to the end of his 32-year reign, and led to the Indonesian 
Reformasi era.  In Malaysia, a series of street protests erupted in response to the firing 
and arrest of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on corruption and sexual misconduct 
charges.  Many Malaysians saw the charges as politically motivated. These protests, the 
first major incidents since the race riots of 1968, upset many people and are 
                                                 
25Elections for State Assemblies of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia are not held together with federal 
elections. See Rainer Heufer, “The Politics of Democracy in Malaysia,” ASIEN, (October 2002), 44.  
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unprecedented in a country that values stability. Mahathir’s popularity continued to 
decline in the wake of the economic recession, revelations of police corruption, and 
Anwar’s trial.  
The situation above continued to 1999. In that year, Malaysia held the country’s 
10th general election. After 15 months of popular demonstrations, Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Muhammad finally decided to have general election. He dissolved 
parliament on November 11, 1999 and after nominations on November 20, the country’s 
10th election was held nine days later.26  
The 1999 general elections, held at a time when Malaysia was caught up in 
political turmoil following the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. 
The consecutive corruption and sex trial of Anwar gave Malaysia’s political struggles a 
highly charged focus throughout the year. Anwar was convicted of corruption on April 14 
and was sentenced to six years in jail. That triggered four days of demonstrations in the 
capital which occasionally turned violent.27 Felker argues that the case of Anwar had 
caused the credibility of Mahathir’s government to decline particularly in the eyes of an 
opposition party like PAS:  
Anwar’s dismissal deeply eroded the government’s credibility. Numerous anti-
government websites emerged on the internet and circulation of the Harakah 
newspaper published by the PAS tripled, while the mainstream pro-government 
dailies become objects of derision.28 
 
                                                 
26Meredith L. Weiss, “The 1999 Malaysian General Elections: Issues, Insults, and Irregularities,” Asian 
Survey 40, no. 3 (May-June 2000), 413. 





Kamaruddin Jaffar, a member of PAS describes Anwar’s dismissal as a big 
political crisis in Malaysia that made Malaysians, particularly Malay majority groups, 
divided. Jaffar says: 
Fakta yang jelas terpampang di mata semua orang ialah bahawa pemecatan 
Anwar ini telah mencetuskan satu krisis yang amat besar dalam politik Malaysia. 
Hakikat bahawa pemecatan Anwar ini telah memecah belahkan masyarakat 
Malaysia khususnya orang-orang Melayu telah tidak dapat dinafikan oleh sesiapa 
lagi.29 
 
The truth of the matter is that the dismissal of Anwar has led to a huge political 
crisis in Malaysia. The reality, that Anwar’s dismissal has divided the Malaysian 
people—especially the Malays—is undeniable to whomever. 
 
The dispute between Mahathir and Anwar actually began when the economic 
crises hit Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia, as with other countries in the region, was 
forced to accept the economic reform policies introduced by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). When the IMF required greater transparency of financial systems and high 
interest rates, Anwar was willing to accept this IMF policy. Anwar even put forward the 
so-called ‘Three Ks (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Kronisme)30 principles to solve financial crisis 
problems. Unfortunately, Mahathir had a different idea about how to restructure the 
endangered financial system. Mahathir not only fixed exchange rates between Malaysian 
Ringgit (RM) and US dollars at 1:3.8, but also expanded the government’s budget on 
infrastructure and helped banks cope with their bad debts.  This dispute was one of the 
reasons why Anwar was forced to resign from his post as Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance on September 2, 1998. It was followed by his dismissal from his 
                                                 
29Kamarudin Jaffar, Pilihanraya 1999 dan Masa Depan Politik Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS Sdn. 
Bhd, 2000), 3. 
30They were Korupsi (Corruption), Kolusi (Collusion) and Kronisme (Cronyism). This idea was known as 
well in Indonesian as KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme). 
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positions within UMNO and finally he was arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) 
and accused of corruption and misconduct.31 
Anwar’s case helped pave the way for the crystallization of a united opposition 
front to the Mahathir government.32 To some extent, Anwar’s personality and the policies 
which he implemented while in governmental authority, had an important bearing on the 
opposition front and coincided with the general ideological platform of the opposition 
parties. Thus, on October 24, 1999, the leaders of PAS, DAP (Democratic Action Party), 
PRM (Parti Rakyat Malaysia) and Keadilan (Parti Keadilan Nasional) signed the 
“Manifesto Bersama: Ke Arah Malaysia Yang Adil (Common Manifesto Toward a Just 
Malaysia)” of the Barisan Alternatif (BA), insisting that the 1999 election was not about 
defeating their opponents and dividing the spoils of power among themselves. The BA 
was meant to be a broad based multiracial and multi-religious alliance of parties with the 
state goal of challenging the BN at the 1999 election and denying the ruling coalition the 
two thirds majority it had enjoyed since 1957.33 The document of this manifesto says: 
Pemerintahan BN (Barisan Nasional) melanggar berbagai prinsip dan cita-cita 
dalam pelbagai dokumen ciptaannya sendiri…mengabaikan tanggungjawab dalam 
melaksanakan Sembilan Cabaran Wawasan 2020…tidak merealisasikan slogan-
slogan laungan sendiri, yakni slogan-slogan tentang pemerintahan yang bersih, 
cakap dan amanah…Maka, kami berikrar akan bersama dengan perjuangan rakyat 
untuk melahirkan Negara Malaysia yang makmur dan adil berdasarkan system 
pemerintahan demokratik tulen; melindungi dan mempertahankan hak dan 
martabat semua rakyat serta menjamin keadilan untuk semua.34 
 
                                                 
31Juo Yu Lin, “A Structural Analysis of the 1999 Malaysian General Election: Changing Voting Preference 
of Ethnic Chinese and Malay Groups and Party”, (Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 5, 
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_northeastasia_lin.aspx?more=rc (accessed March 10, 2007).  
32Hari Singh, “Opposition Politics and the 1999 Malaysian Election,” (working paper in the Trends in 
Southeast Asian Series, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, January 2000), 35. 
33Farish A. Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 
(1951-2003) (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004), 632-633. 
34
 Manifesto Barisan Alternatif, Manifesto Bersama Ke Arah Malaysia Yang Adil (Kuala Lumpur: 
Angkatan Edaran Enterprise Sdn, Bhd, 1999), 4 and 7. 
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The ruling government BN (Barisan Nasional) broke several principles and 
objectives outlined in their own documents…they were irresponsible in the 
execution of their program of The Nine Challenges of Vision 2020…they were 
unable to realize their own public slogans, such as the slogan to establish clean, 
capable and trusted government…Thus, we (Barisan Alternatif) pledge, along 
with that of the citizens’ struggles, to give birth to a prosperous and just 
Malaysian State based on a truly democratic government system; to protect and 
defend the rights and dignities of all its citizens and ensure justice for all. 
 
This BA phenomenon was a unique phenomenon in Malaysian political history. 
DAP president Lim Kit Siang described this BA manifesto as ‘a historic event’ when for 
the first time in the history of the country four major oppositions parties had come 
together on a common platform ‘toward a just Malaysia’.35 The BA platform then, 
according to Greg Felker, “has notably omitted PAS’s longstanding call for an Islamic 
state, reflecting the DAP’s strenuous objections and the PAS leadership’s determination 
to broaden its appeal among disaffected liberals.”36 However, Felker seems to have 
misrepresented the PAS acceptance to join the coalition. PAS does not totally omit its 
objective to struggle for an Islamic state because of joining this BA coalition, as can be 
seen from the statement of Nik Aziz, the head of Majlis Syura Ulamak PAS, who said: 
“Tafsiran Negara Islam yang dikehendaki oleh PAS sebenarnya sudah terkandung dalam 
Manifesto Barisan Alternatif (BA) yang dikemukakan pada pilihan raya ke 10 itu (The 
interpretation of Islamic State wanted by PAS actually exists in the BA manifesto in the 
10th election).”37 Moreover, it is necessary to note here that this coalition seems to be the 
pragmatic tactic of members of the coalition including PAS to attract the voters prior to 
the election. Fadzil Noor, the president of PAS at that time says:  “Kita perlu adakan 
                                                 
35Lim Kit Siang, BA and the Islamic State (Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 2001), ii. 
36Greg Felker, “Malaysia in 1999: Mahathir Pyrrhic Deliverance,” Asian Survey 40, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 2000), 
53. 
37See Harakah, August 1-5 edition, 2001. 
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kerjasama dan kerjasama itu dibuat atas perkara yang kita persetujui...kita mesti akur dan 
patuh. Jadi kita gugurkan apa yang menjadi idealisme kita (we need to cooperate and that 
cooperation is made for something that we agreed for…we should agree and be obedient. 
Thus we leave behind our idealism).”38 The pragmatic reason for the BA coalition to be 
built for only a short term political objective among the members is also clear from the 
fact that two years after the election, DAP decided to pull out from the BA coalition, on 
September 23, 2001, because PAS insisted upon its objective to establish an Islamic state 
in Malaysia. Although the PAS Islamic state blue print does not contradict the BA 
manifesto in which PAS will guarantee the right of non-Muslims to live peacefully under 
PAS Islamic state, DAP decided to separate from this coalition. The BA manifesto 
clearly states: 
Kami berikrar akan mewujudkan suasana yang menggalakkan --melalui 
penyediaan prasarana, pendidikan dan perundangan-- kearah penghayatan Islam 
sebagai system hidup yang menyeluruh (ad-deen) dikalangan umat Islam, 
disamping memastikan bahawa hak masyarakat bukan Islam mengamalkan agama 
atau kepercayaan masing-masing terus terjamin.39 
 
We pledge to realize a conducive environment—by providing infrastructure, 
education and laws—towards the implementation of Islamic teachings as a 
comprehensive system of life among Muslim community, in addition to making 
sure that the rights of non-Muslim community to practice their own religions and 
beliefs are guaranteed 
 
The PAS’s ability to accept this ‘multi-religious coalition’ according to Farish 
Noor partly was due to its leaders like Kamaruddin Jaffar, Hasan Ali and Hatta Ramli 
who believed that the PAS was fundamentally committed to democracy, human rights, 
cultural pluralism and the rule of law.40 Noor could be right that these PAS leaders 
mentioned above could have significant impact on the acceptance of PAS to the BA 
                                                 
38See Berita Minggu, August 5, 2001. 
39Manifesto Barisan Alternatif, 9. 
40Farish A. Noor, 632. 
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manifesto. However, it is important to note that the breaking up of this coalition after the 
election also showed that the ulama factions represented by Nik Aziz and Hadi Awang, 
who advocate for the Malaysian Islamic state, are still strong in PAS. Noor also failed to 
see other reasons like the political tactic of the party when it accepted and joined the 
coalition of BA. Based on my interview with PAS leading figures in Kelantan, the main 
reason of PAS joined the coalision before the 1999 election was because PAS agreed 
with other coalitions’ members to make an issue out of Anwar’s dismissal as an entry 
point to challenge the ruling coalition government Barisan Nasional in the election. This 
meant that whoever led PAS at that time would agree to join the coalition as a strategy to 
attract the voters who seemed to be diassapointed with the government decision to fire 
Anwar.  
In short, the 1999 election was assumed to be a contest between the ruling 
coalition and the first-ever major combined opposition party in Malaysian history, the BA 
coalition. The question remains as to how was the BA coalition’s performance, 




The PAS participation in the 1999 election was the tenth since its establishment in 
1951. Looking at its historical record, the 1999 election was its best performance ever. In 
this election, PAS’s strength in parliament increased to 27 seats in 1999 from the 7 it won 
in the 1995 election, which means a 285 percent jump.41 Similarly, at state level, its 
strength increased 196 percent, from 33 seats in 1995 to 98 in 1999.  
                                                 
41See the Table 9 and 10 below. 
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In this election, a huge victory for PAS was given by its supporters in Kelantan 
and Terengganu. In both states, national parliament candidates from PAS defeated 
UMNO’s candidates. PAS won 10 seats in Kelantan and 7 seats in Terengganu. It also 
won 8 seats in Kedah, defeating BN which only gained 7 seats. PAS’s victory can also be 
seen in Perak, which gained 2 seats.42 
At the state level (State Legislative Seats), for the first time in the party’s history, 
PAS gained a huge victory with 98 seats. It gained 28 seats in Terengganu and 41 seats in 
Kelantan in which since 1990 PAS had always been victorious. Besides Kelantan and 
Terengganu, which were commonly assumed to be the party’s main support bases, PAS 
also won in several states. The party won 12 seats in Kedah, 6 seats in Pahang, 4 seats in 
Selangor, 3 seats in both Perak and Perlis and 1 seat in Pulau Pinang. However, PAS 
failed to gain a seat in Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor, Sarawak and Sabah. 
 PAS’s victory in Terengganu was surprising because it took over BN’s 
domination.  Although there was an argument that PAS took over in Terengganu by 
pretending to impose Islamic-style government, with its ramifications for Malaysia’s 
form of government, Weiss argues that, regardless, Malay and non-Malay voters may 
well have voted for PAS as a vote against UMNO and BN rather than for PAS’s 
Islamization program.43 In line with this argument, Farish A. Noor suggested that: 
This vote of frustration against UMNO is not necessarily a vote of endorsement 
for the Islamist agenda of PAS. PAS should not be led into thinking that the 
massive show of support it has received is in any way an indication that the 
Malaysian public endorse its controversial and problematic project of creating an 
Islamic state in Malaysia.44 
                                                 
42New Straits Times, December 1, 1999, 32. 
43Meredith L. Weiss, “The 1999 Malaysian General Elections: Issues, Insults, and Irregularities,” Asian 
Survey 40, no. 3 (May-June 2000), 426. 




Weiss and Noor seem to be right in arguing that the support for PAS was not the 
endorsement of Malaysian voters for the Islamic state project of the party. However, the 
fact that PAS still upholds their objective to establish Islamic state could not be ignored 
as a factor in their 1999 election’s victory. The fact that two PAS figures at that time, the 
late Fadzil Noor and Nik Aziz, who still advocated an Islamic state but adopted a more 
moderate Islamic agenda as can be seen from their endorsement to join BA coalition in 
1999, aligned with the political situation after the dismissal of Anwar, could be seen as 
factors that led to the PAS victory. The fact that PAS does not totally ignore its objective 
of establishing the Islamic state in their 1999 election could be seen from the statement of 
one of the leading figures of PAS. In my interview with Husam Musa, PAS Vice 
President, in his office at Kelantan Darul Naim he states: 
Dalam masa pilihan raya 1999, PAS masih berkampen untuk perjuangan negara 
Islam ditambah dengan kampen bahwa Islam akur dengan prinsip-prinsip 
demokrasi, hak asasi manusia dan keadilan sosial, juga PAS sebagai obat 
menghadapi kesukaran yang disebabkan oleh buruk dan prilaku rasuah 
pemerintahan UMNO.45 
 
During the 1999 general election, PAS was still campaigning for the struggle of 
an Islamic state.  PAS advocated that Islam was in line with the principles of 
democracy, human rights and social justice. In addition, PAS was likened to 
medicine that would cure the difficulties caused by the bad and corrupt 
behaviours of UMNO’s government. 
 
Another PAS leader, Fadzil Noor in his 45th Ucapan Dasar Muktamar Tahunan in 1999, 
five months prior to the election says: 
Islam yang menjadi dasar perjuangan PAS adalah bertujuan untuk menegakkan 
keadilan. Ciri keadilan yang diperjuangkan oleh PAS adalah bersifat universal. 
Keadilan ini bukan tertumpu kepada orang Melayu sahaja atau untuk orang Islam 
sahaja. Orang Melayu Muslim punya hak dan tanggungjawab yang akan 
dilaksanakan. Bagi orang bukan Islam pula, mereka punya hak dan 
tanggungjawab yang perlu ditunaikan. Tanggungjawab mereka adalah untuk 
                                                 
45
 Interview with Husam Musa in Kelantan, July 12, 2006. 
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memelihara negara ini sebagaimana rakyat lain memliharanya. Kalaulah 
tanggungjawab sudah dipinta dari non-Muslim, Islam menetapkan pula hak-hak 
yang perlu disempurnakan oleh negara. Perbezaan aqidah dan kefahaman tidak 
boleh dijadikan asas untuk tidak berlaku adil seperti disebut dalam Al-Quran.46 
 
The Islam that became the basis of PAS’s struggle aimed to uphold justice. The 
feature of justice that PAS fought for has universal characteristics. This justice is 
not merely directed at the Malay and Muslims only. The Malay-Muslims have 
rights and responsibilities that need to be addressed. For non-Muslims also, they 
also have rights and responsibilities that need to be met. Their responsibility is to 
take care of the country as other communities do. If that responsibility has been 
requested from non-Muslim communities, Islam has determined that their rights 
should be secured by the state. The differences between faiths and beliefs can not 
become an excuse to perform injustices as outlined in the holy Quran. 
 
Although one of the factors to the PAS win in Terengganu and other states was 
seen by many as an ‘upset’ to the BN, as can be seen from the above explanation, the 
inroads made by PAS are suggestive of a longer term trend evident already in the 1995 
election.47 Thus, the PAS victory in Terengganu is perhaps not a surprising outcome after 
all. Moreover, even before Reformasi, PAS’s chances were good in Terengganu, Kedah 
and Perlis as well as Kelantan. 
                                                 
46Fadzil M. Noor, Koleksi Ucapan Dasar Muktamar PAS Kali Ke 36 Hingga 48 (PAS Kawasan Ledang, 
2003), 286. 
47Edmund Terence Gomez, The 1995 Malaysian General Elections (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1996), 44. 
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Parliament States Parliament States 




162 238 148 -8.64 281 -16.86 
UMNO 89 230 72 -19.1 176 -23.48 
MCA 30 70 28 -6.67 68 -2.86 
MIC 7 15 7 0 15 0 
Gerakan 7 23 7 0 22 -4.35 
PBB 10 - 10 0 - - 
SUPP 7 - 7 0 - - 
SNAP 3 - 4 33.33 - - 
PBDS 5 - 6 20 - - 
Independent 1 - 1 0 - - 
UPKO - - 3 300 - - 
SAPP 2 - 2 0 - - 
LDP 1 - 1 0 - - 
Oppositions 30 56 45 50 113 101.79 
DAP 9 11 10 11.11 11 0 
PAS 7 33 27 285.71 98 196.96 
Semangat 46 6 12 - - - - 
PBS 8 - 3 -62.5 - - 
STAR - - - - - - 
Keadilan - - 5 - 4 - 
MDP - - - - - - 
Independent - - - - - - 
Total 192 394 193  394  
Source: Zakaria Haji Ahmad (2000), 10 
 
Table 8: PAS’s Performance during the Election 1955-2004 (Parliament Seats) 
Year of 
Election 


















The PAS’s victory in the 1999 election cannot be separated from the good 
cooperation of its leaders, both younger generations and the party’s senior ulama. While 
younger generations of PAS were busy wooing new voters and potential supporters in the 
urban areas, the senior party’s leaders were occupied with the task of keeping the ranks in 
order and strengthening the party’s hold on its traditional bases of power in the Malay 
heartland.48   
While the younger PAS leaders were trying to win over the support and 
confidence of the non-Malays and non-Muslims, the more senior party ulama were 
addressing themselves exclusively to the Malay-Muslims. During the campaign, the 
senior ulama like Fadzil Noor and Nik Aziz kept telling their constituents that PAS was 
the best alternative party for Malay-Muslims in the country; even prior to the 2004 
election this promotion was still kept by PAS as their popular slogan. Nik Aziz says: 
Ada lima sebab mengapa PAS boleh menjadi parti alternative kepada orang 
Melayu. Pertama, kebanyakan ahli-ahlinya terdiri daripada orang-orang Melayu 
beragama Islam, yang mudah menarik sokongan, simpati dan kepercayaan 
daripada orang Melayu Islam, tidak seperti UMNO yang mana ahli-ahlinya ada 
orang Melayu dan bumiputra bukan beragama Islam. Kedua, perjuangan Islam 
yang dibawa oleh PAS mendapat sokongan padu daripada orang-orang Melayu 
beragama Islam yang mempunyai cita-cita dan harapan yang sama dengan PAS. 
Ketiga, kelantangan PAS membela hak, nasib dan kepentingan orang Melayu 
menaikkan imej PAS sebagai kubu terakhir pertahanan orang Melayu. Keempat, 
kewibawaan akhlak pemimpin PAS menjadikan PAS sebagai parti yang dihormati 
dan dikagumi oleh segenap lapisan masyarakat, tidak seperti UMNO yang mana 
pemimpinnya yang banyak tidak berakhlak dan terlibat dengan pelbagai skandal 
yang mengaibkan. Kelima, keupayaan PAS mentadbir Terengganu dan Kelantan 
walaupun ditekan dan ditindas oleh kerajaan Persekutuan boleh terus mentadbir 
dengan jayanya berdasarkan kemampuan yang ada.49 
 
There are five reasons why PAS can become an alternative party for the Malays. 
Firstly, the majority of the PAS elite echelon consist of Malay-Muslims that will 
easily attract support, sympathy and trust from Malay-Muslims voters; unlike 
                                                 
48Farish A. Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 
(1951-2003) (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004), 628. 
49Interview with Nik Aziz in Kelantan, July 4, 2006. 
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UMNO where their elite echelon consist of Malays and indigenous members who 
are not Muslims. Secondly, the Islamic struggle that PAS brings is supported 
firmly by Malay-Muslims whose objectives and hopes are the same as PAS’s. 
Thirdly, PAS‘s daringness to help the rights, the fate and interests of the Malay 
people has raised the image of PAS as the Malay people’s final front. Fourthly, 
the dignified character of PAS’s leaders has made PAS a party that is respected 
and admired by the community, unlike UMNO whose leaders are without 
dignified character and are involved in various negative scandals. Fifthly, the 
ability of PAS to govern Terengganu and Kelantan even though they were 
pressured and oppressed by the ruling federal government, shows that PAS can 
still govern well despite  their limited capabilities. 
 
The senior ulama, who are believed by most Malay-Muslims to be a group of 
people who are the most capable to deliver Islamic teachings, also used efficiently the 
Islamic gatherings (pengajian-pengajian) in the open fields and in the madrasah (Islamic 
schools) and Islamic boarding schools (pondok pesantren) as campaign arenas in 
delivering the party’s political programs and manifesto, while delivering Islamic teaching 
at the same times to attract Malay-Muslims voters around Malaysia in general and in 
Kelantan and Terengganu in particular. Muhammad Yasin, a PAS activist in Kelantan 
says: 
Menjelang pemilihan, jentera kempen parti-parti pembangkang khususnya PAS 
mantap serta effisien sehingga mampu melaksanakan majlis-majlis ceramah setiap 
malam di pelbagai tempat diseluruh pelosok Negara. Pengaruh PAS merebak dan 
keyakinan pengundi-pengundi Melayu meningkat. Program di surau dengan 
majlis Sambutan Maulidur Rasul, Musabaqoh Al-Quran dan perbincangan 
konseptual dan epistemology Islam oleh UMNO berkurang dan digantikan oleh 
kempen PAS.50 
 
Prior to the election, the campaign machinery of opposition parties, particularly 
PAS, ran so efficiently that it could hold religious gatherings every night in 
various places around the country. The influence of PAS has spread and the 
Malay voter confidence has increased. The programs in small mosques like the 
commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth, the Quranic recitation 
competition and discussion of conceptual and epistemological of Islam 
coordinated by UMNO decrease and replaced by PAS’s campaign 
 
                                                 
50Interview with Muhammad Yasin in Kelantan, July 6, 2006. 
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From my observations in Kota Bharu, I found it a fact that the influence of PAS 
particularly in Kelatan could not be separated from the existence of religious institutions 
like mosque and Islamic boarding schools (pondok pesantren). These Islamic institutions 
in Kelantan and other places like Terengganu and Kedah still were the main instruments 
of PAS support up to the time of my research. The PAS senior ulamas’ success in using 
Islamic institutions and issues to attract Muslim voters was admitted by their opponent 
like Najib Tun Razak from UMNO, who stated: 
Kita kalah di Terengganu kerana PAS mempunyai usaha untuk menakutkan 
rakyat dan jaminan bahawa orang yang mengundi PAS boleh ke syurga telah 
dapat mempengaruhi setengah orang melalui pengajian-pengajian…Tetapi kita 
terima hakikat itu kerana Negara demokrasi dan dalam pilihan raya kemungkinan 
untuk kalah adalah sama besarnya dengan kemungkinan untuk menang.51 
 
We lost in Terengganu because PAS’s effort to frighten the people and the 
campaign assurance that those who voted for PAS could enter paradise had 
influenced half of the citizens of Terengganu through the medium of religious 
speeches…but we accept this reality because in a democratic country and in the 
general elections, the probability to lose is the same as the probability to win.  
 
Moreover, with the younger PAS activists and intellectuals such as Dr. Hassan 
Ali, Nashruddin Mat Isa, and Dato’ Kamaruddin Jafar, PAS’s Islamist rhetoric was 
liberally peppered with references to democracy and human rights. Issues and questions 
related to democratic participation, representation, pluralism and cultural diversity were 
raised by the younger generation of PAS leaders time and again.52 These young PAS 
activists aggressively promoted the Barisan Alternatif manifesto. PAS, with other 
members of coalition, promoted a program called “Membina Demokrasi Tulen (To Build 
a True Democracy).” The BA manifesto says: 
                                                 
51See Malaysia Kini, Desember 1, 1999. 
52Farish A. Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 
(1951-2003) (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004), 622-623. 
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Demokrasi tulen memberikan ruang yang bermakna untuk penyuaraan pendapat 
orang awam dalam berbagai proses pemerintahan harian dan bukan hanya sekedar 
mengundi lima tahun sekali…kami juga akan: --memansuhkan Akta Keselamatan 
Dalam negeri dan menghentikan penahanan tanpa bicara; --memastikan 
suruhanjaya hak-hak Asasi Manusia yang bebas dan berwibawa untuk melindungi 
dan memupuk hak-hak asasi manusia rakyat, dimana keahliannya mewakili semua 
golongan utama dalam masyarakat madani; --menggubal suatu Akta Kebebasan 
Maklumat (Freedom of Information Act) bagi menjamin ketelusan dan pengaliran 
maklumat kerajaan kepada rakyat.53 
 
The true democracy gives meaningful space to the expression of the voices of the 
grass roots citizens in various processes of daily governance and not only for the 
sake of holding elections every five years…we will also:--abolish the Internal 
Security Act and stop arresting people without justifiable cause;--making sure to 
create a commission for human rights that is free and capable to protect the 
people’s rights, in which its leaders will be represented by all the ethnic groups in 
the civil society; --to draft a Freedom of Information Act to guarantee 
transparency and the flow of Royal information to the people. 
 
 
The above manifesto shows that BA centered its campaign around human rights, 
including freedom of speech, press and assembly; social justice and equity. During the 
the campaign, the PAS younger generation also insisted that the 1999 election was a good 
opportunity for Malaysian people to cooperate to change the ruling BN coalition party 
under the slogan Masa Depan Negara Dalam Tangan Rakyat. However, PAS and its 
coalition party admitted that removing the BN coalition was not an easy task without the 
support of the people in the election, as a BA manifesto states: 
Sesungguhnya amatlah sukar bagi kami-yang serba kekurangan- mengalahkan 
BN, yang sedang terus menyalahgunakan kuasanya terhadap jentera dan 
perbelanjaan kerajaan, media siaran dan cetak, serta politik wang. Walau 
bagaimanapun, penyelewengan dan penyalahgunaan kuasa BN dewasa ini telah 
membuka jalan baru yang belum pernah diterokai rakyat Malaysia sebelumnya. 
Buat kali pertama sejak kemerdekaan, kebanyakan rakyat Malaysia daripada 
semua kaum menghendaki perubahan sedangkan parti politik alternative pula 
berjaya bersatu demi keadilan. Sekurang-kurangnya kesadaran rakyat meluas dan 
                                                 
53Manifesto Barisan Alternatif, 40-41. 
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perpaduan parti alternative yang kukuh akan mengurangi dominasi Barisan 
Nasional dalam pilihan raya kesepuluh.54 
 
The truth of the matter is that it is very hard for us, due of our various 
deficiencies, to defeat BN, who are continually abusing its influence in terms of 
the military and government money, live broadcasting and printed media, and 
money politics. However, the misuse of BN power has paved a new way that has 
never been opened to Malaysians before. For the first time since independence, 
the majority of Malaysians of all ethnicities want change while alternative 
political parties have successfully united for justice. At the very least, the 
awareness of the citizens has increased and strong united alternative parties will 
reduce the domination of Barisan Nasional in the tenth general election. 
  
These younger generation leaders were also more concerned about economic and 
political matters affecting the country. During the months prior to the 1999 election, they 
spoke about the need for economic structure reform, upholding the constitution, greater 
transparency and accountability in government. Charges of cronyism, nepotism and 
corruption were brought to the fore and adopted by PAS as its new concerns.55 These 
concerns were most likely in line with the BA’s coalition in which PAS shared. The BA 
manifesto states: 
Cukup kentara bahawa dasar penswastaan Barisan Nasional dan pelaksanaan telah 
banyak diselewengkan demi menguntungkan segelintir orang dengan pendekatan 
pilih kawan (kronisme) dan pilih keluarga (nepotisme). Melalui penyelewengan 
demikian, monopoli swasta telah menggantikan monopoli awam sehingga rakyat 
dibebankan dengan harga yang terus meningkat. Di bawah BN, faedah daripada 
penswastaan dibolot oleh kroni pemimpin tertentu. Kami berjanji: Menggantikan 
dasar penswastaan kini, yang mengandung unsur udang disebalik batu, dengan 
dasar penswastaan telus yang dapat memelihara kepentingan pengguna serta 
pekerja dan menjamin hak rakyat.56 
 
It is clear enough that the basis of the privatization program of Barisan Nasional 
and implementation has been deflected to benefit their friends (cronyism) and 
family (nepotism). By deflecting it as such, a private monopoly has replaced the 
public monopoly, so much so that the citizens are increasingly burdened with 
                                                 
54Manifesto Barisan Alternatif, 44. 
55Farish A. Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 
(1951-2003) (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004), 624. 
56Manifesto Barisan Alternatif, 20. 
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rising prices. Under the BN government, the benefit of privatization has been 
replaced by the cronyism of certain leaders. We promise: to change the basis of 
the present privatization, which has ulterior motives, with a transparent 
privatization that can maintain the interest of users and workers as well as 
guarantee people’s rights.  
  
  
 In short, the victory of PAS in the 1999 election was due to several factors, both 
external and internal. Externally, PAS has benefited from the case of Anwar, which led to 
dissatisfaction among Malaysians toward the Mahathir government and led them to 
support the BA coalition (where PAS took part) instead of supporting the BN coalition.  
With regard to people’s disappointment with the ruling government, Kamaruddin Jaffar, 
one of PAS leading figures, admits that Anwar was one symbol of the people’s struggle 
arising from their dissatisfaction with Mahathir’s government. Jaffar says: 
Kebangkitan kesedaran dan gerakan rakyat yang menentang kerajaan ini ada pula 
simbol-simbolnya; Anwar dan mata lebamnya sebagai simbol utama, Wan azizah 
simbol wanita (isteri dan ibu) penyabar dan Nurul Izzah sebagai simbol dan idola 
golongan muda. Dikalangan masyarakat bukan melayu pula penahanan Ketua 
Pemuda DAP, Lim Guan Eng turut menjadikan beliau simbol perjuangan. Semua 
golongan ini pula menggunakan satu slogan atau seruan yang sama, iaitu 
Reformasi.57 
 
The emergence of the awareness and people movement that opposed the ruling 
government have its various symbols; Anwar with his bruised eyes is the main 
symbol; Wan Azizah as a symbol of the persevering woman (wife and mother) 
and Nurul Izzah as a symbol and youth idol. In the non-Malay community as well, 
the arrest of DAP young leader, Lim Guan Eng has become a symbol of struggle. 
All these groups use the one slogan or same call, namely Reformasi. 
 
 And internal party factors, particularly the effective cooperation between younger 
generation and more senior ulamas within the party, have led the PAS to attract both 
Malay-Muslim voters and non-Malay and non-Muslim voters to support the party. 
 
                                                 
57Kamaruddin Jaffar, Pilihan Raya 1999 dan Masa Depan Politik Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS Sdn., 
Bhd, 2000), 6. 
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Concluding Remarks  
Looking at their participation in the 1999 elections provides us with some 
indicators in measuring the commitment of PKS and PAS to uphold democratic rules in 
achieving their objectives. The previous discussions show that the local issues that 
appeared leading up to the elections and the differing performances of both PKS and PAS 
in their elections, are different. However, a similarity is found in the general political 
situation both in Indonesia and Malaysia leading up to the 1999 elections. This was the 
massive political change in both countries, popularly known as the reformation era, post-
Asian economic crisis.  
However, the issues emerging prior to the elections during the reformation era in 
Indonesia and in Malaysia that more or less affected PKS and PAS performance in the 
elections, are quiet different. The PKS, as a new party established during the reformation 
era in Indonesia, faced a political euphoria after Soeharto stepped down, in which more 
than forty political parties were established in the country. As a result the PKS was faced 
with fierce competition from other Islamic political parties in the country. The PAS, on 
the other hand, faced the dismissal of Anwar as the main issue in Malaysian politics prior 
to the election. These political situations in both Indonesia and Malaysia influenced the 
strategy and performance of these two Islamic parties in running during the elections of 
1999. 
As a new Islamic political party, PKS still shared the objective of turning 
Indonesia into an Islamic state in their political agenda during the 1999 election (an 
objective also pursued by other Islamic parties like PBB-Partai Bulan Bintang) which 
some argue was one of the factors that undermined the PKS performance during that 
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election. PKS failed to pass the 2 percent electoral threshold and their achievement was 
still short of their target of 10 percent of the voters. Different from PKS, PAS in Malaysia 
performed well in the 1999 election and if we look at its historical record, the 1999 
election was the PAS’s best performance ever. Although the commitment of PAS to 
promote its objective to establish an Islamic state could not be ignored, its strategy to join 
and lead the BA coalition could be seen as a major factor in its 1999 election victory. 
This means that the political situation in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as the level of 
experience of PKS and PAS in running the election (this was the first for PKS and tenth 
for PAS), had a significant impact on their performance during the elections. 
As a long-established party in the country, PAS on the one hand, successfully 
utilized its leaders as an asset to attract significant voters. The good cooperation of its 
leaders, both younger generations and the party’s senior ulama, paved the way for PAS to 
be victorious in the election. PKS, on the other hand, had relatively few numbers of 
charismatic party figures known to the Indonesian grassroots people and this seemed to 
contribute to its poor performance. This could be understood because PKS was only a  
year-old party during the election. There was not a single province in Indonesia where the 
PKS won a majority.  
While the PAS senior ulama used the Islamic gatherings (pengajian-pengajian) in 
the open fields and in the madrasah (Islamic schools) and Islamic boarding schools 
(pondok pesantren) as a campaign tactic in delivering the party’s political programs to 
their constituents in the grass-roots level in Malaysia, the PKS as an Islamic party did not 
have charismatic figure like ulama to attract their voters. This could be understood 
because although both PKS and PAS claimed to be Islamic parties, they have had 
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different historical establishments. PKS began from the tarbiyah movement, which 
consists of educated students/scholars and middle class Indonesians as party generators, 
while PAS from the beginning of its establishment had been supported by ulama. 
Finally, looking at their performances during the election of 1999 in their 
respective countries clearly both PKS and PAS could learn from each other to increase 
their popularity among their constituents and voters. While PAS had it biggest support 
ever, since its establishment, during its participation in the 1999 election, conversely PKS 
was not as successful as predicted.The question remains, then, of comparing how both 
parties performed in the 2004 election. Did PKS gain more seats in the parliament and if 
so what were the factors leading to their success? Did PAS maintain their success in the 
2004 election as well? And what were the factors leading to PAS’s victory or loss? In the 


















Photo 4: As part of a cadre’s training, it is common for PKS member to bring their 





Photo 5: A researcher participated in the protest rally as a part of his approach to dig 








PKS Performance in the 2004 Indonesian General Election 
The Indonesian General Election of 2004 could be seen as the largest and most 
complicated election in Indonesian history, differing from previous elections in scope, 
procedure and mechanism.  The Constitution was amended to include a two-round direct 
election for the president and vice-president as well as to establish a second, regionally-
based Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD). This was only the 
second election after the introduction of competitive multi-party elections in 1999, and 
therefore an important milestone in the process of democratic development in 
Indonesia.58  
Sri Nuryanti has pointed out several differences between the 2004 general 
election and the 1999 election in terms of purpose, procedure, participants, mechanism, 
and quota for female voters. To make it clear, Nuryanti briefly summarized her findings 
of the differences of the 2004 election compared to previous one in her table below:59 
                                                 
58Tone Sissener, “The Republic of Indonesia: General and Presidential Elections April-September 2004,” 
NORDEM Report 12, University of Oslo, (October 2004): 1. 
59Sri Nuryanti, “The 2004 Indonesian Legislative Election: New Means to the Same Ends?,” Kyoto Review 
of Southeast Asia 6, (March 2005): 1. 
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Table 9: The Differences between 1999 and 2004 Indonesian Election 
1999 Election 2004 Elections 
Purpose: 
To choose legislative members of the DPR (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, House of Representatives) and 
the DPRDs (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, the 
local legislatures) only. 
Purpose: 
To choose members of the DPR, the DPRDs, the 
DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional 
Representative Council, the new upper house), and 
the president and vice president 
Procedure: 
Single-stage election for members of the DPR, 
DPRD I (provincial legislatures), and DPRD II 
(municipal legislatures) 
Procedure: 
Single-stage legislative elections held separately 
from a two-round direct election of the president 
and vice president 
Participants: 
48 political parties 
Participants: 
24 political parties 
Districting: 
Electoral districts determined by administrative 
regions (province, regency/city). 
Districting: 
Electoral districts determined by the Election 
Committee based on criteria that each district be 
allocated 3 to 12 seats, depending on its population  
Mechanism: 
Voters choose political party symbol 
Mechanism: 
Voters choose political party symbol and candidate 
name or party symbol alone 
Other: 
No regional representatives chosen directly by the 
voters 
No quota for female candidates 
Other: 
Voters directly elect DPD (Regional 
Representative Council) members 
Quota of 30 percent for female candidates 
 Source: Sri Nuryanti (2005), 2. 
 
From the above table, it is clear that different from the previous election, the 
purpose of the 2004 election was not only to choose the members of Parliament but also 
to select the president and vice president directly. Thus three separate elections were held 
during the 2004 general election. The first on April 5, simultaneously chose members of 
National Parliament (DPR), the new senate-like Regional Representative Council (Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah) and representatives for all provincial, district and municipality-level 
legislatures throughout the country. It was then followed by the first round of presidential 
election held on July 5 and final presidential election on September 20, 2004. 
One of the new characteristics of the 2004 election was the listing of candidates. 
Different from previous elections in which the voters did not know the candidates list and 
only voted for the party’s symbols, in 2004 the candidates’ names and party appeared in 
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the ballot paper (Kertas Suara). The system of representation used was a form of open-
list proportional representation. The system used in the 1999 election was closed list 
proportional representation, which was perceived to give the political parties too much 
control when it came to which candidates took which position on the list.60  Although the 
candidates were chosen by the political parties, for the first time the process of 
candidates’ selection became somewhat competitive. A number of parties, including 
PKS, employed a scoring system to select candidates. The scoring was based on the 
party’s criteria, which included a candidate’s loyalty, position within the party, activities 
for the party, and educational background.61 
In addition, the 2004 elections were the first held under the new electoral system. 
As in 1999, the Indonesian General Election Commission or Komisi Pemilihan Umum 
(KPU) was responsible for electoral administration. However, the reforms created a new 
independent KPU with 11 members appointed in April 2001 for a five-year term. These 
members were assisted by a secretariat of about 500 civil servants seconded from various 
government ministries including the Ministry of Home Affairs. The KPU is a permanent 
structure at the national, provincial and regency/city levels. At the provincial levels 
(Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah/KPUD) there were approximately 1,000 members and 
staff and about 12,000 at the regency/city level. For the elections, temporary bodies were 
created at the sub-district and village levels with approximately 5.7 million election 
committee and polling station staff.62  
                                                 
60Tone Sissener,  8. 
61Sri Nuryanti, 1. 
62Sue Nelson and Lia Juliani, “Final Report Election 2004 Support Program,” Program Evaluation, United 
Nations Development Program,(Jakarta: October 2004): 8. 
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Electoral complaints were handled through a system of Election Supervisory 
Committees (Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum, PANWASLU) formed by the KPU. 
The PANWASLU was a temporary body with offices, members and staff at the national, 
provincial, regency/city and sub-district levels. It processed complaints, investigated and 
resolved non-criminal disputes. Election administrative cases were referred to the KPU 
for resolution while criminal offenses were referred to the District Courts. Disputes of 
election results were handled by the Constitutional Court. 
Although the 2004 election was very complicated under new legislation, with 24 
political parties participating and several problems occurring, it was assumed that the 
election had run well and was democratic. Several scholars and analysts, both domestic 
and foreign, have given positive comments on the success of the election. Jusuf Wanandi, 
for example, says: “Elections were not only very peaceful, democratic and honest, as 
were those of 1999, but they also were held without extreme emotional outburst or 
demonstration during the campaign period.”63 In addition, R. Dillon believes that even 
before the April 5, 2004 legislative election, Indonesians had made remarkable strides in 
democratizing their government and society, and the outcome of the election is less 
important than the success of the process. Dillon’s appreciation of the 2004 election 
process was not without reason. He says: 
2004 elections are more than just an exercise in Indonesian democracy; they 
feature institutional improvements in the elections process over 1999 elections at 
least for five reasons: (1) voters were able to select regional representatives to the 
legislature, and for the first time in Indonesian history, voters went to the polls to 
directly select their President and Vice President, (2), the newly elected 
legislatures did not longer contain members of the military and police, (3), 
Indonesian civil society continued to mature, (4), police have been able to enforce 
                                                 
63Jusuf Wanandi, “The Indonesian General Elections 2004,” Asia-Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (2004): 116. 
 199
order at political campaign rallies, and (5) the Jakarta stock exchange has been 
unaffected by the campaign seasons, indicates political stability.64  
 
In short, the 2004 general elections have showed the maturity and mushrooming 
of democracy in the most populous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. And the 
elections, according to Wanandi, were most likely critical to Indonesia’s future 
development. He put forward several reasons to justify the importance placed on the 2004 
elections: (1) It was held at the time when reforms were assumed to be slowing down, (2) 
corruption had become more rampant, (3) security remained a problem to be overcome, 
(5) the rule of law and the judiciary had not improved while unemployment was high and 
on the rise, and (6) foreign investment had not come back since the financial crises of 
1997-1998. Thus, the elections were highly expected by Indonesians to produce leaders 
in parliament and government who could guide Indonesia back to normality and high 
economic growth as before the 1997 economic crisis.65 
 
From Partai Keadilan to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
The Law on Political Parties (UU No. 2/1999), chapter VII, article 39 on a party’s 
participation in the election stipulates that to be eligible to participate in the 2004 
election, a party should pass the electoral threshold in the previous (1999) election.66 
Under this criterion, parties unable to meet these stipulations, including Partai Keadilan 
(PK), were required to satisfy KPU that they had offices in at least two-thirds of the 
                                                 
64Dana R. Dillon, “Elections in Indonesia: Already a Success,” see 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asiaandthepacific/wm469/cfm, (accessed October 20, 2006). 
65Jusuf Wanandi, 116. 
66Based on this law, to be eligible to participate in the election, a party  at least  should gained two percent 
seats at National Parliament (DPR) or three percent of Regional Parliament seats (DPRD I) or District 
Parliament (DPRD II) in at least half of the country’s provinces and half of its districts in the provinces.    
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country’s provinces and two-third of its districts in the provinces.67 Thus, some 1999 
parties-contestants changed their names and merged and contested in the polls under 
different names, while others were splinters from the larger parties. 
Based on the requirement above, only six parties which contested in the 1999 
election passed the electoral threshold; these were the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (PDIP) which got 33.7 per cent of the votes, Partai Golkar (22.4%), Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan  (10.7%), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (12.6%), Partai Amanat 
Nasional (7.1%) and Partai Bulan Bintang (2.0%). Although Partai Keadilan (PK) 
stayed among the seven biggest parties in the polls, it only gained 1.7% of the votes and 
therefore to be eligible to participate in the 2004 election, the party had to either merge 
with other parties or establish a new party. This was big challenge faced by the PK as a 
new party to prove whether they would continue to follow the rules of democracy to gain 
their ideological objectives. 
As a party committed to the procedures of democracy and the rule of law, the PK 
tried to respond to this challenge both inside and outside parliament. Outside the 
parliament building, the party’s elites tried to lobby other Islamic parties which had failed 
to pass the electoral threshold to merge with them and establish a new party. Inside 
parliament house, the members from the PK formed several political lobbies with other 
parliament members from the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and Partai Bulan 
Bintang (PBB) in order to make other Islamic parties support the PK in amending the 
                                                 
67Leonard C. Sebastian, “The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 
(August 2004): 258. 
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1999 Election Law to postpone the 2% electoral threshold requirement until the 2009 
general election. The efforts of PK parliament members were unsuccessful.68 
Another alternative solution proposed by the PK was to establish a new political 
party. Thus, in 2001, an official meeting among party elites was held to discuss whether 
they would continue their political struggle and dakwah through the political party or not. 
Two different ideas came up at the meeting. The first was to move their dakwah activities 
away from participating in elections to become a more “cultural dakwah.” They would be 
brought about by changing the PK from a political party to a Muslim mass organization, 
like Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah organization.  
The second proposal was to establish a new political party, which in symbol and 
name would be slightly different from the existing PK party but with the same mission 
and vision. After several meetings and discussions, the PK’s political elite agreed to 
change its name from Partai Keadilan (PK) to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Thus, 
on April 20, 2002, a new party by that name was officially declared. The additional name 
“Sejahtera” (prosperous) was agreed upon by the party’s leaders.  
In his comment to the addition of Sejahtera to the party’s name, Almuzammil 
Yusuf, one of the founding fathers of PKS, says: Adapun landasan filosofis dalam 
penamaan ‘sejahtera’ yaitu untuk memberikan tekanan yang lebih besar, bukan saja pada 
perjuangan hukum pada tingkat politik, tapi ingin menyelesaikan persoalan kesejahteraan 
yang ada pada masyarakat tingkat bawah (“The philosophical bases of its additional name 
‘prosperous’ is not only to strengthen its legislation struggle at the political level, but also 
                                                 
68Aay Muhamad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim 
Indonesia Kontemporer (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), 288. 
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to actively be involved in solving the problem of prosperity at the grassroots level.”69  In 
other words, the additional word sejahtera in the Indonesian context implies 
strengthening the party struggle in the sense that the Indonesian people not only expect 
‘keadilan’ or justice (as in the original name Partai Keadilan) but that, also, the grassroots 
people in general hope that they can become prosperous people in a prosperous nation. 
Thus, it is reasonable for PKS to add ‘padi’ (rice) in their party’s symbol. 
Looking at both the PK’s and PKS’s political missions and visions, it can be seen 
that although the texts are slightly different, their meanings are nevertheless almost the 
same. The vision of the PK states: ‘menjadi unsur perekat dan pengarah kesatuan umat 
dan bangsa’ (becoming an adhesive and a guidance staff for people and nation unity),70  
while the PKS vision says: ‘sebagai partai dakwah penegak keadilan dan kesejahteraan 
dalam bingkai persatuan umat dan bangsa’ (as a dakwah party which upholds justice and 
prosperity under the framework of unity between community and nation).71 In terms of 
their mission, the PK and PKS have also had a quite similar mission. The mission of the 
PK is to have positive contributions to the enhancement and advancement of world 
civilization, while the PKS’ mission is to have positive contributions in upholding justice 
and rejecting violence, especially for Muslim countries that are under threat. Here, it is 
clear that both PK and PKS have similar missions to actively involve themselves in 
establishing a more peaceful and civilized world. Based on the same vision and mission 
above, in the 8th -Musyawarah Majlis Shura Partai Keadilan held at Wisma Haji, Bekasi 
on April 17, 2003, the Partai Keadilan (PK) officially decided to transform itself to the 
Partai keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). The transformation of the PK to PKS could also be 
                                                 
69Interview with Almuzammil Yusuf in Jakarta, May 17, 2006. 
70See DPP Partai Keadilan, Sekilas Partai Keadilan  (Jakarta, 1998), 46-47. 
71See http://www.pks.co.id (accessed February 11, 2007). 
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seen from the founding fathers of PKS such as Muzammil Yusuf, Ahzami Samiun Jazuli 
and Nasir Zein who also became founding fathers of the PK when it was previously 
declared on August 9, 1998.  
After changing its name from the Partai Keadilan (PK) to Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS), crucial questions appeared about the extent of the challenges and 
prospects for the PKS in the 2004 general elections. Kamarudin pointed out several 
factors that could benefit the PKS in the 2004 election and enable it to be more successful 
than during the previous election. He mentioned the complicated electoral system, the 
good image of PKS as a new party, and public dissatisfaction with Megawati’s 
presidency.72 The complicated electoral system and procedures applied in the 2004 
election would lead to much larger numbers of kertas suara tidak sah (invalid paper-
ballot) because most voters particularly in the villages or rural areas were not well trained 
in election procedures. Because PKS constituents and supporters mostly lived in the 
urban areas and were commonly believed to be more educated, the complicated system 
would impact less upon PKS voters as compared to other political parties’ supporters. 
The second advantage for the PKS in the 2004 election was deemed to be its 
image as an alternative and new party. Looking at the 24 parties that participated in the 
2004 election, one would assume that most still had some connection with Soeharto’s 
New Order Regime and anti-Reformation. This was evidently the case with several new 
political parties which happened to be led by political figures previously active in 
supporting the New Order regime when it was in power. In other cases, the connections 
with the New Order could be gleaned from the nature of the organizations that supported 
                                                 
72Kamaruddin, Ada Apa Dengan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Catatan Dari Warga Universitas Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Nauka, 2004), 5-8. 
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the new political parties. In this situation, the PKS as a new Islamic political party could 
have the advantage of being identified as a party totally unconnected to the Soeharto New 
Order regime and thus validating its image as a “clean” party. 
Another advantage to the PKS came from public disappointment with the 
Megawati government’s performance. Her failure to reduce the poverty and 
unemployment rates in Indonesia during her presidency would have a big impact on her 
PDIP supporters. The voters who supported PDIP in the 1999 election would have reason 
to shift their political preferences due to such dissatisfaction. In this situation, the PKS 
could play its role as an alternative political party that upholds justice and prosperity. At 
the same time, prior to 2004 general election, there was a national campaign to reject 
corrupt politicians known by Indonesian as ‘Gerakan Nasional Tidak Pilih Politisi Busuk 
(National Movement Not to Choose a Corrupt-Politician),” which began on December 
29, 2003. This campaign could be seen as a blessing in disguise for the PKS, which was 
commonly believed to be a party that supported good and clean governance in Indonesia. 
The 2004 election was not without challenges for the PKS as a new party. The 
new electoral system that went into force in 2004, for example, did not apply the 
‘stembus accord system’ as in the previous election.73 During the 1999 general election, 
the Partai Keadilan benefited from this stembus accord system, which enabled the party 
to have 7 seats in the national parliament. If this stembus accord system had not applied 
in the 1999 election, the Partai keadilan would not have had a single seat in the 
Indonesian parliament. 
                                                 
73Stembus accord literally means regulating (and dividing) the left-over votes. It as an agreement made 
between parties to combine their remainders to try to win a seat in parliament. 
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The most significant challenges for the PKS and other new political parties in the 
2004 election were money politics, political terror, and the manipulation of politics. 
These three challenges, according to Kamaruddin, were the “three enemies of 
democracy.”74 Money politics was commonly assumed as very rampant in Indonesian 
political culture particularly during the campaign period. This money politics could be 
demonstrated by giving money or other valuable materials to the particular voters in 
order to attract them to vote for a particular party. This political practice was commonly 
known by Indonesians during the election period as a “serangan fajar” (dawn attack) to 
influence voters to vote for a particular party or candidate.75  
The political intimidation of the voters was also a challenge to the PKS because of 
the use of force and other pressures to make voters support certain parties or candidates. 
If the voters did not abide by the provocateur’s wish, these voters would face very 
dangerous situations not only for themselves but also for their families and their wealth.  
During election times political manipulation is commonly practiced by the incumbent or 
ruling parties, particularly on the day of the election and during the time of ballot paper 
counting.  
The three potential problems cited above, sometimes regarded as “enemies of 
democracy” presented serious challenges for the PKS during the 2004 general election. 
The party’s performance then would reflect the extent to which it could maximize its 
opportunities and overcome the treats and challenges that it faced. In the following 
section, the discussion will focus on PKS’s performance during the 2004 election. 
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75This bad political practice was known as Serangan Fajar (dawn attack) because the money was given to 
the voters in the early morning (dawn) of the day of the election. 
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The PKS in the 2004 Legislative Election 
The Indonesian General Election Commission (KPU) registered 148,000,369 
Indonesians to take part in the April 5, 2004 poll in which 7,800 candidates from 24 
political parties ran for 550 seats in the national legislative (DPR). This registration of 
voters was conducted with a new registration system created on the basis of the 2003 
census. The great bulk of the data collection process took place between April and May 
2003, through a door to door canvassing exercise that involved 250,000 enumerators.76 
In the final tally, of the 148 million registered voters, a total of 124,420,339 
people (84.06 per cent) cast ballots in the election time. Of the total number of ballots 
cast, 113,462,414 were considered valid votes while 10,957,925 were invalid ballots.77 
When the results were announced on May 5, during a plenary session of the KPU, only 
10 of the 24 parties that contested the polls endorsed the results. Hence, according to 
Sebastian, it is not an indication that the bulk of the political parties considered the 
elections illegitimate but rather a reflection that those parties who are unable to make the 
election threshold to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates would be 
unwilling to sign the election results.78 According to Liddle, the 2004 electorate was the 
most fragmented in Indonesian history. There are seven major political parties in the 
national Parliament (DPR).79 This fragmentation could make the process of formulating 
policies more difficult, because it would take more than two parties to get a majority in 
the parliament. 
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By looking at the official result of the Indonesian general election announced by 
KPU on May 5, 2004, what catches the eye immediately is the severe loss of the PDIP, 
the party of incumbent President Megawati Soekarno Putri and the success of the Golkar 
Party which remained as a potent political force. It did not suffer the significant loss of 
public support as experienced by PDIP in this 2004 election. The number of seats of 
PDIP in the national parliament (DPR) fell from 154 in the 1999 election to only 109 in 
2004. The Golkar Party that was second in 1999 with 120 seats, rose to 128 and therefore 
became the biggest party in the DPR. 
No less remarkable was the fate of newcomers Partai Demokrat that gained no 
less than 57 seats and the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) that gained 45 seats, 
compared to only 6 seats in 1999 election. PKS increased its vote mainly in urban areas 
and had especially resounding victories in Jakarta. In Jakarta, PKS won the election with 
22 percent of the vote followed by the Partai Demokrat’s 21 percent. The same 
phenomenon was seen in regional cities such as Bekasi and Depok. PKS also won in 
Banda Aceh and Padang. 
Compared with the 1999 election, Islamic political parties, including the PKS, in 
general had little presence in the 2004 election. No Islamic party requested the 
introduction of Islamic Law (Sharia), and a big coalition of Islamic parties was not 
formed.  According to Kazuhisa Matsui, there was no clear confrontation between Islam 
and nationalism in Indonesian politics on the surface.80 In line with the Matsui’s 
argument, Wanandi believes that beyond the figures and numbers of the 2004 election, 
                                                 
80Kazuhisa Matsui, The 2004 Indonesian General Election and the New Government (Institute of 
Developing Economics (IDE), JETRO, 2004), 6. 
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one should note the change of paradigm in the debate of the electorates, which has been 
divided into so-termed nationalist and Islamic parties. He further says:  
The divide between santri and abangan as defined by Clifford Geertz is perhaps 
no more relevant. The Golkar party is defined as ‘secular’ or nationalist 
(abangan), but among its leaders there are many HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam or Muslim Student Union) leaders. Although Golkar is a proponent of 
‘nationalist’ policies and programs and is open to every citizen, it is also very 
sensitive and up to date on Islamic issues and struggle in Indonesia.81 
 
The success of the PKS, which is considered to be the most conservative Islamic 
party, was actually predicted since the campaign period. Wanandi believes that the 
success of PKS could not be separated from the campaign issues that the party brought 
out, using corruption and good governance as its main themes in the campaign. This was 
the compromise PKS had made to reach out to a large mass of supporters in society. Had 
it used the Sharia as its main theme, it could not have gotten those votes.82 The PKS gain 
was not generated by a campaign for Sharia, but by its anticorruption and welfare 
strategy. The former President of PKS, Hidayat Nur Wahid says: 
Secara sederhana, tema besar (tag line) perjuangan PKS ditetapkan oleh Lajnah 
Pemenangan Pemilu (2004) sebagai: “BERSIH, PEDULI.” Ini bukan klaim 
sepihak, bahwa PKS adalah satu-satunya partai yang bersih dari korupsi dan 
peduli terhadap nasib rakyat. Namun maksudnya, kita menginginkan dan 
memperjuangkan bersama seluruh komponen masyarakat akan lahirnya 
”Kepemimpinan Nasional yang Bersih dari Korupsi dan Peduli dengan Nasib 
Rakyat.”83 
 
Simplified, the tag line of the PKS struggle was determined by Committee of 
Election Victory of PKS in 2004 as “CLEAN, CARE.” This is not a one-sided 
claim that PKS is the only party that is clean from corruption and care for the 
people. What we mean is that we want and want to struggle with all people to 
create a “National Leadership that is Clean from Corruption and Care for the 
People’s Fate. 
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As commonly known by Indonesians, the most important issues that drew the 
attention of Indonesian voters during the 2004 election were corruption and the rule of 
law, which they felt had not been seriously addressed since the advent of reformasi in 
1998. While all the parties (with differing levels of conviction) tried to make the 
eradication of such problems part of their campaign message, the PKS, according to 
Sebastian, benefited the most from such a platform, gaining a strong following among 
younger voters impressed by the party's repudiation of money politics and corruption and 
the exemplary lifestyles of their leaders. The PKS shifted its strategy from direct 
advocacy of the sharia in 1999 to calling for the application of the sharia in the fight 
against corruption, collusion and nepotism, issues the big parties had to struggle with as 
they attempted to overcome public perception of their involvement in such activities.84 
Sebastian was correct, because prior to the election PKS published their official platform 
entitled “Menyelamatkan Bangsa: Platform Kebijakan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Save 
the Nation: The Policy Platform of PKS).” In this 154 page-long document, PKS not only 
offered their programs and policies but also examined problems of Indonesia as a nation. 
Under a subheading “Agenda Penyelamatan Bangsa (Agenda to Save the Nation),” it 
said: 
(1). Membangun organisasi yang solid dan berdisiplin tinggi sebagai role model 
kekuatan reformasi; (2) Mencetak kader-kader pemimpin yang amanah, kapabel 
dan kompeten, dan konsisten dalam menjalankan tugas publik; (3) Melakukan 
pendidikan politik kerakyatan yang otentik dan membebaskan, bukan dengan 
politik uang; (4) Membangun hubungan lintas kelompok dan lintas kepentingan, 
dengan memperioritaskan kepentingan umat dan bangsa; (5) Membina moral 
generasi muda terutama dikalangan pelajar dan mahasiswa; (6) Menumbuhkan 
budaya dan gaya hidup yang sejalan dengan tuntutan syariat serta kesantunan 
masyarakat; (7) Merintis solidaritas nasional dan internasional dalam merespon 
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masalah yang berkembang; (8) Mengembangkan Pos Wanita Keluarga Sejahtera 
sebagai pusat pelayanan keluarga untuk kesehatan ibu dan anak; (9) Mendorong 
pendidikan berongkos murah; (10) Memelopori usaha swadaya berskala mikro; 
(11) Mendukung pengelolaan pers yang jujur, bebas dan bertanggungjawab; (12) 
Membangun gerakan rakyat (civil society) yang mandiri; (13) Menyemai bibit 
kepakaran dalam berbagai bidang; (14) Memompa jiwa sportivitas dalam 
beragam kegiatan olah raga; (15) Membentuk Posko Kemanusiaan di sejumlah 
daerah konflik; dan (16) Menumbuhkan kesadaran atas kelestarian sumber daya 
dalam bentuk kegiatan pencinta alam dan peduli lingkungan.85 
 
(1) Establish a solid and disciplined organization as a role model of reformation 
power; (2) Create future leaders who are trustworthy, capable, competent and 
consistent in serving the public; (3) Give an authentic and enlightening political 
education, not money politics; (4) Create inter-groups and cross-interest 
relationship, but put ummah and nation’s interest as priority; (5) Develop the 
morality of the young generation, particularly high school and university students; 
(6) Cultivate culture and lifestyle which is in accordance with Islamic values and 
people’s politeness; (7) Become a pioneer to create national and international 
solidarity in solving contemporary problems; (8) Develop Wanita Keluarga 
Sejahtera Centres as a centre of family health services for mother and children; 
(9) Develop economically accessible eduation; (10) Initiate independent micro 
economic entrepreneurship; (11) Support a trustworthy, free and responsible 
press; (12) Create independent civil society groups; (13) Cultivate prospective 
experts in all fields; (14) Encourage sportiveness in all sports activities; (15) 
Establish Humanitarian Centres in Conflict Areas; and (16) Develop awareness to 
save natural resources through programs and activities of love and care of nature 
 
Moreover, the PKS' success was a vindication of a strategy based on a strong 
cadre program combined with the massive mobilization of its party network, allowing 
them to make significant gains particularly in Jakarta.86  
The factors that led to PKS success in attracting voters during the 2004 election 
were also highlighted by Syafii Anwar, an Indonesian political analyst from the 
International Center for Islam and Pluralism, Jakarta, when he was interviewed for the 
Van Zorge Report after the election. As with the other political analysts mentioned 
above, Anwar highlighted the PKS’ well organized organization, anti-corruption focus, 
                                                 
85Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah Jawa Barat PKS, Menyelamatkan Bangsa: Platform Kebijakan Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (Bandung: Lajnah Pemenangan Pemilu DPP PKS, 2004), 44-51. 
86Sebastian, 261. 
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and withdrawal from Islamic sharia issues in their campaign as the main factors why this 
party was successful in the 2004 election.  In his answer to the question as to why the 
PKS won so many votes during the election, he explained: 
It is a combination of three factors. The first, from my own observations, is 
related to the PKS’s excellent organization. There is no single party that is as well 
organized, especially in building a strong network among the young generation, 
which they do through university campuses. Second, the PKS has a good strategy 
for convincing the constituents. They raised issues in their campaign that are quite 
important to the people: to be clean, and to care. This means that they would like 
to show the people that PKS could form a clean and concerned government. 
Clean, as in anticorruption, and care, in that the party shows they are concerned 
with the issues facing voters. The key factor though is that they did not raise the 
issues of implementing shariah law. The combination of these strategies 
influenced many people, because they can see that PKS is the only well-organized 
Islamic party. This is totally different that their strategy in 1999 when they 
demanded the implementation of shariah law… In comparison, PPP and PBB still 
demanded the implementation of shariah law. The leadership of the PKS finally 
understood that shariah was not the main issues of interest to the voters. They 
studied the necessity of addressing these other issues. I believe they learned from 
surveys that Indonesian people do not accept the agenda for implementing 
shariah, in the sense that shariah is interpreted in a strict way, related to criminal 
law, cutting hands et cetera. But the way people think about shariah is what we 
call improving your ritual obligations in order to become a devout Muslim, which 
has no relationship with implementing radical, strict criminal law.87 
 
 
Anwar’s explanation above has been accepted by several Indonesian political 
analysts who have paid special attention to the success of the PKS at the provincial level. 
For example, Heru Cahyono in his report entitled Evaluasi Atas Proses dan Hasil 
Pemilihan Umum Legislatif 2004: Study Kasus Jawa Barat, argues that the success of the 
PKS could be reasonably predicted because of good party management, a solid cadre and 
                                                 
87M. Syafi’i  Anwar, “PKS’s Vision and Strategy,” Van Zorge Report (2004): 1. 
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the hard work that the party devoted to socializing their programs.88 In West Java, the 
PKS gained third place with 14 local parliament seats below Golkar (28 seats) and PDIP 
(19 seats). Different from the success of Partai Demokrat, which relied heavily on the 
popularity of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the success of PKS mainly relied on the 
ability of their cadres to mobilize constituents and supporters. In the case of West Java 
province, Cahyono presented more factors to explain why the PKS won big support in the 
election.  
The first factor was the PKS success in building its image as a trustworthy party 
of the young generation. The grassroots constituents in West Java believed and trusted in 
PKS for its commitment to be clean and free of corruption. Enhancing support for the 
PKS was an internal social contract between the party and its legislative candidates to 
maintain the party’s mission when they were selected as parliament members, and to be 
ready to be expelled if they broke their commitment.  
 The second factor in the PKS’s success in West Java was the mass media’s role 
in enhancing the PKS’s popularity. Local media in Bandung such as Pikiran Rakyat 
covered intensively the PKS’s activities and programs during the campaign period. 
Another factor was blunders made by other Islamic parties such as PAN, PKB and PPP, 
which failed to bring to their Islamic constituents in West Java the message of 
‘reformasi’. This blunder led Muslim constituents to change their political preferences 
and vote instead for PKS. An example of media coverage which helped PKS to be more 
popular in West Java was the news about the Dana Kavling case or “Kavling-gate” which 
became media headlines prior to the 2004 election. The issue of Kavling-gate related to 
                                                 
88Heru Cahyono, “Evaluasi Atas Proses dan Hasil Pemilu Legislatif 2004: Study Kasus Jawa Barat,”  in 
Evaluasi Pemilihan Umum 2004: Analisis Proses dan Hasil Pemilu Legislatif, ed. Lili Romli (Jakarta: 
Pusat Penelitian Politik Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2004), 46-47. 
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corruption by members of local parliament in West Java (Anggota DPRD Jawa Barat). 
Only parliament members from the PKS were excluded from this corruption case; in fact, 
this corruption case was first discovered and brought to public attention by a parliament 
member from the PKS.89  
Besides in Jakarta’s province where the PKS increased its percentage of voter 
from 4.7% in 1999 to 22.3% in 2004, the increasing support for the PKS can also be 
easily found in other provinces in Indonesia if compared to its performance in the 1999 
election. For example, in Aceh, its votes increased from 1.6% in 1999 to 9.1% in 2004, in 
West Sumatra from 2.9% to 11.8%, in West Java from 2.3% to 11.5% and in South 
Kalimantan from 1.2% to 10.7%.  
Popular support for the PKS was evident even during the campaign period. 
Different from other parties, which did not use this opportunity to bring down to the mass 
level their party programs and missions, the PKS effectively used the pre-election 
campaign for political education (pendidikan politik) among their constituents and 
supporters. For example, Lili Romli, reporting on the process and results of the 2004 
legislative election in Central Java province, observed that: 
Kecuali PKS yang memberikan pendidikan politik, partai yang lainnya tidak ada, 
yang lainnya pesta dangdut saja. Kampanye dangdutan ini ternyata juga dimaui 
oleh masyarakat. Berdasarkan penelitian saya, saya bertanya kepada mereka 
maukah datang ke tempat kampanye kalau tidak ada musik dangdut, pembagian 
kaos, tidak di beri uang, hampir 90% menjawab tidak mau. Jadi motivasi orang-
orang datang ke kampanye memang kalau tidak lihat dangdutan, karena diberi 
kaos atau diberi uang bensin.90 
 
                                                 
89Kavling-gate was a state money (budget) amount of 33.4 billion rupiah, given to West Java parliament 
members by the former governor of West Java, R. Nuriana. Each parliament member received 250 million 
rupiah. Although the parliament members from PKS received the money, they distributed the money to 
poor people in West Java which lead people’s sympathy to the party. 
90See Lili Romli, “Perubahan atau Kesinambungan: Analisis Hasil Pemilu Legislatif 2004 di Jawa Tengah,” 
in Evaluasi Pemilihan Umum 2004: Analisis Proses dan Hasil Pemilu Legislatif, ed. Lili Romli (Jakarta: 
Pusat Penelitian Politik Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2004), 66. 
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Only PKS promotes political education to the voters. Other parties only provide 
entertainment music (such as traditional dangdut performance) to the voters 
during the campaign period. This music performance was also welcomed by the 
people. Based on my survey, almost 90 per cent of the supporters will only come 
to the campaigning place if the party provide entertainment music, give the 
money and party’s “attribute” or party campaign give-aways (such as t-shirt) to 
the audience. 
 
 As has been commonly believed by Indonesians, the success of the PKS in 
Central Java was also due to double-tactics applied by the party during the campaign. The 
PKS not only successfully built its image as a party which struggled for Muslim 
communities, but also at the same time was perceived by the people in Central Java as a 
clean and caring party, which was concerned with people’s needs particularly at the 
grassroots level. The people who voted for PKS in Central Java were those who believed 
in the party which worked and cared for their constituents in practice, not a party which 
only sold political propaganda and paid lip-service to programs and promises. The good 
image of the PKS and its party elite, which attracted the people to vote for it, could be 
seen from the follow comment by a supporter on the attitude of parliament member from 
the PKS in the Central Java: 
Dalam kasus PKS, saya kira tipologinya sama dimana-mana yaitu pencitraan 
partai yang bagus. Di Jawa Tengah khususnya, saya melihat prestasi dari salah 
satu wakilnya yang duduk di DPRD yang mencitrakan sebagai partai yang betul-
betul bersih dan jujur serta peduli. Ia tidak ikut-ikutan jalan-jalan ke luar negeri 
atau studi banding ke daerah-daerah lain. Dia juga menolak subsidi sumbangan 
maupun segala macam penerimaan yang controversial di mata masyarakat. 
 
In the case of PKS, I think, its typology is similar everywhere that is a good 
political image as a clean party. In Central Java province especially, I saw how a 
PKS member of local parliament projected an excellent image as clean, honest 
and caring people. They do not go on political junkets (go on trips abroad or other 
places using government funds to supposedly observe or study how things run in 
these other countries). They also rejected subsidies or other money politics which 
are controversial in the eyes of the people.91 
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In short, the official announcement of the 2004 election result “shocked” many 
Indonesians - not only political analysts but even the PKS’s own supporters. It was clear 
from the 2004 election result that PKS had become a new star in Indonesian politics. 
Although it was predicted by several survey institutions in Indonesia that the PKS would 
become a new success in the 2004 election, the prediction was that it would just gain 
enough to pass the 2% electoral threshold. Yet, the PKS not only emerged as the sixth 
biggest party in the national election, but it also became a winner in the DKI Jakarta 
province.  
 
The Presidential Election and PKS’s Position 
On July 5, 2004, for the first time in Indonesian history, the people of Indonesia 
exercised their right to elect their own choice for president. Approximately 155 million 
Indonesians, according to the KPU, voted in 574,945 polling stations throughout the 
nation’s 440 autonomous districts and towns.92 Because the Presidential election was the 
first time the Indonesian people directly voted for their favorite pair of candidates, it 
would be better to discuss here the voting results rather than party composition in 
Indonesian parliament (DPR).93 Until 1999, the President and Vice President in Indonesia 
were elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). At that time party 
composition was the most important factor in predicting the next president, but not in the 
direct presidential 2004 election.  
According to the new Election Law number 23/2003, only political parties or 
coalitions winning at least 3 per cent of the parliament seats or 5 percent of the popular 
                                                 
92See KPU website www.kpu.go.id (accessed January 21, 2007). 
93Kazuhisa Matsui, The 2004 Indonesian General Election and the New Government (Institute of 
Developing Economics (IDE), JETRO, 2004), 6. 
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vote were allowed to nominate presidential candidates and no later than seven days after 
the results of the legislative elections have been announced, the parties or coalitions must 
register the nomination of the presidential and their vice president candidates with the 
KPU.94 Thus in the 2004 presidential election, there were five pairs of candidates for 
President and Vice President nominated: Soesilo Bambang Yudoyono-Jusuf Kalla (SBY-
JK), Megawati Soekarno Putri-Hasym Muzadi, Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid, Amien Rais-
Siswono Yudohusodo and Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar. Election Law Article 66 further 
states that this presidential election is won by the pair of candidates that secures more 
than 50 percent of the vote with at least 20 percent of votes in more than half of the 
country’s 32 provinces. If no one achieves such qualified majority in the first round, then 
the best two tickets compete again in a second round that scheduled to take place on 
September 20, 2004.95 
 Looking at these five pairs, one would argue that the combination of Java and 
non-Java could be seen in SBY-JK and Hamzah-Agum, while others are Java and Java. 
The combination of Nationalism and Islam were Megawati-Hasyim, Wiranto-Solahuddin, 
and Amien-Siswono. Megawati-Hasyam also claimed the combination of Abangan Islam 
and Santri Islam. In addition, the combinations of military-origin and civilian origin 
candidates were SBY-JK, Wiranto-Solahuddin and Hamzah-Agum. There were three 
retired army generals among the presidential or vice-presidential candidates, a situation 
that according to Kazuhisa, is often referred to as “Star Wars.”96 NGO groups, which 
                                                 
94Bilveer Singh, “The 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia: Much Ado About Nothing?,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 3 (2003): 435. 
95Francois Raillon, “Islam and Democracy: Indonesia’s 2004 Election and Beyond,” European Institute for 
Asian Studies, http://www.eias.org/briefpapers.html (accessed March 12, 2007).  
96
‘Star Wars’ here means the competition among candidates who are retired starred generals. See Kazuhisa 
Matsui, The 2004 Indonesian General Election and the New Government (Institute of Developing 
Economics (IDE), JETRO, 2004), 9. 
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regard themselves as the front runners of democratization, criticized these military-origin 
candidates and it worked to the advantage of Megawati-Hasyim. 
 When the first round results were announced, the presidential candidates, in the 
order of the first-round finish, were as follows: Partai Demokrat’s Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, 33.6%; PDIP’s Megawati Soekarnoputri, 26.6%; Golkar’s Wiranto, former 
armed forces commander, 22.2%; Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional, PAN) and former head of Modernist Muslim organization 
Muhammadiyah, 14.7%; and PPP’s Hamzah Haz, the incumbent vice president, 3%. Of 
the five presidential candidates, only Hamzah Haz represented an Islamist party.97 These 
gains are very different from those achieved by political parties during the April 
legislative elections that had the Partai Democrat at the number 5 position with 7.45%; 
PDIP at number 2 with 18.53%, Golkar at number 1 with 21.58%, PAN at number 7 with 
6.44% and PPP at number 4 with 8.15%.  
This demographic map of voting patterns above makes for interesting reading.98 
The results of the presidential election indicate that the support for a presidential 
candidate and for the political party that supports the candidate is not always the same. 
This result also shows that the popularity of candidate is more influential than political 
party machinery. SBY-JK understood that in this election, voters were choosing the 
person, not the political party, and therefore strove to make direct contact with the people 
to hear their voices. SBY not only visited markets, but also watched movies with the so-
called ‘street children (anak Jalanan)’ and talked with the farmers in the villages. In 
                                                 
97R. William Liddle and Saeful Mujani, “Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,” 
Asian Survey 45, no. 1 (2005): 121. 
98Leonard C. Sebastian, “Indonesia’s Historic First Presidential Elections,” UNISCI Discussion Paper, 
(October 2004), 2. 
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addition, Hasyim Muzadi (Megawati vice president candidate) could not help to increase 
Megawati’s popularity as duo-Nationalis-Islamis presidential candidate particularly 
outside Java Island. Hasyim’s popularity was exceeded by Jusuf Kalla’s who was 
popularly known outside Java as a bureaucrat-entrepreneur. Thus,  according to Sapto 
Waluyo, the duo of SBY-JK was presumed by the public as a perpetuator of Soekarno 
(Java-Communicator) and Muhammd Hatta (Sumatera-Administrator), the first 
Indonesian President and Vice President.99 Although the Amien-Siswono’s pairs declared 
themselves as a new dwitunggal, a bad track record of Siswono as former Ministry in 
Soeharto’s era reduced public trust for Amien’s candidacy.  
The Golkar political machinery did not work optimally either. It could be 
understood as stemming from the party’s elite disappointment with Wiranto’s victory 
over Akbar Tanjung in the party’s national convention. It was commonly believed that 
the Golkar national convention was held to purify Golkar from its stigma as new Order 
supporter and to give Akbar a chance to become presidential candidate. Unfortunately, 
Akbar as a head of Golkar was defeated by Wiranto in this convention, which caused 
several of Golkar’s cadres at the grassroots level to half-hearted support Wiranto as 
presidential candidate from Golkar. The PKB’s political machinery also failed to support 
Solahuddin Wahid as Wiranto’s running mate. This could be easily seen from the fact 
that the Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid pair was defeated by SBY-JK in East Java Province, 
which was known as the PKB and NU political base and constituency. The PPP as a 
political machinery for Hamzah Haz’s presidential candidate was worse. The PPP could 
not even maintain its party’s supporters who voted for the party in the legislative election. 
                                                 
99Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah: Konsep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera di 
Masa Transisi (Bandung: Harakatuna, 2005), 287. 
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This could be seen from the fact that Hamzah Haz-Agum only won 3% of the votes 
during the first round presidential election.100 
As no candidate received an absolute majority, a run-off election was held on 
September 20 between the top two tickets headed by Yudhoyono and Megawati. 
Yudhoyono again won by a landslide, obtaining 60.6% of the valid votes cast. This result 
strengthened the argument that the popularity of the candidate was more important than 
the political party. This could be easily seen from the fact that the bigger parties’ 
coalition (PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKPB and PDS) under the name ‘Koalisi Kebangsaan’ 
which supported Megawati-Hasyim, was defeated by SBY-JK. The results of both the 
first and final rounds of direct presidential elections have been mapped by Sapto Waluyo 
in his tables below. 
 
Table10: Indonesian Presidential Election Result 
1st Round (July 5, 2004) 
No Candidates Voters Gained  Phenomenon 
1. Yudhoyono-Kalla 33.57% • A candidate’s popularity was more 
influential than party machinery. 
  
• Money politics did not change the 
political position of constituents. 
• One of the political elite  pushed 
himself  to compete in the election 
that broke Muslim voters(it seems to 
refer to Hamzah who is not really 
popular at that time but want to run 
for presidency)  
• Surveys and polling influenced the 
position of constituents in the 
election. (surveys published by the 
NGO’s institutions more or less 
have influenced the psyche of voters 
to vote a candidate who are leading 
in survey or polling result)   
2. Megawati-Hasyim 26.62% 
3. Wiranto-Salahuddin 22.15% 
4. Amien-Siswono 14.66% 
5.  Hamzah-Agum 3.01% 
Source: Sapto Waluyo (2005), 289. 
 




Table 11: Indonesian Presidential Election Result 
2nd Round (September 20, 2004) 
No. Candidates Voters Gained Phenomenon 
1. Yudhoyono-Kalla 60.6% • People had more trust in a new 
figure that would bring a change. 
• Political coalitions were not 
effective in attracting voters; 
coalitions represent political elites, 
not people. Thus, internal conflicts 
inside the party could not be 
avoided, as in PDIP, PPP and 
Golkar. 
• Bureaucracy mobilization and 
money politics could not attract 
voters; building public opinion was 
more effective.   
2. Megawati-Hasyim 30.3% • Several political elites from PKB 
and PAN wanted seats in the cabinet 
although their parties had not 
supported a winning candidate 
• The military in the SBY inner circle 
were able to influence the cabinet 
and SBY’s future. 
Source: Sapto Waluyo (2005), 291. 
 
With the victory of SBY-JK both in the first and final rounds, the remaining 
question was why SBY-JK acquired the top position. Political analysts and polling 
institutions have tried to answer the above question. According to Liddle, Yudhoyono’s 
victory was especially impressive because it was broadly based both across the party 
spectrum and demographically.101 Quoting a survey result conducted by Indonesian 
Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia), Liddle argues that the SBY-JK team won 
84.7% of the voters who had chosen Golkar in the April parliamentary election. This was 
despite the fact that the national Golkar leadership allied with PDIP in the National 
Coalition (Koalisi kebangsaan), to support Megawati in the second round.102 SBY-JK 
also won 79.5% of the voters of PKB; 84.3% of PAN’s voters, 89.2% of PKS voters, 
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78.8% of PPP’s voters and even 32.6% of PDIP voters.  Although demographically there 
was little distance between Yudhoyono and Megawati voters along the variables of 
rural/urban, region of residence, age, education and employment differences, what 
accounts for Yudhoyono’s broad support according to Liddle  was the people’s 
dissatisfaction with the poor performance of Megawati’s government prior to the 
election. Liddle says: 
And more important was Yudhoyono’s capability to capitalize on pervasive 
dissatisfaction with incumbent Megawati’s leadership of the country in which 
Indonesian voters are most troubled by the rising costs of basic commodities and 
difficulty in finding jobs.103  
 
PKS’s Position  
As a party which gained 7.4% of the votes and 45 seats in the national parliament, 
the PKS was eligible to nominate its own presidential candidate. However, the PKS stuck 
to its earlier commitment not to nominate its candidate if the party did not gain at least 
20% of the votes. Thus, when the pairs of presidential candidates were officially 
announced by the KPU, PKS supporters and constituents were waiting for the PKS’s 
decision as to which candidates they would give their political support. Before the PKS 
announced its preferences, the party’s supporters and many other Indonesian voters 
assumed that there were differing opinions among PKS leaders concerning which 
candidates to support. According to Elizabeth Fuller and Ihsan A. Fauzi, a breach opened 
up in the party between a faction led by Hidayat Nur Wahid (commonly assumed as a 
representative of the old PKS political leadership), which favored maintaining the party’s 
alliance with Amien Rais, and the faction led by the Secretary General of PKS Anis 
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Matta (as a representative of the younger PKS political elites), which favored Wiranto.104 
This different political preference was admitted by Anis Matta who claimed that when he 
openly supported Wiranto, several issues were brought up against him, such as receiving 
a huge sum of money from Wiranto (money politics) and above all being a Wiranto son 
in law. He says: “…saya diisukan macam-macam, mulai soal uang hingga dituduh 
sebagai menantu Wiranto (I was plagued by several bad rumors, starting from receiving 
illegible money to being Wiranto’s son in law).”105 Commenting on the reason why this 
internal split among PKS political elites occurred, Elizabeth Fuller further explained: 
The ‘hard-line’ faction pointed out that Wiranto’s wife and daughters wear the 
Islamic head covering (jilbab) and his son-in-law is a member of PKS. They 
argued that Wiranto had a chance to win the election with PKS support, while 
Amien was not likely to make the final round… The split illustrates the tension in 
PKS between those who seek power in order to achieve Islamist goals and 
younger idealists committed to Islam and democracy.106  
 
Fuller’s analysis, however, is oversimplified to say that there was a serious split between 
the old ‘hardline faction’ and younger generation of PKS prior to the presidential 
election. Anis Matta argues that the different preferences among PKS leaders at that time 
was normal because the Majlis Syura of PKS instructed all PKS leaders and cadres to 
scrutinize all presidential candidates and proposed their preference to Majlis Syuro before 
they decided which candidates will be recommended by PKS. Anis Matta says: 
Perbedaan pendapat di internal partai adalah normal dan wajar, jangan dilihat 
sebagai konflik yang serius. Majlis Syura memang meminta kepada seluruh kader 
dan pimpinan PKS untuk mencermati dan mengevaluasi semua calon yang ada 
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untuk direkomendasikan kepada Majlis Syura dan mereka nantinya yang akan 
bermusyawarah untuk memutuskan. PKS berharap bahwa keputusan Majlis Syura 
dapat didengar oleh seluruh kader dan simpatisan. Karena begitu Majlis Syura 
memutuskan perkara melalui mekanisme dan system syura, maka semua harus 
tunduk dan patuh atas hasil syura tersebut. Jadi, wajar kalau ada perbedaan 
sebelum Majlis Syura bermusyawarah, bukan ada konflik diantara pemimpin 
PKS. Kita semuanya tunduk dan patuh pada keputusan Majlis Syura.107 
Different opinions within a party are normal and common. I do not see it as a 
serious conflict. In fact, the Majlis Syura has requested all cadres and leaders of 
PKS to scrutinize and evaluate the performance of all (presidential) candidates 
available to be recommended to the Majlis Syura and they (Majlis Syura) will 
hold musyawarah (meeting) to make a decision. PKS hopes that the decision 
made by Majlis Syura will be followed by all cadres and sympatizers. Because 
once the Majlis Syura made a decision through the musyawarah system, all PKS 
members have to accept the decision. Thus, it is normal if there were different 
opinion before the Majlis Syura held musyawarah. This does not mean that there 
was conflict among PKS leaders. We all accept and follow the decision made by 
Majlis Syura. 
To answer the uncertainty as to whether PKS political support would be given to 
Amien Rais or Wiranto, on June 30, 2004 (less than one week prior to first round 
presidential election) the PKS officially announced its support of the Amien Rais-
Siswono Yudohusodo team in the election. In his official announcement, Hidayat 
Nurwahid (the former PKS President) stated that PKS’s decision to support Amien Rais 
for presidential candidate was decided by the PKS’ Majlis Syuro members in their 
official meeting held on June 29, 2004. In this meeting, 70% out of the 44 Majlis Syuro 
members agreed to support the Amien Rais-Siswono pair and the rest of the members 
supported Wiranto-Solahuddin, Hamzah Haz-Agum and Yudhoyono-Kalla. None of the 
Majlis Syuro members gave support for the Megawati-Hasyim pair.108 
The PKS’s decision to officially support Amien Rais as presidential candidate 
was very late, only less than one week before the election. This very late decision was 
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questioned not only by PKS constituents but also by Indonesian voters in general. 
However, this delay was understandable because such political recommendation had to 
be carefully made by the PKS, considering many factors including political preferences 
and the political-dynamism within the PKS’s leadership and ranks. This long process of 
recommendation and deep consideration can be clearly seen in a PKS official document 
which states that: 
Proses pembahasan rekomendasi yang dilakukan syura lembaga-lembaga tinggi 
partai yang mendapatkan mandat dari Majelis Syura, dilakukan dengan 
mencermati dan mempertimbangkan secara mendalam dan menyeluruh dinamika 
internal maupun eksternal partai. Dengan mekanisme internal partai yang ada, 
syura secara sungguh-sungguh telah mempertimbangkan; prinsip dan kebijakan 
dakwah, visi-misi, hasil-hasil keputusan Majlis Syura, perolehan suara pemilu 
legislative, hasil jaringg capres emas dan masukan-masukan seluruh anggota 
lembaga-lembaga Tinggi partai dan seluruh anggota majelis Syura. Pada saat 
bersamaan, syura juga mencermati dan mempertimbangkan secara mendalam dan 
menyeluruh dinamika politik eksternal terkait dengan; peta capres-cawapres yang 
ada, visi dan program mereka, proses kampanye yang berlangsung, track record 
diri capres-cawapres dan partai pendukungnya, komitmen mereka dalam 
melakukan kontrak politik dengan masyarakat, serta tingkat kedekatan visi-misi 
dan program capres-cawapres dengan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. 
 
The process of deliberations (of the recommendations) conducted by the party’s 
highest agencies (based on the mandate given by the Majlis Shura) was conducted 
through comprehensive procedures taking both internal and external political 
dynamics into consideration. Through the existing internal party mechanism, the 
deliberations (syura) has thoroughly considers: the dakwah principles and 
policies, vision and mission, the results and decisions of Majlis Syura, the votes 
gain during the legislative election, the internal poll, and also the input from both 
the members of the party’s elite as well as all members of Majelis Syura. At the 
same time, the deliberations has also taken into account the external political 
dynamics related withz; the mapping of the presidential and vice-presidential 
candidates, the candidates’ vision and mission, the ongoing campaign process, the 
track record of the candidates and the parties that support them, the candidates’ 
commitments for establishing a political contract with their constituents, and also 
the parallel of the candidates’ programs (including vision and mission) with those 
of PKS.109 
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In addition, according to Hidayat Nur Wahid, the pair of Amien Rais-Siswono 
Yudohusodo was the most likely fit with the three criteria imposed by the Majlis Syura, 
namely, “reformist, demokratis and Islami” (the candidate is pro-reformation, pro-
democracy and Islamic).”110 Amin was also considered as the only presidential candidate 
who bravely signed a political contract with Indonesian students particularly from the 
Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia (Indonesian Students Council of 
Indonesian University) which would take effect if Amien later was elected as Indonesian 
president. This political contract signed by Amien on 9 June 2004 consisted of the 
following seven points: (1) bringing Soeharto and his cronies to court, (2) law 
enforcement, (3) rejecting militarism, (4) fighting corruption, (5) improving education 
and public health, (6) restraining goods prices and (7) creating the developed nation.111 
In short, the PKS, especially the Majlis Syura as the highest institution in the 
party showed how the democratic rules had been implemented. This can be seen from the 
fact that Majlis Syura members collectively have discussed and debated to whom their 
political support would be given. All Majlis Syura members had been given equal 
opportunity to share their ideas and considerations as to whether Amien Rais or Wiranto 
would be supported. When the collective decision made by Majlis Syura had been 
officially announced to support Amien Rais, all party’s elites and constituents respected 
its decision. Even Anis Matta (Secretary General of The Party) who previously supported 
Wiranto admitted that his support for Wiranto was a personal one. He further says: 
“Mulai sekarang, tidak ada lagi pendapat pribadi, saya yakin rekomendasi Majlis Syura 
tidak akan menimbulkan perpecahan diantara kader partai (…from now on, since its 
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decision has been officially announced, there was no personal view anymore. I believed 
that recommendation made by Majlis Syura will not lead to internal conflict among 
cadres of the party).”112 
Unfortunately for the PKS, when the first round election result was officially 
announced by the KPU, Amien Rais only gained 14.66% of the votes and stood at fourth 
place out of five pairs of candidates. Some political analysts argued that this 
unsatisfactory result, to some extent, was caused by the lateness of the PKS 
announcement to support Amien Rais, which was less than a week before Election Day. 
This announcement to ‘the last minutes’ of the election day, of course, would have made 
it difficult for the PKS to fully disseminate its decision to the party’s constituents around 
Indonesia. Thus, the PKS’ recommendation to choose Amien Rais in the first round of 
the presidential elections was ineffective. 
No candidate, of course, received an absolute majority in the first round. The top 
two candidates, Yudhoyono and Megawati, had to contest for final round of the 
presidential election. In this second round election, the PKS gave its support to 
Yudhoyono-Kalla instead of Megawati-Hasyim. Some PKS factions opposed the decision 
because they saw SBY as a secular political leader opposed to implementing Islamic 
Law. SBY supporters, on the other hand, argued that his election offered the best chance 
for democratic reform, good governance and an end to corruption.113 However, after the 
Majlis Syura officially announced its support of SBY-JK, PKS constituents and members 
agreed to follow its decision.  
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As with its support of Amein Rais in the first round, the PKS’s decision to support 
SBY-JK in the second round was made through musyawarah among the members of the 
Majlis Syura. Prior to the final presidential election, the PKS held Musyawarah Majlis 
Syura VI in Jakarta on August 20, 2004, which resulted in four recommendations that 
PKS should take in facing the second round of the election. These recommendations were 
as follows: 
(1) PKS mengukuhkan untuk melakukan musyarakah dalam pemerintahan, 
sehingga akan menentukan pilihan pada salahsatu pasangan calon presiden dan 
wakil presiden pada putaran kedua. (2) PKS mendukung dan siap memenangkan 
pasangan calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-
Muhammad Jusuf Kalla (SBY-JK). (3) Dukungan diberikan apabila yang 
bersangkutan siap menandatangani nota kesepahaman bersama sebagaimana 
arahan majlis Syura. (4) Apabila kesepakatan tidak tercapai, maka keputusan 
selanjutnya ditentukan oleh Rapat Gabungan Terbatas Lembaga Tinggi Partai.114 
 
(1) PKS is determined to join a coalition in forming the government. Thus, PKS 
has decided to support a pair of presidential candidates; (2)  PKS supports SBY-
JK for the presidential election; (3) Support will be given if SBY-JK is ready to 
sign a Memorandum of Understanding with PKS; (4) If the agreement between 
PKS and SBY-JK fails, the decision will be made by a meeting among PKS’s 
elites. 
 
From the above recommendations, it is clear that PKS would get actively 
involved in supporting SBY-JK if this pair of candidates agreed to sign a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) proposed by the party. This means that the PKS supported 
these candidates with very strict requirements that SBY-JK should abide by if they won 
the election. In this agreement, the PKS would actively participate in promoting 
Indonesian good governance and encourage elected president to create a prosperous civil 
society. Thus, on August 26, 2004, the President of PKS Hidayat Nurwahid and 
Indonesian President Candidate Yudhoyono signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
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 228
which the SBY-JK pair promised to follow this agreement if they later were selected as 
President and Vice President. This MOU states that both Yudhoyono and Kalla agreed: 
(1) Konsisten melakukan perubahan untuk membangun pemerintahan yang 
bersih, peduli dan professional, diantaranya dibuktikan dengan keteladanan dan 
kesiapan memberhentikan anggota cabinet yang melakukan korupsi. Tidak 
mengulangi kesalahan pengelola Negara yang sebelumnya dan tidak menjadikan 
kekuasaan untuk menzalimi umat dan bangsa Indonesia. (2) Mempertahankan 
kedaulatan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia di tengah-tengah percaturan dan 
pergaulan dunia internasional. (3) Melanjutkan proses demokratisasi dan 
reformasi di Indonesia dalam rangka terbentuknya masyarakat madani, 
mengedepankan supremasi sipil dan tidak menghadirkan pemerintahan yang 
‘militeristik’ dan atau ‘police state’. (4) Meningkatkan moralitas bangsa, kualitas 
msyarakat dan kesejahteraan rakyat, dan mengedepankan penegakkan hokum 
serta penghormatan terhadap hak asasi manusia.( 5) Mendukung upaya 
perjuangan bangsa Palestina dalam mencapai kemerdekaannya dan tidak menjalin 
hubungan diplomatic dengan Israel.115 
 
(1) to consistently work towards building a clean, caring, and professional 
government in which the president is ready to force cabinet members to resign if 
they are corrupt; (2) to be ready to protect national integrity; (3) to continue the 
democratization and reformation process in the country; (4) to improve state 
morality, people’s prosperity, and consistent law enforcement and the upholding 
of human rights in the country; and 5) to support Palestine’s struggle for 
independence. 
 
In the agreement above, the PKS undertook the responsibility to encourage its 
members and constituents to vote for SBY-JK in the election. And when, finally, SBY-JK 
have won the election, the PKS would engage with and support the governing coalition 
led by President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. By joining 
and supporting the SBY-JK government, the PKS believed that such cooperation would 
add to their political education, including the art of governing. The PKS also saw their 
participation as a means to prevent Islamic radicalism from entrenching itself in 
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Indonesia as a result of Muslim communities feeling alienated from participation in the 
government structure.116 
From the above discussion on the PKS involvement in the democratization 
process in Indonesia both in the legislative and presidential elections, one could argue 
that it is unlikely that the PKS as Islamic party will ever undermine the democratic 
process in Indonesia. The internal PKS democratization process, for example, has shown 
to what extent the PKS upholds democratic rule. For example, in the run-up to the 
presidential election in 2004 as discussed above, PKS leaders had to decide on which 
candidate to support. A segment of the party advocated support for Wiranto for pragmatic 
reasons, chiefly the calculated chance of Wiranto winning the election. The majority, 
however, supported Amien Rais. In the end the Majelis Syuro (religious council) voted in 
favor of Amien Rais, despite strong pressure for the party to throw its weight behind 
Wiranto. In addition, the PKS commitment to stay in coalition with the ruling 
government of SBY-JK could be considered as part of the party’s struggle for democracy 
in Indonesia. This could be seen from the case of raising fuel prices decided by the SBY 
government on August 2005 that put the PKS, as a party which supported the 
government, in a dilemma as to whether to withdraw from the governing coalition or not. 
This case was excellently explained by Zulkieflimansyah, a parliament member from the 
PKS. He clearly states: 
As part of the governing coalition, the PKS had to face the difficult task of 
supporting the decision even when it would affect the everyday lives of its 
constituents. The decision to support the government was based on the rational 
calculation of supporting an unpopular government move for the longer term 
benefit of turning the economy around and stabilizing the democratic process.  At 
the same time PKS leaders sought to remind the government of the need to 
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channel the accumulated savings into community-oriented projects like education 
for the masses, an important component of the party's overall objective of 
improving society. The fallout from the party's decision to support the 
government has been quite real, so much so that the highest decision-making 
body in the party, the Majelis Syuro, has had to reconsider the PKS' continued 
role as part of the governing coalition. PKS supporters have been quite vocal in 
their calls for the party to reposition itself as an opposition facing the government, 
rather than being within the government. Indeed, such a move would be extremely 
popular. However, PKS' leaders have stuck to the need to work with the 
government for the overall stability of Indonesia's democratization process.117  
 
 
Finally, from the experience of the PKS as an Islamic party, one would argue that 
its Islamist framework does not necessarily preclude support for the democratic process, 
though admittedly more can be done in terms of the party's approach to other issues of 
plurality, human rights, and the role of women in the public sphere. The PKS is already 
aware of the issues they have to address as they adapt to the prevailing process. There are 
no indications of wanting to undermine the system, but rather of learning and finding the 
balance between the Islamist model they began with and the existing system of the 
modern world.  
PAS and the 2004 Malaysian Election 
Prior to 11th Malaysian election in 2004, a number of significant political 
developments took place both in the Malaysian domestic scene and in regional and global 
politics as well. In Malaysia the biggest issue was the retirement in October 2003 of 
Mahathir Muhammad who was in power for more than 22 years. In the global context, 
the dramatic attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the USA profoundly 
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changed the political atmosphere in Malaysia, reinforcing many non-Malays’ fears about 
Islam.118 
The Mahathir retirement and Abdullah’s honeymoon as new political leader 
would impact upon the political situation leading up to the 2004 election. The Malaysian 
political system under Mahathir had come to be one characterized by a concentration of 
power in the hands of the executive branch. The structure of the state had become so 
extremely personalized that the term “Mahathir hegemony” was liberally applied in most 
analyses of Malaysian politics.119 Edmund T. Gomez argues that Mahathir’s 
administration was also noted for its close link with business, typified by selective 
patronage of businessmen as a means to achieve three primary goals which are, says 
Gomez “First, the creation of a dynamic entrepreneurial community with the capacity to 
compete internationally; second to achieve fully-developed industrialized nation status 
for Malaysia 2020; and finally, to create a new class of internationally recognized Malay 
capitalists.”120 
 
The Mahathir administration had, in the words of Clive Kessler, “created a world 
in his own image, according to ideas and visions made possible yet also constrained, 
perhaps even foreshortened or distorted, by his own mental and intellectual horizons.”121 
Yet, according to Zainal Kling, it can be agreed upon that he left a tremendous legacy 
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particularly in raising Malay confidence through material and occupational achievement. 
To the Malays, he has been considered a guiding light, providing a strong vision for 
achieving possibilities unheard of in life.122 In the light of such performance by the 
Mahathir government in relation to the Malay population, the country’s leadership was 
smoothly handed over to Mahathir’s Malay successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. 
When Badawi took over the premiership from Mahathir, he was viewed at first as 
someone who was unable to escape from the latter’s shadow. Yet, Badhawi was 
distancing himself from the excesses of the Mahathir administration and some of the 
latter’s controversial and unpopular developmental plans, showing little support for his 
predecessor’s entrepreneurial and industrial agenda.123  
Badawi quickly made administrative reform a theme of his administration and 
established a degree of political legitimacy. Ho Khai Leong notes that since taking office 
several steps to improve governance have been taken by this new prime minister, as 
follows: 
His public commitment to lead a clean, incorruptible, modest and beyond 
suspicion administration; His surprise visit to the immigration department to 
underline his call for an end to red tape and bureaucracy, the introduction of a 
people oriented civil service, and his message ‘work with me, not for me’; His 
proposal to set up a regional anti-corruption academy, operational by mid-2005; 
and he drew up a code of ethics for his ministers that require them to declare their 
financial assets. The code also requires ministers to submit a report card to the 
Prime Minister’s Department every three months spelling out what duties they 
have performed on behalf of the people.124 
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 Since Badawi has declared publicly that fighting corruption is his chief concern, 
the success and failure of his administration will be measured against how successful he 
combats corruptions. Badawi, called by the media as ‘Mr. Nice Guy’, ‘Mr. Clean’ and 
‘Pak Lah’ contrasted with Mahathir in such areas, and in his initial weeks, he acted 
effectively to highlight this contrast. Prior to that, Abdullah had already displayed his 
Islamic credentials in a convincing fashion when he symbolically conducted prayers at 
the May 2002 funeral of Fadzil Noor, the late-president of PAS. And as Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, Badawi continues to regularly conduct opening prayers at a range of 
activities, from government meetings to the breaking of fast during the month of 
Ramadhan (Holy Month in Islam). 
 In short, a smooth transition of power from Mahathir to Badawi in turn has 
generated what observers have termed the ‘feel good’ factor among the population, and it 
could well work to the advantage of the incumbent government in the election. Indeed, 
some have already suggested that the retirement of Mahathir could be a boost for 
UMNO’s prospects, simply because his continued leadership of UMNO was seen in 
certain quarters as an indication that the party was unwilling to implement the change 
deemed necessary to regain the support of the Malay ground.125 
 In addition to the internal political factor  in domestic Malaysia prior to the 2004 
election, the September 11, 2001 event in the United States would have fundamentally 
transformed the Malaysian political landscape in favour of UMNO and the Barisan 
National (BN). September 11 and the fear of militancy amongst Islamic extremists could 
move the Malay ground, the so called silent majority, back to UMNO and the National 
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Front.126 September 11, according to Zainal Kling, contributed an unexpected gift to 
UMNO. It provided a moral legitimacy for the detention of several opposition members 
and pro-Islamic militants, some of whom were related to PAS leaders. It captured the 
imagination of the non-Malays who later rejected PAS and withdrew their supports of the 
other opposition party, DAP.127 Kling even argues that the terrorist attacks of September 
11 and the subsequent discovery of Jemaah Islamiyah cells within Malaysia, allowed 
Mahathir and his successor to paint PAS and various fringe Islamic groups and societies 
as dangerous and fanatical. And Malaysia’s government at that time successfully sold 
itself to both domestic and foreign audiences as led by moderate Islamic leaders.128 
 Under such a political situation both in Malaysia and in the global scene post 
September 11, the Badawi administration held the 11th Malaysian general election on 
March 21, 2004.  
 
The 2004 Election Result 
On March 4, 2004, Prime Minsiter Abdullah Ahmad Badawi advised the 
constitutional monarch to dissolve the House of Representatives, paving the way for the 
national election. This early polls had been expected since former Prime Minister 
Mahathir Muhammad voluntarily stepped down in October 2003. On March 5, the 
Electoral Commission set March 13 for the nomination of candidates and March 21 for 
the election. 
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In this 11th election, there were 219 parliamentary and 505 state legislative 
assembly seats contested. Compared to the 1999 general elections, this means an increase 
of 26 parliamentary and 111 state seats. The increase in the number of parliamentary 
constituencies was prompted by a redelineation of district lines carried out by the 
Electoral Commission in 2003. The increase in the state seats derived from the new state 
assembly constituencies and the inclusion of 60 Sabah state assembly seats.129 
When the election result was officially announced, according to Gomez, it was 
“shocking” to most Malaysian and particularly opposition parties in the country.130 The 
Barisan Nasional (BN) ruling coalition secured a massive endorsement, securing victory 
in 198 out of the 219 parliamentary seats and 453 out of 505 state assembly seats under 
contest. This means that the ruling BN coalition won 90.4% of the seats in the parliament 
and its best showing since it was formed in 1974.131 BN won 62.37% of the total votes 
cast, up from 56.5% in 1999. It made a clean sweep of all parliamentary seats in seven 
states, winning 198 seats and scoring a nine-tenth majority. 
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Table 12: Malaysian Parliamentary and State Seats in the 2004 Election 
 Parliament State 
States BN DAP PAS ADIL Ind Total BN DAP PAS Ind Total 
Perlis 3 - - - - 3 14 - 1 - 15 
Kedah 14 - 1 - - 15 31 - 5 - 36 
Kelantan 9 - 5 - - 14 21 - 24 - 45 
Terengganu 8 - - - - 8 28 - 4 - 32 
Penang 8 4 - 1 - 13 38 1 1 - 40 
Perak 21 3 - - - 24 52 7 - - 59 
Pahang 14 - - - - 14 41 1 - - 42 
Selangor 22 - - - - 22 54 2 - - 56 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
7 4 - - - 11 - - - - - 
Labuan 1 - - - - 1 - - - - - 
Putrajaya 1 - - - - 1 - - - - - 
Neg. Semb 8 - - - - 8 34 2 - - 36 
Melaka 6 - - - - 6 26 2 - - 28 
Johor 26 - - - - 26 55 1 - - 56 
Sabah 24 - - - 1 25 59 - - 1 60 
Sarawak 27 1 - - - 28 - - - - - 
Total 199 12 6 1 1 219 453 16 35 1 505 
Source: Abdul R. Moten and Tunku M. Mokhtar (2006) 331. 
 
 
Table 13: Percentage of Votes in the 2004 Malaysian Parliamentary Election 
State Voters BN PAS ADIL DAP Others Indep. Turnout 
Perlis 112,482 62.16 35.39 - - - - 83.22 
Kedah 821,901 58.43 27.77 11.58 - - - 80.99 
Kelantan 662,722 49.02 37.42 9.87 - - 1.16 80.40 
Terengganu 455,924 55.21 37.43 5.15 - - - 87.93 
Penang 672,362 55.57 3.74 12.01 26.43 - - 76.04 
Perak 1,170,351 57.17 13.63 7.88 17.29 - - 70.08 
Pahang 570,106 65.67 20.23 5.32 5.75 - - 76.20 
Selangor 1,422,274 63.96 13.87 12.61 6.81 - 0.35 72.95 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
670,920 57.27 4.10 12.19 24.73 0.24 0.03 69.75 
Putrajaya 5,079 87.64 - 11.58 - - - 91.79 
Neg. Semb 429,786 67.16 9.83 6.18 12.92 - - 73.36 
Melaka 345,917 69.23 5.74 7.63 14.05 - - 78.94 
Johor 1,184,788 77.14 9.35 3.67 6.77 - - 73.51 
Labuan 22,006 75.11 21.58 - - - - 67.08 
Sabah 512,490 62.08 - 11.38 2.57 0.33 19.30 65.03 
Sarawak 695,969 64.61 0.24 1.25 15.67 8.07 8.23 62.03 
Total 9,755,007 62.05 15.01 8.37 9.74 0.53 1.52 73.92 
Source: Abdul R. Moten and Tunku M. Mokhtar(2006) 332. 
 
From the tables above, it is clear that BN’s coalition led by UMNO gained big 
successes in the state elections. Abdul R. Moten and Tunku M. Mokhtar further explained 
in detail parliamentary and state seats won by UMNO. In Terengganu, UMNO won all 
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eight parliamentary seats and 27 of the 32 state seats, garnering 55% of popular votes, 
while MCA won one. In Kelantan, the stronghold of PAS, UMNO received 49% of the 
votes and won 21 of the 45 state seats, as compared to two seats in 1999. In Kedah, 
UMNO won 14 of the 15 parliamentary and 31 of the 36 state assembly seats. In the 
parliamentary seats, BN’s Chinese and Indian partners performed well, with MCA 
winning 31 of 40 seats, Gerakan 10 of 12 seats, and MIC winning all nine seats it 
contested. For the state seats, MCA won 75 of the 90 seats, MIC won all the 19 seats, and 
Gerakan won 30 of the 31 seats it contested. Gerakan even formed the state government 
in Penang, where it won 13 seats it contested.132 
During the 2004 election, the performance of opposition parties was very poor. 
The results suggest that the Barisan Alternative (BA)’s opposition coalition did not 
appear to be a viable alternative to many Malaysians, issues that became apparent 
following the 1999 election. While the opposition as a whole suffered its worst defeat, 
PAS was particularly humiliated. PAS had its representation drop from 27 to 7 in 
parliament and from 98 to 36 state legislative assemblies.133 
Among the opposition, the DAP was the only party that recorded a rise in the 
number of seats won; compared to its performance in the 1999 election. The DAP’s 
representation in parliament rose from 10 to 12, while in the state level elections, the 
number of the party’s assemblymen nationwide increased from 11 to 15. The DAP’s best 
performance was in Perak where the party won seven seats, where previously it had four 
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seats.134 Keadilan probably fared the worst among the opposition, winning narrowly just 
one of the 58 parliamentary seats it contested, that is Permatang Pauh, formerly held by 
Anwar and represented by his wife and Keadilan president, Wan Azizah. The party did 
not win any of 121 state seats it contested.135 
In short, the result of the 2004 elections suggested a reverse condition of the 1999 
election. While the ruling Barisan Nasional’s coalition swept to its greatest electoral 
victory ever, the opposition parties, particularly PAS, had dramatically decreased their 
representations both in parliament and in state legislative assemblies. The question 
remains as to why the PAS faced a 2004 electoral setback. What are some of the factors 
behind PAS’s embarrassing defeat? In the following paragraphs, I will examine the 
reasons behind the poor performance of PAS during the 2004 election, in contrast to the 
success of its counterpart in Indonesia. 
 
PAS’s Defeat? 
The PAS’s performance in 2004 was, as Gomez put it, “dismal, a severe 
regression” for a party seemingly on the rise after the very successful 1999 election 
performance. As mentioned above, in term of seats in parliament, it dropped from 27 to a 
mere seven. Six of these victories were recorded in Kelantan as the party’s stronghold, 
the remaining one in Kedah.136 In a humiliating loss, the leader of the party, Abdul Hadi 
Awang, lost his federal parliamentary seat. And PAS failed to win a single parliamentary 
seat in Terengganu, a major reversal of its fortunes compared to the 1999 election result.  
                                                 




 The poor performance of PAS in the 2004 election has surprised many observers 
and analysts because the rate of swing was almost unthinkable even by the ruling Barisan 
Nasional’s leaders. Several analyses have focused on the fatal conditions of the 
opposition parties PAS, Keadilan and DAP.  The key factors in PAS’s defeat in the 
election mainly could be divided into two categories: PAS-driven factors (internal) and 
external factors including those driven by the UMNO (ruling party). 
 
PAS Internally Driven-Factors 
The main internal factor which led to the PAS’s poor performance was its 
campaigning on a rigid interpretation of an Islamic state as the preferred form of 
governance for Malaysia. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid argues that PAS’s 
misinterpretation of its rise in support in 1999 as an endorsement for its juridical brand of 
Islam was misplaced and was to cost it heavily in 2004.137 In 2004, PAS was over-
confident that it would gain more support from Malaysian people by promoting an 
Islamic state in Malaysia. Since taking control in Terengganu in 1999, the PAS has 
imposed religious laws, including bans on alcohol and gambling.  
The defeat in the 2004 election was attributable to the party’s aggressive style of 
wooing voters by pushing for an Islamic state agenda with what many saw as an undue 
emphasis on the implementation of Islamic criminal laws (hudud) and by branding an 
anti-PAS vote as an act of apostasy. Abdul Rashid states that “PAS seems to be suffering 
from role confusion. It is a political party with the professed aim of capturing power but 
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it is acting like a religious organization interested in the invigoration of religious faith and 
recreation of an Islamic state.”138 
PAS’s greatest weakness with respect to its governing style appeared to be its 
inability and even unwillingness to consult the public, especially non-Muslims. Despite 
efforts to reach out to non-Muslims, such as the offer of associate membership of the 
party,139 PAS had failed to convince non-Muslims that its version of an Islamic state 
would confer on them a proper policy-made role as equal citizens under the law.140 
The fear of non-Muslim voters to the idea of an Islamic state promoted by the 
PAS was also triggered by the fact that prior to the 2004, PAS launched its Islamic State 
document (ISD). This document was officially presented in November 12, 2003, revoked 
for a brief period of time due to criticism from non-Muslim and Muslim elements of 
society, and then finally re-released and made available to the public on the PAS 
website.141 Despite the substantial media publicity surrounding the term of the document, 
at its official release the President of PAS repeatedly emphasized that PAS’s conception 
of an Islamic state upholds all of the current principles of the Malaysian Constitution, 
including freedom of religion, status quo of the court system, the rights of minorities and 
the democratic rights of each citizen.142 It seems that the document affirms some 
democratic values with Islamic characteristics inserted. 
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In this document, PAS defines an Islamic state as “one that provides security, 
welfare and services to the entire country…based on the sharia with the intention of 
fulfilling the demands of Islam as a complete and comprehensive way of life.”143 
However, despite its comprehensive theoretical model, PAS’s actual record of 
implementing policies that work toward the realization of an Islamic state seems to be a 
failure. Ever since PAS regained control of Kelantan in 1990 up to the present, and took 
power in Terengganu in 1999, the PAS has focused its attention on literalist reforms, such 
as prohibition of alcohol and gambling, imposition of the hudud penal code, the 
segregation of the sexes and other moral initiatives, rather than those consistent with the 
spirit of Islam, such as the pursuit of justice and equality. In other words, the PAS has 
focused largely on form rather than substance. Khoo Boo Teik called PAS’s Islamic state 
advances just before the elections a “strategic mistake,” which alienated potential allies 
who remembered PAS for defending a ‘democratic state’ in 1999. Non-Muslims 
continually see PAS’s leaders as harboring an image and style that are too idealistic and 
distant from daily concerns of life.144 Thus, on September 23, 2001, the DAP which 
joined Barisan Alternatif’s coalition in 1999 election, declared its withdrawal from the 
coalition because they did not agree with PAS’s Islamic state agenda. 
The fear of PAS’s Islamic state agenda was worsened by the leadership change 
from Fadzil Noor, who was perceived as a moderate leader, to Abdul Hadi Awang 
following the death of Noor on June 23, 2003. Hadi’s image as a quick-tempered and 
radical has worsened PAS’s reputation among non-Muslims and moderate Malay-
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Muslims.145 That Awang would steer PAS away from an accommodating approach in 
multi-ethnic cooperative politics toward a decidedly uncompromising stance in pursuit of 
its Islamic state dream, seemed to have been confirmed by the 49th PAS general assembly 
in 2003, which officially installed Abdul Hadi Awang as president and elected Senator 
Hasan Shukri in favour of lawyer Mustafa Ali as PAS’s deputy president. Hasan was 
practically the representative of the conservative ulama, while Mustafa was believed to 
have commanded the support of the fast emerging professionals.146 
In addition to the above factors, the embarrassing loss of PAS in the 2004 election 
was due to its “weaker political coalition” with DAP compared to 1999. PAS also seemed 
to be still in “euphoria” and over-confident that the party would have the same support as 
in the previous 1999 election. According to Mustafa Ali (Deputy President of PAS), his 
party was too confident about winning in the 2004 election because it believed that its 
constituents in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah were very solid at that time, but it was 
wrong.147 Besides these internal-driven factors, several external factors that led to PAS’s 
defeat in this election are explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
External Factors 
There were at least three external factors in PAS’s defeat in the 2004 election, 
namely, Badawi’s personal factor, UMNO’s and global politics factors following the 
September 11 terrorist attack in the United States. 
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The 2004 election result showed that the obvious winner was the new Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who according to Slater has “cemented his position 
atop Malaysia’s dominant political party.”148 It was clear that the magnitude of this 
election victory enhanced Badawi’s power base within the ruling party, UMNO. 
According to BN’s secretary general, success in the election was 99.9% due to Abdullah 
Badawi’s personality.149 The Badawi factor not only led to the big victory of his party 
UMNO but also denied support to the PAS from Malaysian people. 
Soon after taking over from Mahathir, the new Prime Minister Badawi, who has a 
degree in Islamic studies, promoted himself to the public through words and actions. He 
created a personal vision, seemingly tempered with deep-rooted ideas within the Islamic 
political traditions which were also considered to be a democratic and civil vision of the 
siyyasah shariah system, when he loudly proclaimed on his first arrival as prime Minister 
at the Bayan Lepas airport, Penang, his home state: “This is my hope. I do not ask you to 
work for me but work with me for the sake of the nation and country.”150 This statement 
immediately became the slogan of his new government. 
 Since he holds the Premiership, Badawi has immediately tried to differentiate his 
leadership by tackling corruption and by avoiding Mahathir’s undiplomatic outbursts. 
Badawi said the right things about the need for greater transparency, accountability, 
cutting bureaucratic red tape, and above all, less corruption. By the time of the transfer of 
leadership, Badawi knew he needed to gather the support of all the people behind him as 
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a demonstration of his mandate to govern. He tried to lower the tone of confrontation in 
dealing with PAS and the opposition. He did not brand PAS leaders ‘liars’ and 
‘hypocrites’ as Mahathir had. And his release of 19 ISA detainees with alleged ties to 
extremist groups at the end of the fasting month in November 2003 was, according to 
John Funston, perhaps “a cautious step to demonstrate a less punitive approach to Islamic 
groups.”151 
 With his very strong Islamic background and credentials, Badawi tried to 
popularize his idea of Islam Hadhari as an alternative to PAS’s Islamic state propaganda 
and to make it a fundamental theme of his administration. This concept has been 
disseminated by the Prime Minister since he took over from Mahathir.  Badawi says: 
Soon after I assumed leadership of the Government at the end of 2003, we wanted 
to make a formal pronouncement that the true and correct teachings of Islam shall 
serve as the basis and inspiration for good governance in Malaysia. We decided to 
call the approach and articulate it as Islam Hadhari. We initiated this action in the 
wake of developments at the global level and we took into account, at the same 
time, our own rather unique national situation. Malaysia is a Muslim country of 
some 20 million people in which 33% are non-Muslims. The need to be just and 
fair towards all without distinction as to race or religion forms an important part 
of the principles underlying Islam Hadhari.152  
 
 
Officially translated as “civilizational Islam,” Islam Hadhari can be understood as 
a progressive form of Islam which espouses a joining of forces between the ulama and 
professional technocrats, a rational acquisition of knowledge, a balance between spiritual 
and material development, and religious tolerance.153  
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This concept of Islam Hadhari has been assumed as an important factor that led to 
UMNO’s victory in the 2004 election. This can be seen from the fact that after the 
elections, the strongest direct articulation of Islam Hadhari to date has been Abdullah 
Badawi’s keynote address at the 55th UMNO general assembly in Kuala Lumpur  
September 23, 2004.  In this speech, Badawi proclaimed Islam Hadhari to be a 
comprehensive form of Islam which emphasized all-encompassing economic and 
civilizational developments. In this assembly, moreover, for the first time Badawi 
identified ten principles of Islam Hadhari, namely: (1) Faith in and piety towards Allah; 
(2) A just and trustworthy government; (3) a free and independent people; (4) a vigorous 
pursuit and mastery of knowledge; (5) a balanced and comprehensive economic 
development; (6) the stress on achieving a good quality of life for the people; (7) the 
protection of the rights of minority groups and women; (8) the maintenance of cultural 
and moral integrity; (9) the safeguarding of natural resources and the environment; and 
(10) strong defence capabilities.154  
In his keynote speech in Jakarta when he was awarded the degree of Doctor 
Honouris Causa by the State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta on 
July 24, 2006 due to his achievement in popularizing Islam Hadhari in Malaysia, Badawi 
further emphasized the objective pronouncement of Islam Hadhari and clarified that its 
concept was not new Islam or madzhab. Rather, he says: 
It is our intention to adopt Islam Hadhari as a comprehensive approach to the 
development of mankind, society and country based on the perspective of Islamic 
teachings and the Islamic civilization. The approach supposes a proper 
understanding of Islamic law and jurisprudence. As an approach to religion, we 
feel everyone should be comfortable with Islam Hadhari because it embodies 
principles which are universally familiar and accepted. Islam Hadhari is a 
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progressive approach for all Malaysians whether they are Muslims or non-
Muslims. There is no cause to fear any discrimination or persecution on account 
of religion because the Malaysian Constitution guarantees freedom of worship. In 
any case, every Malaysian citizen irrespective of race or religion is equal before 
the law.  At the international level, it is Malaysia’s hope that Islam Hadhari will 
be able to showcase Islam as a tolerant and caring religion and culture. In this 
connection, I would like to make it clear to all concerned, to my fellow Muslims 
in particular, that Islam Hadhari is not a new religion or a new mazhab or any 
kind of new religious order. Islam Hadhari merely re-emphasises the centrality of 
Islam in the daily lives of its believers. It serves as the guiding principles for 
appreciating and practicing the faith in these modern times, Inshallah. Malaysia 
certainly wishes to be a dynamic part of the modernizing and globalizing world 
while maintaining its Islamic credentials. It is our intention that Islam Hadhari 
serves this purpose.155   
 
 The presence of the idea of Islam Hadhari of course could not be separated from 
political development in Malaysia and how the new Prime Minister tried to seek mass 
political support and the Malaysian people’s mandate. By presenting his vision of 
“progressive” Islam, Badawi did not want Malaysian Muslims to fall into the PAS’s 
model of Islam.156 Thus, the politics of Islam Hadhari, according to Terence Chong, 
emerge on four fronts.  
Firstly, it is emerging as a struggle with Anwar Ibrahim’s more civil society-
based Islam Madani to claim the progressive Islam mantle in Malaysia. Anwar’s 
Islam Madani may be the Islamic banner under which the opposition or civil 
society groups gather for religious imprimatur or to mobilize Islamic anti-
establishment sentiments.157 Secondly, Islam hadhari continues to be used to 
counter PAS’s Islam. In this sense, there will be no change in UMNO’s drive to 
institutionalize Islam. Thirdly, Islam hadhari serves as a set of values for Malay 
capitalists in the age of globalization. And lastly, on a broader global scale, Islam 
hadharis allows Malaysia to position itself as a model Muslim society in a post-
September 11 world.158  
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 In short, Islam hadhari and the popularity of Prime Minister Badawi were the 
most significant factors that led to PAS’s big loss in the 2004 election. This election 
seems to have been “Abdullah’s honeymoon” as a new prime minister who got big 
support as well as expectations to develop Malaysia from the grassroots constituents’ 
level.  
Another external factor that led to PAS’s embarrassing loose was the event of 
September 11, 2001. The terrorist attack on the World Trade centre in New York and the 
Pentagon near Washington DC reinforced many non-Malay fears about Islamic militants 
and Islamic government in the world.159 The September 11, incident which was followed 
by the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and several incidents of bombing which were 
portrayed by the media as the work of Islamic radicals resulted in further anxieties among 
non-Muslims about political Islam. In Malaysia, it of course has heightened fear of PAS 
among Malaysians, particularly non-Muslims. The anxieties have persisted because PAS, 
instead of adopting and publishing its developmental policies, has focused its attention on 
introducing the Islamic State document and introducing hudud and qisos (retaliatory) 
laws and Islamic rule generally in Terengganu after the 1999 election.160The sympathy 
for the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida network shown by PAS’s leadership 
easily fell prey to the mainstream media which led to its portrayal of PAS as “the next 
Taliban in Southeast Asia.”161 To make the situation even worse to PAS, some 
Malaysians were found to be involved in violent incidents in Indonesia. Although 
evidence of the existence, activities and link to PAS of the Kesatuan Mujahidin Malaysia 
(KMM, Malaysian Mujahidin Group) has been sketchy, the government’s crackdown on 
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the KMM radical group has evoked comparatively little opposition, given widespread 
“societal fear of the specter”of radical Islamic militancy in Malaysia.162 Added to this 
were the PAS anti-USA demonstrations briefly recreating the very loud scene 
surrounding the reformasi agitations of 1998-1999. The above factors leading to PAS’ 
defeat were aggravated by the fact that the ruling party UMNO controlled the mass media 
in order to popularize its developmental policies and clean government propaganda. Of 
course as a ruling party, the UMNO also used its government machinery and money, 
which PAS as an opposition party did not have, to deliver its large victory in 2004.163  
 In addition, PAS has blamed its defeat on the biased media and the poor 
monitoring standards of the Election Commission (SPR or Suruhan Pilihan Raya) and 
National Registration Department. From available evidence gathered via the alternative 
media, the opposition claims of irregularities in the elections including unexplained 
tremendous increases in voter turnouts, discrepancies between votes polled in 
parliamentary constituencies and corresponding states constituencies164 Through its 
official media “Harakah,” PAS has pointed out the following reasons why the party was 
defeated embarrassingly in the elections: 
Antara faktor tersebut ialah pengundi hantu, kertas undi pos dijumpai bertaburan 
dibeberapa kawasan seperti di Jitra, Kedah dan Sabak Bernam, Selangor, 
peningkatan jumlah peratusan pengundi secara mendadak di Terengganu, dan 
daftar pengundi yang berbeza antara yang diberikan kepada partai politik, borang 
SPR dan tempat mengundi.165 
 
Among the factors (PAS’s defeat) are phantom voters, ballot sheets found 
scattered in several areas such as in Jitra, Kedah and Sabak Bernam, Selangor, a 
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suddenly increased number of voters in Terengganu, and the list of voters given to 
the political party differing from the one given to the Election Comission and that 
of at voting place. 
 
In short, several external factors have led to PAS’s defeat in the 11th elections. 
However, according to Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, focusing on the external factors 
would divert attention away from PAS’s own weaknesses and the efficiency of UMNO’s 
election machine, both of which would have delivered the 2004 elections to BN anyway, 
without the existence of electoral irregularities. Because irregularities are not alien to 
Malaysian politics, complaints surface in all elections.166 Focusing on the internal factors 
such as PAS’s over confidence and its overestimation of the size of the pro-Islamic state 
constituency, would be more helpful for PAS in future elections. Although its defeat in 
the elections have shocked PAS’s leaders, members, and constituents, one would have to 
say that PAS’s commitment to democracy has been proven by the fact that the PAS 
accepted the election result in a sportive way. This has strengthened the argument that an 
Islamic party, particularly the PAS in Malaysia, could have a significant role to play in 
the democratization process in Malaysia. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From the above discussion of PKS and PAS involvement in the 2004 elections in 
their countries, it is clear that both parties have proven that they are very committed to 
democratic rule. Although PKS performance in 1999 was quite poor and the party only 
gained 1.4 percent of the vote at the national level, its performance dramatically 
improved during the 2004 election in which it gained 7.4 percent of the votes and forty-
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five seats in the national parliament. This means that PKS’s appearance in the Indonesian 
political arena was accepted and supported by Indonesian people.  
In Malaysia, PAS also has participated in all the elections held by its country’s 
government since the first election in 1995. However, during the 1999 and 2004 
elections, its situation was different from, or even the reverse of, that of PKS in 
Indonesia. While PKS was gaining in strength, support for PAS in the 2004 election 
decreased dramatically. PAS gained twenty-seven seats in parliament at the national level 
in the 1999 election and this dropped to only seven seats in the 2004 election. A 
comparison of the internal factors, particular, that contributed to PKS’s victory and 
PAS’s defeat in the 2004 elections suggests two rather different routes an Islamic party 




Conclusion: PKS and PAS Compared 
 
 
This thesis has traced how two Islamic parties, the Indonesian Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), went about conceiving their roles 
and becoming involved in democratic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia from 1999 to 
2005 respectively. In particular, it has focused on three main areas: the varying 
definitions of democracy, the nature of party membership and leadership, and party 
participation in the 1999 and 2004 general elections. 
This thesis has raised a number of crucial questions concerning the relationship 
between Islam and democracy: Can Islamic and democratic values and rules be 
reconciled? Obviously believing this to be so, how did these two Islamic parties 
implement democratic values in their processes of recruiting members and leaders? And 
how did they perform in the 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia and Malaysia, in which 
they decided to participate? The study reveals two possible and comparable, ways, 
embodied in the experiences of PKS and PAS, in which an Islamic political party can co-
exist with democratic rules and can share in the same vision and enjoy a reasonable 
possibility of electoral success. 
In this thesis, I have shown that while the compatibility between Islam and 
democracy has been questioned by scholars like Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis 
and Amartya Sen, who tend to believe that Islam is inimical to democracy, PKS and PAS 
leaders have always believed, and have sought to prove, that Islam and democracy can 
walk together and that at the very least democratic values can be implemented in 
Indonesian and Malaysia where Muslims are the majority. Hidayat Nur Wahid (the 
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former President of PKS), as discussed in chapter 2, argues that democracy goes to the 
roots of Islam and the Indonesian context in which it exists; democracy is a good political 
tool for an Islamic party like PKS to achieve its political goals. The same as Wahid, Nik 
Aziz Nik Mat (the spiritual leader of PAS) as discussed in the same chapter, believes that 
democracy could be used as means to implement and actualize the concept of shura in 
Islam in the Malaysian context. As Nik Aziz puts it, “The mutual discussion between the 
ruling party and opposition party in parliament building (in Malaysia) are in line with the 
teaching of Islam, which encourages people to have musyawarah to solve any problems.” 
This means that for PKS and PAS Islam as an ideology and the democratic values 
commonly believed to be rooted in and promoted by Western countries can co-exist side 
by side.  
The experiences of PKS and PAS have also shown that Islamic parties in both 
countries have significantly helped to connect Muslim to democratic political systems 
through direct engagement. In the case of PKS and PAS in Indonesia and Malaysia 
respectively, their style of recruitment of members and promotion of their programs have 
paved the way for Muslims in both countries to more actively engage in politics, which 
includes interest in politics, following political news, political discussions and political 
partisanship.  
 To strengthen the argument that Islam and democracy can be reconciled, in this 
thesis I have shown that the experiences of PKS and PAS in their formation, recruitment 
of members and leaders and participation in the 1999 and 2004 general elections, have 
proven that the assumption of Western scholars who have written that Islam and 
democracy are different creatures and walking separate paths, are not really correct. The 
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PKS and PAS acceptance of democracy has also challenged Muslims, both individuals 
and organizations, who have rejected the concept of democracy and believed that 
democracy is in contradiction with Islamic teaching due to its acquiescence to the 
sovereignty of people instead of sovereignty of God. Here, it is also clear that although 
both parties more or less were influenced by the Islamic groups from the Middle Eastern 
countries such as al-ikhwan al-muslimun as discussed in chapter 2, both PKS and PAS 
did not accept in total the ideas of Middle Eastern scholars like Al-Maududi and Hasan 
Al-Bana (the founding father of al-ikhwan al-muslimun) who believe in the sovereignty 
of God in which only God is the law giver (legislative body), as Javid Iqbal notes: 
Ultimate sovereignty and absolute authority only vest in God and the only 
principle operative in an Islamic state is the supremacy of Islamic Law. Using 
modern terminology, therefore, the Islamic Constitution has only two important 
organs: the executive and the judiciary. The third organ, i.e., the legislature, is not 
an important feature since all legislation has already been made by God in the 
Quran which is only to be implemented or executed by the Caliph who in 
consultation with his Council of Advisers or otherwise may make subordinate 
legislation by way of ordinances.1 
 
PKS and PAS also challenged the ideas of Islamic groups particularly in 
Indonesia who do not believe in democratic process in their struggle to achieve their 
objectives2 in expanding Islamic dakwah. Examples of such groups in Indonesia are the 
MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahidin Council),3 FPI (Front 
                                                 
1Javid Iqbal, Democracy and the Modern Islamic State: Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 253. 
2Although these organizations are different in name; their major concern and objective are almost the same. 
Their short term objective, on the one hand, is to push and demand the government for formalization of 
sharia or Islamic law in Indonesia or at least to recognize Islamic sharia as a core ingredient or an integral 
part of the Indonesian Constitution. And their long term objective, on the other hand, is to establish 
Indonesia as an Islamic state.  
3
 This organization found by Abu Bakar Ba’asir and it was formally established after the first congress in 
Yogyakarta, August 5-7, 2000. See, http://majelis.mujahidin.or.id/ (accessed February 24, 2007). 
 254
Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender's Front),4 Laskar Jihad or Holy War Soldiers,5 Hizbu 
al-Tahrir Indonesia6 (Independence Party Indonesia), and KISDI (Komite Indonesia 
Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity).7 
These organizations do not only believe that democracy is incompatible with Islam but 
also argue that to choose a leader through a democratic procedure (such as a general 
election) is not the best way because a competent candidate might be defeated by 
incompetent candidates due to popular votes. And they have a good point because even in 
the USA, politicians like Nixon, Reagan and Bush were elected by popular votes, even 
though there were much more competent candidates around. 
The democratic method, although adopted by Western countries in order to 
achieve the same objectives, ordinarily does not ensure the election of the best, 
because a really suitable or competent candidate may be defeated by an unsuitable 
or incompetent candidate only for that the latter has obtained more voted, 
regardless of how they might been achieved.8 
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adopts Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah and the ruling by what Allah (swt) revealed. The 
Islamic Thought is the soul of its body, its core and the secret of its life. Hizbu al-Tahrir first emerged 
among Palestinians in Jordan in the early 1950s. It has achieved a small, but highly committed following in 
a number of Middle Eastern states and has also gained in popularity among Muslims in Western Europe 
and Indonesia. See, http://iicas.org/libr_en/islst/libr_14_06_03_1is.htm (accessed February 24, 2007). 
7Led by Achmad Sumargono, several years KISDI and its associated Dewan Dakwah missionary 
organization have been vociferous but marginal. KISDI has organized demonstrations on issues such as 
Western pornography and gambling, but also on causes that to the outsider appear anti-Semitic, anti-
Chinese and intolerant of other religions, including the Javanese mystical religion. See Gerry van Klinken, 
“Emerging Support for the New President,” Inside Indonesia, June 9, 1998. 
8Javid Iqbal, 256. 
 255
Returning to our discussion of the influence of the socio-historical context on the 
development of these parties, as Islamic political parties in Southeast Asia, PKS’s and 
PAS’s establishment could not be separated from the influence of the socio-political 
context of the region, particularly Indonesian and Malaysian Islam. These two parties, 
from their birth to their later development, were deeply influenced by their respective 
socio-political and historical contexts, particularly in the process of democracy, which in 
turn shaped the parties’ structure, ideology, and activities. As can be seen from the 
discussion in chapter 3, the parties are the products of certain political developments in 
both countries. PKS was formed in a context where Indonesians faced a crisis of 
legitimacy and in the period of transition to democracy following Suharto’s resignation 
during which several political parties were established. PAS, on the other hand, was 
established in the context where Malay Muslim leaders were disappointed with the 
nationalist-UMNO ruling parties, which failed to pronounce Islamic ideological elements 
in their programs.  
Although the historical and political contexts of their establishment are different, 
the PKS and PAS are similar in their objectives of struggling for Islamic ideology 
through the democratic process and not through “street parliaments,” and to be actively 
involved in strengthening democracy in their countries. However, different from PAS 
which still tried to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia, PKS in its struggle does not 
insert the Islamic state in their agenda, which can be seen from the issues promoted by 
PKS during the 2004 election as discussed in chapter 6. Yet, many political observers, 
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both domestic and international, as well as other political parties in Indonesia, still 
believe that in the long-term, PKS would still hold on to an Islamic agenda.9 
For PKS, its acceptance of democracy can be seen since its early establishment. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the party was founded and initiated neither by a person nor 
several activists.  Instead it was decided through a democratic musyawarah (meeting) 
among all tarbiyah activists after polling was conducted among the members as to 
whether or not they should form the party. This process of polling and musyawarah could 
be seen as PKS’s efforts to combine Islamic values and democratic procedures in forming 
the party. This process also could be seen as a communal effort triggered by a shared 
vision and mission among its members to achieve their objectives.  
The democratic process was also observed in the creation of PAS. As was 
discussed in the same chapter 3, the impetus of PAS’s establishment was through a legal 
conference and musyawarah among ulama in Malaysia. Although the processes of PKS 
and PAS establishment, respectively, have shown that they follow democratic rules as 
can commonly be seen in non-religious political parties, it is important to note that both 
PKS and PAS asserted their Islamic identities in their continuing belief that the formation 
of a political party was to develop vehicles for expaning their Islamic dakwah activities. 
In their responses to democracy, moreover, it is clear that PKS and PAS not only 
followed democratic rules from their early establishment, but also accepted democratic 
values, such as refraining from discrimination based on language, nation, and religion as 
                                                 
9Mietzner for example states that large number of political observers and officials from rival political 
parties believed that PKS’ shift to the political centre was purely tactical and that the party leadership 
would continue to push for the Islamization of Indonesia’s state and society once it had achieved more 
influence over policy-making in the legislative and executive institutions’. See Marcus Mietzner, 
“Comparing Indonesia’s Party Systems of the 1950s and the post-Soeharto Era: From Centrifugal to 
Centripetal Inter-Party Competition,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39, (October 2008): 450. 
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can be seen in the parties’ policy on membership as discussed in chapter 4. Their 
adherence to the democratic process can be seen from the fact that while they claimed  to 
be Islamic parties, both gave equal rights to all Indonesian and Malaysian people, 
respectively, to join. It did not matter if they were Muslims or non-Muslims, male or 
female, Malay or any other ethnic group. Their acceptance of the values of democracy 
was strengthened by the fact that the party leaders such as Hidayat Nur Wahid, 
Zulkieflimansyah and Tifatul Sembiring (PKS), Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Abdul Hadi Awang 
and Nasharuddin Mat Isa (PAS) believed that democracy was the best way to achieve 
their political goals. They argue that, based on the reality of the political situation in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia, there is no other way to be involved in the political arena except 
to follow democratic processes. However, these parties’ commitments to democracy are 
not free from criticism even from among their constituents. At the grassroots’ level, some 
PKS and PAS supporters not only hold the argument that women should not become 
heads of state (a gender bias inimical to democracy) but also they are suspicious of non-
Muslims joining their party. While at the elite political level, for example, the PKS 
collaborated not only with the secular parties but also with a Christian party like Partai 
Damai Sejahtera (PDS) to win local elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah) in Indonesia, 
PKS supporters at the grassroots level, as shown in a 2005 survey, did not agree with 
their party building a coalition with a non-Islamic party.10  
 As discussed in chapter 4, the commitment of PKS and PAS to strengthening 
democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia also could be seen in their process of recruiting 
their leaders. Both PKS and PAS have practiced democratic rules in their internal party 
                                                 
10Saeful Mujani, ”Analisis Parpol: PKS, Tantangan Baru Politik Indonesia,” Media Indonesia, July 28, 
2005. 
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activities, particularly in the way they used to recruit their members who would be 
nominated as parliament members and how they chose their own leaders. Although they 
have different name for their membership training, such as liqo for the PKS and halaqoh 
and for PAS usrah activities, the core of the training programs have remained similar, 
that is to create very loyal and integrated members with their Islamic values as their basic 
ideology. It is also one of similarities between both parties that more or less they are 
influenced by the style of Ikhwan al-Muslimin’s Hasan Al-Bana in Egypt in recruiting 
their members. The style of member training and the existence of the Majlis Shura in the 
case of PKS, and the Majlis Shura Ulamak in the case of PAS, could be regarded as a 
reflection of the fact that both parties’ internal structures are almost the same as their 
counterpart in Egypt. Besides similarities between PKS and PAS in maintaining their 
cadre’s integration to the parties through special training, it is necessary to note that in 
terms of member recruitment and expanding the cadres of the party, the PKS seems to 
have a special strategy which PAS does not have, that is, encouraging their cadres to have 
big families as discussed in chapter 4. Having a lot of children as shown by parliament 
members from the PKS has been interpreted by Indonesians as a reflection of a party 
strategy to increase their party membership.  In the case of PAS, this strategy is not 
found. 
 Moreover, due to the different national political contexts of Indonesia and 
Malaysia as discussed above, PAS has its own style in promoting its ideology and 
programs to its supporters. In Kelantan, for example, PAS conducted an open-field 
dakwah forum and activities in the centre of Kota Bharu which was held every week to 
educate people on how democracy and Islam can go side by side. This was also used to 
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promote their policies known as the Friday gathering, which cannot possibly be imitated 
by PKS in the Indonesian context. It could be understood in terms of the fact that because 
Malaysia is a federal state an opposition party like PAS can become a ruling party in any 
state in Malaysia. As a ruling party in Kelantan, it is easy for PAS to hold such Friday 
gatherings every week to promote the party’s programs and policies on contemporary 
political issues to the public even though outside the campaigning period prior to the 
elections. In Indonesia, however, by law the PKS would not be allowed to have a 
gathering in open field except during the campaigning period scheduled prior to an 
election. 
 The parties’ consistent adherence to democratic procedures, moreover, was clear 
in their involvement in the elections in their respective countries. In Indonesia, the PKS 
since its establishment was involved in two consecutive general elections, in 1999 and 
2004. Although PKS performance in 1999 was quite poor and it only gained 1.4 percent 
of the vote at the national level, its performance dramatically improved during the 2004 
election in which it gained 7.4 percent of the votes and forty-five seats in the national 
parliament. This means that PKS’s appearance in the Indonesian political arena was 
likely to be accepted and supported by Indonesian people. As discussed in chapter 5, the 
poor performance of PKS in the 1999 election was understandable because it was a new 
party that was established following Soeharto’s resignation and the PKS did not have a 
national party figure at that time comparable to Megawati Soekarno Putri (PDIP), Amein 
Rais (PAN) and Abdurrahman Wahid (PKB) to attract Indonesian voters who still tended 
to vote for the figure of a party instead of looking at its vision, mission and programs. 
The small support for PKS in the 1999 election inspired political elites and members of 
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PKS to build its reputation as a party which was concerned to fight against corruption, 
collusion, nepotism and moral decadence among the political mainstream in Indonesia. 
This groundwork in the end led PKS to increase its 1999 result fivefold in the 2004 
election. Here, it is necessary to note that the issue of Islamic state establishment had 
been put asided by PKS in their campaign in 2004. Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President 
of PKS) asserted that the PKS stayed away from such issues because it was genuinely 
committed to pluralism and bridge building between diverse communities, which is not 
really acceptable to their supporters at the grassroots’ level as mentioned above. 
In Malaysia, the PAS also has participated in the all elections held by its country’s 
government since the first election in 1955. This fact can be seen as evidence that PAS 
has consistently supported democratic procedures applied in the country. However, 
during the 1999 and 2004 elections, its situation was different from that of the PKS in 
Indonesia. While PKS was gaining in strength, support for PAS in the last two elections 
decreased dramatically by the 2004 election, as we saw in chapter 6. This was due to 
several factors such as overconfidence that by the promotion of an Islamic state they 
could attract voters, but the result was the opposite. Badawi as the new Prime Minister 
replacing Mahathir was also another crucial factor in PAS’s defeat by UMNO in the 
election. Here, it is important to note that both in Indonesia and Malaysia, as shown by 
PKS’s good performance in contrast to the poor performance of PAS in their respective 
2004 elections, the people of both countries seem not to support the establishment of an 
Islamic state. However, from the start, PKS and PAS differed from most other parties in 
both countries, not only because of their Muslim identity, but also because of their 
representation of lower- and middle-class interests. The latter characteristic is especially 
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notable since most other parties dealt only with a few elite, educated people and pursued 
activities which did not impact upon the grassroots level of society. The distinctiveness of 
PKS and PAS, especially because of their Islamic ideology, was reflected in many other 
respects, causing the parties often to present different perspectives or stands on different 
issues such as the issue of Palestine. 
This study has compared the similarities and differences in the involvement of 
PKS and PAS in democratic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively. In 
comparing these parties, this study suggests that Islamic political parties in Southeast 
Asia can successfully participate in democracy in the region. The PKS and PAS have 
proven this to be so. If both parties are consistently playing their role in democratization 
and are given the opportunity to be ruling parties in the future, I believe that the 
stereotype of Islam as incompatible with democracy could finally be eliminated. The 
experience of PKS and PAS which struggle through democratic processes in promoting 
their objectives could strengthen the assumption of the peaceful movement of Muslim 
movements in Southeast Asia, which is different from other Islamic movements in other 
regions particularly in the Middle Eastern countries. 
This study is the first to attempt to compare the PKS and PAS in their 
participation in democratic politics in both Malaysia and Indonesia and hopefully can fill 
a gap in the literature on the subject of Islam and political parties in Southeast Asia. 
During the last forty years there has been growing scholarly interest in Indonesian and 
Malaysian politics in general, but little attention has been paid to Islamic political parties. 
These parties in Southeast Asia have yet to be the focus of Western scholars and media in 
the same way that radical Islam is. The PKS and PAS, which could be considered as 
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moderate Islamic parties through their contribution to the political discourse on religion 
and state and Islam and democracy, have been inadequately explored.11 In the same vein, 
this study also fills a gap in recent studies on Islam and democracy in Southeast Asia, 
which are commonly focused on the role of “civil society” in a democracy. For example, 
the book written by Hefner12 only examines Muslim efforts to bring civility and 
democracy to Indonesia over the past half-century. He praises those Muslims who have 
championed a religiously tolerant and politically secular Islam, while criticizing 
"regimist" Muslim leaders who supported Soeharto's New Order. The present study of 
Islamic political parties hopes to fill a gap in the literature by showing how Muslims in 
Indonesia and Malaysia have been actively involved in the democratization of their 
countries. 
Finally, this study could help in elaborating upon the “peaceful” role of political 
Islam in Southeast Asia, which in the eyes of the Western media and even some scholars 
is commonly portrayed as radical. This study of political parties not only strengthens the 
findings of the Indonesian scholar Saiful Mujani, who argues against the hypothesis that 
the more Islamic a Muslim, the more unlikely he or she is to support democratic 
principles, but also tries to fill a gap in his study, which only focused on Muslim attitudes  
toward democracy as individuals. For Mujani, in the case of Indonesian Muslims, this 
                                                 
11Most scholarly research on contemporary Islam is focused on the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism or 
fundamentalism. Several books have been published on Islamic fundamentalism, such as A. S. Sidahmed 
and A. Ehteshami, ed. Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996); Y. Choueiri, 
Islamic Fundamentalism (Washington, D.C.: Pinter, 1997); L. Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, c1998); R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda : Global Network of Terror 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2002); G. Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of 
Islam (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004); G. Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Ridge Books, c2005); and P. J. Smith, ed. Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: 
Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability (New York: M.E. Sharpe, c2005). 
12R.W. Hefner, Civil Islam and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
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hypothesis has no empirical foundation.13 Similar to Mujani, Alfred Stephan14 in a recent 
conference (30 September 2008) on Democracy and Secularism in the Muslim World: 
Challenge and Opportunities held in Jakarta, admits that “there is a misconception in the 
Western world including among intellectuals who believed that a state with a Muslim 
majority could not become a democratic state.” For Stephan, this misconception appeared 
to be due to lack of understanding and information regarding Islam and the incapability to 
differentiate between Islam and the Arabic world. He reminds us that in fact the Arabian 
only represents 20 per cent of all Muslim communities in the world. Studying the Muslim 
community not only in the Middle Eastern countries but especially in Southeast Asia 
would not be comprehensive enough without the inclusion of Islamic political parties in 
the region, which the present thesis has focused on in the hope that a better understanding 














                                                 
13Saiful Mujani, “Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia” (PhD diss.,Ohio State University, 2003), 342. 
14Alfred Stephan is a Professor of Government and Director of the Center for Democracy, Toleration and 




PAS and PKS in the 2008 and 2009 Elections 
 
The PAS’s and PKS’s consistent adherence to democratic procedures can be seen 
from their continued participation in the most recent elections in their countries: the 2008 
Malaysian and 2009 Indonesian elections. In these elections, the political performances 
of PAS and PKS were quite different. While PAS in Malaysia gained in strength 
compared to its performance in 2004, the support for PKS in the 2009 election was a 
disappointment for the party. PKS has failed to its their ambition to gain at least 20 per 
cent of the vote. PKS’s votes only slightly increased from 7.4 per cent in 2004 to 7.9 per 
cent in 2009. 
The dynamics of the political situations in both Malaysia and Indonesia have 
influenced the performance of PAS and PKS in the recent elections. Disappointment of 
Malaysians with Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s government and his Barisan Nasional (BN) 
coalition was the major factor in explaining why the opposition parties, including PAS, 
gained wide support in the election. The 2008 Malaysian election was the worst 
performance ever for BN, which lost its two-thirds majority in parliament.1 BN votes 
decreases dramatically from 65% of popular votes and 92% of parliamentary seats in 
2004--as discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis--to only 50% votes and 63% of seats in the 
parliament in 2008.  
In Indonesia, on the contrary, the popularity of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
presidency has paved the way for Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) to become the 
                                                 
1
 Abdul Rashid Moten, “2004 and 2008 General Elections in Malaysia: Towards a Multicultural, Bi-party 
Political System?,” Asian Journal of Political Science 17, no. 2 (August 2009): 173 
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most successful party that has managed to gain 20.9 per cent of the votes in 2009. 
Yudhoyono’s party defeated other big and established parties like the Golkar Party and 
the PDIP, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle). Golkar, the most powerful party during Soeharto’s era, dropped to only 14.5% 
compared to 21.6% of votes in 2004 election, and PDIP’s Megawati party fell from 
18.5% in 2004 to 14.0% in 2009. Although the performance of PKS is better in 2009 
compared to that of in 2004, the performance of Islamic parties declined from 38.1% in 
2004 to 27.8% in 2009.2 A detailed explanation of factors that contributed to PAS success 
in 2008 and PKS’s relative failure in 2009, is provided below. 
 
PAS Victory? 
There are both external and internal driven factors that have contributed to the 
PAS’s victory in 2008. Badawi’s decline of popularity and the Anwar Ibrahim factor are 
significant external contributions to the success of the opposition parties, including PAS, 
in defeating the BN ruling government. 
The issues raised against BN were corruption, increased food and fuel prices, 
weak position on religious issues,3 and the failure to establish the Independent Police 
Complaints and the Misconduct Commission that Badawi had promised. Moreover, there 
was internal conflict within UMNO, including Mahathir’s criticism of the cancelation of 
the building of a new bridge between Southern Malaysia and Singapore. These and many 
                                                 
2
 Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party 
System, Lowy Institute for International Policy, (Sydney 2009): 12. 
3
 Abdul Rashid Moten, 174. 
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other external factors benefited PAS and other opposition parties enabling them to bring 
down Badawi’s popularity and win a huge victory.4  
Billions of dollars of corruption in the Port Klang Free Trade Zone and the 
corruption by a ruling party member of the Selangor State Assembly are portrayed by the 
opposition party as evidence of the half-heartedness of the ruling government in the fight 
against corruption.5 Nik Aziz, the spiritual leader of PAS, criticised the ruling 
government for corruption and money politics even during the election period. According 
to Nik Aziz: “Akhir-akhir ini pula, Umno seronok masuk kampung malam-malam bawa 
duit, bagi RM100 ($43), RM200. Ini jadi buah mulut orang kampung. Kerja-kerja ini 
menjejehkan masyarakat. (In these days [prior to election], UMNO aggressively makes 
night visits to villages, brings and gives money to the people, around 100 to 200 
Malaysian Ringgits. People in the villages are gossiping about it. These works of UMNO 
have disturbed the people.”6 
 Abdullah Badawi’s propagation of a moderate “Islam Hadhari” (Civilizational 
Islam) that made him very popular in 2004 election, as discussed in chapter 6, was seen 
by Malaysians in the 2008 election as political rhetoric to attract voters, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim. Islam Hadhari’s campaign, in Andreas’s words “signifies nothing but 
euphonic phrases to many members of religious minorities.”7 Andreas could be right 
because of the fact that prior to the election, the HINDRAF (Hindu Rights Action Force) 
                                                 
4
 Badawi finally gave up his position to Najib on April 3, 2009. 
5
 Abdul Rashid Moten, 175. 
6
 Nik Aziz Nik Mat, “PAS Menang Kerana Perjuang Kebenaran,” Berita Harian, Singapore, March 10, 
2008.  
7
 Andreas Ufen, “The 2008 Elections in Malaysia: Uncertainties of Electoral Authoritarianism,” Taiwan 
Journal of Democracy 4, no. 1 (July 2008): 161. 
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held a demonstration that criticised the government for discrimination against the Indian 
Hindu minority.  
The second significant external factor was Anwar Ibrahim. The PAS victory in 
the 2008 election cannot be separated from Anwar Ibrahim. As a symbol of the 
Malaysian opposition, Anwar formed Partai Keadilan Rakyat and successfully built an 
alliance with PAS and Democratic Action Party (DAP) named the Pakatan Rakyat 
(People’s Alliance) to fight the BN ruling party.  The Pakatan Rakyat successfully built 
its image as an alternative to the corrupt ruling government. According to Motten, credit 
should be addressed to PAS’s willingness to soften its radical views on Islamic state and 
sharia, which enabled them to join multi-ethnic Pakatan Rakyat’s coalition. The PAS 
reformed its policy to place more emphasis on welfare state instead of Islamic state.8 PAS 
issued its manifesto for the 2008 election on February 19, entitled “A Trustworthy, Just 
and Clean Government: A Nation of Care and Opportunity.” In this manifesto, the 
President of PAS, Abdul Hadi Awang states: 
Through this manifesto, PAS resolutely and relentlessly undertake to: (1) Defend 
the well-being of the rakyat and the welfare of the downtrodden marginalised 
section of the citizenry and safeguard the interests of the nation through prudent 
management of the wealth and resources of the state and a balanced approach to 
development that is both human- and environmental- friendly. (2) Protect the 
safety and security of the citizenry, especially the weaker section of society, 
namely the women and small girls through better enforcement of security 
measures and uplifting the professionalism of our Police and Security forces. (3) 
Reinstate the credibility and integrity of our nation through effective integrity 
plan that uproot grafts, corrupt practices, abuses of power, cronyism and 
nepotism.(4) Uphold the Rule and Sanctity of Law by reinstituting the Judicial 
Integrity. (5) Restore genuine democracy through electoral reform and a free, 
clean and fair electoral process and (6) End the absolute control of the legislative 
power of the ruling regime through the ballot box as to put an effective element of 
‘check and balance’ in our system of government.9 
                                                 
8
 Abdul Rashid Moten, 178. 
9
 Abdul Hadi Awang, “PAS President’s Statement,” Manifesto of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS): A 
Trustworthy, Just and Clean Government: A Nation of Care and Opportunity, February 2008. 
 268
 
 While Badawi lost his popularity, the victory of PAS and other opposition parties 
was the biggest success in Malaysian history. It was the first time in fifty years that 
opposition won control over five state governments (Kedah, Kelantan, Perak, Penang and 
Selangor). There had never been more than two opposition state governments at any one 
time, until the post-2008 election.10 PAS kept control of the state of Kelantan and won 
back a large number of seats, 38 out of 45 which it had lost to the BN in the 2004 
election.  
Table 14: 2004 and 2008 Malaysian Elections Result 





Seats Won Percent 
Seats 
Barisan Nasional 199 90.87 140 63.06 
UMNO 110 50.22 79 35.58 
MCA 31 14.16 15 6.80 
MIC 9 4.11 3 1.40 
Gerakan 10 4.57 2 0.90 
Others 39 17.81 41 18.50 
     
Opposition Parties 19 8.68 82 36.94 
DAP 12 5.48 28 12.60 
PAS 6 2.74 23 10.40 
PKR 1 0.46 31 14.00 
     
Independents 1 0.46   
Total 219 100.01 222 100 
 Source: Abdul Rashid Moten (2009, 187) 
Besides the external factors discussed above, several internally driven factors 
paved the way for PAS to gain its success. 
The free flow of information particularly the use of internet benefited PAS. The 
massive campaign through internet media not only helped the party to easily promote its 
                                                 
10James Chin and Wong Chin Huat, “Malaysia’s Electoral Upheaval,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 
(July 2009): 72. 
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programs and policies to the public but also helped it to uncover the negative sides of the 
ruling government. PAS ran its own online journal, harakahdaily.net, and featured six 
different online television channels.11 Through these media, PAS in its manifesto for 
2008 election for example, exposed the negative performance of the Malaysian 
government under Badawi: 
The spectre of ‘revelations’ of malignant corrupt practices in the body politic of 
the Executive; the expose’ on the worsening crime rate, the rape and rot of the 
judiciary, the yawning income disparity of the rich and the have-little, 
marginalization of the poor and unfortunate section of society, the unending 
religious and ethnic fault-lines that frequently raised their ugly heads, are but 
some evidences that remind us, that all are not well after all.12 
 
 The same as other opposition parties, PAS also used blogs, YouTube and sms 
extensively to promote its programs and policies. According to Motten, PAS even offered 
information via sms for only 50 cents per message consisting of daily political headlines 
around the country and information about the ceramah activities (both time and venue) 
held by PAS.13 
 The same as what PAS did during the 2004 election, the party used ceramah and 
door-to-door campaigning to explain its policies and programs to attract approval from 
the people. Compared to 2004, ceramah in the 2008 elections were frequent. Prior to the 
election, the police issued 2,971 permits for election ceramah nationwide.14 The 
opposition parties used the ceramah to highlight the failure of the ruling government to 
lower the crime rate and fuel prices in Malaysia and also to expose corruption. 
                                                 
11
 Abdul Rashid Moten 188. 
12
 Manifesto of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS): A Trustworthy, Just and Clean Government: A 
Nation of Care and Opportunity, February 2008. 
13
 Abdul Rashid Moten, 182. 
14
 New Straits Times, “2,971 permits for ceramah issued,” (Feb 29, 2008), 20 
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 Another internally-driven factor for PAS to gain huge support was its strategy to 
support new candidates that come from the professional class, the youth, and the more 
energetic politicians.15 In Kelantan for example, PAS fielded 11 candidates at 
parliamentary level, of whom seven were new. 
 Avoiding Islamic state issues, as clearly seen from its manifesto prior to the 
election, was another factor that made PAS successful. Unlike in 2004, in this election 
PAS did not call for transforming Malaysia into an Islamic state. It rather developed the 
idea of defending the well-being of the people and safeguarding the interest of the nation 
through prudent management of state resources. PAS also promised to reduce the cost of 
living, promote freedom of religion and ensure equal justice to all.16 For Andreas, PAS 
probably modelled itself on Islamist parties in Turkey and Indonesia.17  
 
PKS Survival? 
 If PAS was clearly successful in the last Malaysian election, how was the PKS’s 
performance in the 2009 Indonesian election? The performance of Islamic political 
parties in the 2009 Indonesian election has attracted many comments from political 
analysts. The election shows the decline in support for Islamic parties except for PKS. 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Party of National Awakening), dropped from 10.6% in 2004 
to 4.9% in 2009. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Depelopment Party) dropped 
from 8.1% to 5.3%, and other two Islamic parties Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) and Partai 
Bintang Reformasi (PBR) failed to pass the 2.5%  electoral threshold. PKS won about 7.9 
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 Abdul Rashid Moten, 181. 
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 Manifesto of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS): A Trustworthy, Just and Clean Government: A 
Nation of Care and Opportunity, February 2008. 
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 Andreas Ufen, 163. 
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per cent of votes and thus stood at the fourth rank after Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party 
and other two secular parties, Golkar and PDIP. One could argue that PKS just managed 
to survive in the 2009 election. 
 
Table 15: 2004 and 2009 Indonesian Elections Result 
Party 2004 2009 








Golkar Party 21.6 128 14.4 108 
PDIP 18.5 109 14.0 93 
PKB 10.6 52 4.9 26 
PPP 8.1 58 5.3 39 
Partai Demokrat 7.4 57 20.80 148 
PKS 7.3 45 7.9 59 
PAN 6.4 52 6.0 42 
Gerindra -- -- 4.5 30 
Hanura -- -- 3.8 15 
PDS 2.13    
Source: adopted from the General Election Commission (KPU) 
 
 The failure of PKS to reach its target to at least gain 20% voters in the election 
was mostly due to external factors, mainly the popularity of Yudhoyono and his 
Democratic Party. Different from the ruling government in Malaysia that experienced an 
embarrassing loss, the incumbent government under Yudhoyono presidency won a 
significant victory. The same as in Malaysia, corruption become an important issue in the 
2009 Indonesian election. However, while in Malaysia the ruling government was 
portrayed as a corrupt government, Yudhoyono was perceived by Indonesians as ‘a hero’ 
who campaigned extensively for anti-corruption. During his first term in office, to 
combat corruption in Indonesia, Yudhoyono established two institutions, Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission) and Pengadilan Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi (Corruption Court).  
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Another factor in Yudhoyono’s success was his introduction of massive cash 
programs for the poor known as Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) or Direct Cash handouts 
programs to help poor people in the country. Mietzner notes that the ruling government 
spent US$2 billion between June 2008 and April 2009 (almost one year before the 
election). Yudhoyono’s campaign was the government’s compensation for the poor after 
his government had increased fuel prices.18 
Besides the popularity of the Yudhoyono’s government, Noorhaidi highlights 
three internally-driven factors that contributed to the disappointing result of PKS: wrong 
campaign strategy, failure to attract swing voters ,and failure to portray itself as an 
outsider and reformist party.19  
PKS’s campaign to strengthen its image as a moderate Islamist party open to all 
segments of Indonesian society, both Muslim and non-Muslim, was a failure. PKS failed 
in its attempt to attract their non-cadre constituents although it offered a pluralist 
orientation to voters. Its approach even seems to be to lessen their support from both 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike. On the one hand, for Muslim voters, PKS’s lesser 
emphasis on Islamic ideology made them curious about whether PKS had abandoned its 
Islamic agenda. For non-Muslims, on the other hand, this campaign was considered as 
only a rhetorical tactic or political strategy to attract voters to PKS.  
The PKS campaign in printed media and television that praised Soeharto as ‘a 
national hero’ also contributed to its decline. While some saw this campaign as an 
                                                 
18
 Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party 
System, Lowy Institute for International Policy, (Sydney 2009): 4. 
 
19
 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wa Mobilization among Youth: The 
Prosperious Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia, RSIS Working Paper, Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies (Singapore 2009): 20-21. 
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opportunistic and pragmatic manoeuvre of PKS, others saw this pro-Soeharto move as 
making it difficult for PKS to stand on their own position as a reformist party.20 
The PKS also failed to repeat its success in attracting the swing voters, as it did in 
2004. According to Mietzner, significant electoral swing voters during the 2009 election 
have benefited the secular parties, particularly the Democratic Party. The decision of 
several Muslim socio-religious organization to join a variety of parties has also 
contributed to the decline of Islamic parties like PKS.21 PKS move to join Yudhoyono’s 
ruling government (2004-2009) also brought another disadvantage for it. On the one 
hand, when the government was praised by the people for its success, it was easily 
claimed as the success of Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party, instead of PKS. On the other 
hand, by joining the government, it was difficult for PKS to keep its image as an outsider 
party committed to total reform that had made it popular in the 2004 election. 
PAS and PKS participation in the 2008 and 2009 elections in Malaysia and 
Indonesia has provided us with some indicators in measuring the commitment of PAS 
and PKS to uphold democratic principles in achieving their objectives. The discussion 
above shows how the local political issues that appeared prior to the elections in the two 
countries greatly influenced the electoral performance of both parties. In Malaysia, the 
ruling government was portrayed by the people as a failed government and there was a 
leading opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who helped PAS and other opposition parties 
to get huge support. In Indonesia, conversely, the incumbent Yudhoyono government was 
perceived by the people as succesful in combating corruption in the country, which made 
it difficult for PKS and other parties to compete with the ruling party. Unlike Anwar 
                                                 
20
 Marcus Mietzner, 14. 
21
 Marcus Mietzner, 15. 
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Ibrahim in Malaysia, there was no alternative Indonesian political leader who could rival 
Yudhoyono’s popularity and provide powerful leadership for the opposition. 
Although similarities of issues like corruption, ethnicity and Islamic state are 
found in both Malaysian and Indonesian elections, these issues have resulted in different 
performance for both Islamic political parties, PAS and PKS. While in Malaysia the issue 
of corruption in Badawi’s government benefited PAS in its campaign for an anti-
corruption government, in Indonesia this issue benefited the ruling governemt instead 
since it was perceived by the people as an anti-corruption government. In terms of 
ethnicity, both PAS and PKS tried to present themselves as a pluralist party in these 
elections. PKS and PAS were avoiding the Islamic state issue in order to attract larger 
support. However, while PAS benefited from this campaign even to the extent that non-
Muslim Indians unhesitantly voted for them, in Indonesia the campaign of PKS as a 
pluralist party disadvantaged their performance in the election. 
The experience of both PAS and PKS in the recent elections also shows that 
parties asserting an Islamic ideology will not be able to compete adequately with other 
non-religious parties unless they expand to cover non-religious issues like corruption and 
the welfare state, as mentioned above. An exclusive Islamic ideology seems no longer 
able to meet the needs of Indonesian and Malaysian voters alike. Thus, Islamic-based 
parties like PAS and PKS are required to envision a dynamic non-monolithic Islamic 
society to be able to provide opportunities for various elements within the Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities. 
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 The 2008 and 2009 elections in Malaysia and Indonesia also show that Islamic 
political parties like PAS and PKS, whose origins and features have been the subject of 
this thesis, can indeed sustain the process of democracy and provide an alternative 
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APPENDIX 1: Websites Related to PKS 
 
 
No. Name of PKS Institution Website Address 
1. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 





2. Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah  
(PKS Office at Provincial 
Level) 
1. DKI Jakarta: http://www.pks-jakarta.or.id  
2. Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam: http://www.pks-aceh.org  
3. Banten: http://www.pks-banten.or.id  
4. Jawa Timur: http://pksjatim.org  
5. Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta: http://www.pks-jogja.org  
6. Maluku: http://www.pks-maluku.or.id  
7. Riau: http://www.pksriau.org  
8. Sumut: http://www.pkssumut.org  
9. Lampung: http://www.pkslampung.org  
10. Jawa Tengah: http://www.pks-jateng.or.id  
11. Jawa Barat: http://www.pks-jabar.org  
12. Sulawesi Selatan: http://www.pks-sulsel.or.id  
13. Kalimantan Selatan: http://www.pks-kalsel.or.id  
14. Nusa Tenggara Barat http://www.pksntb.org 
15. Sumatera Selatan : http://www.pks-sumsel.org  
3. Perwakilan Luar Negeri 
(PKS Overseas Centre) 
1. Japan: http://www.keadilan-jepang.org  
2. Egypt: http://www.pksmesir.uni.cc 
3. Australia and New Zealand: http://www.pks-anz.org  
4. Netherland: http://www.pk-sejahtera.nl  
5. South America: http://www.pk-sejahtera.us  
6. United Kingdom: http://www.pk-sejahtera.org.uk  
7. Malaysia: http://www.pks-malaysia.com/  
8. Germany: http://www.pk-sejahtera.de  
9. Qatar: http://www.pks-qatar.org  
10. Saudi Arabia http://www.geocities.com/pks_saudi/ 
11. Emirates Arabs Union http://www.pks-uae.com 
4. Dewan Pimpinan Daerah  
(PKS Offices at District 
Level) 
1. Aceh Utara: http://www.pks-aceh-utara.org  
2. Banyumas: http://www.pks-banyumas.or.id  
3. Bandarlampung: http://www.pks-bandarlampung.org/  
4. Jakarta Selatan: http://www.pks-jaksel.or.id  
5. Jakarta Timur: http://www.pks-jaktim.or.id   
6. Jakarta Pusat: http://www.pks-jakpus.or.id   
7. Jakarta Barat: http://www.pks-jakbar.or.id  
8. Kabupaten Bandung: http://www.pks-kabbandung.org  
9. Kabupaten Bekasi: http://www.pks-kab-bekasi.org  
10. Kabupaten Majalengka: http://www.pks-majalengka.or.id  
11. Kota Bandung: http://www.pks-bandung.org  
12. Kota Banjarmasin: http://www.pks-banjarmasin.or.id  
13. Kota Bekasi: http://www.pks-bekasi.or.id   
14. Kota Bogor: http://www.keadilanbogor.or.id  
15. Kota Tangerang: http://www.pks-kotatangerang.or.id  
16. Kabupaten Tangerang: http://www.pks-kabtangerang.or.id  
17. Kota Batam: http://www.pks-batam.or.id  
18. Kota Depok: http://www.pks-depok.or.id  
19. Kabupaten Malang: http://pksmalang.atspace.com  
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20. Kota Malang: http://www.pks-malang.or.id  
21. Kota Pekanbaru: http://www.pkspekanbaru.org  
22. Kota Surabaya: http://www.pks-surabaya.or.id  
23. Kota Jambi: http://www.pkskotajambi.org/  
24. Pariaman: http://www.pkspariaman.blogspot.com  
25. Makassar: http://www.pks-makassar.or.id   
26. Sleman: http://www.pks-sleman.org  
27. Kota Yogyakarta: http://www.pksjogja.or.id  
28. Sidoarjo: http://www.pks-sidoarjo.org  
29. Pasaman Barat: http://www.pks-pasamanbarat.org  
30. Kabupaten Solok: http://www.pks-solok.org  
31. Kudus: http://www.prokeadilan.blogspot.com  
32. Kudus: http://www.prokeadilan.wordpress.com  
 
5. Dewan Pimpinan Cabang 
(PKS Offices at Sub-District 
Level) 
1. Rumbai: http://pksrumbai.pcr.ac.id  
2. Turi Sleman Yogyakarta: http://pks-turi.tripod.com  
3. Jagakarsa: http://www.pks-jagakarsa.or.id  
4. Kebayoran Baru: http://www.pks-kebayoranbaru.org/  
5. Jatiuwung: http://www.pks-jatiuwung.web.id  
6. Cimanggis, Depok: http://www.pks-cimanggis.or.id/  
7. Ciomas, Kab. Bogor: http://www.pks-ciomas.org/  
8. Cilandak, Jaksel: http://www.pks-cilandak.org/  
9. Kebayoran Lama, Jaksel : http://www.pks-kbylama.org/  
10. Pasaman Barat, Pasbar : http://www.pks-pasbar.org/  
11. Sail, Pekanbaru : http://dpcpkssail.blogspot.com/ 
12. Lawang, Malang: http://pkslawang.wordpress.com/ 
 Dewan Pimpinan Ranting 
(PKS Offices at Village 
Level) 
1. DPRa PKS Kedoya Selatan: 
http://www.pkskedoyaselatan.multiply.com  
2. DPRa PKS Kedoya Utara : 
http://www.pkskedoyautara.wordpress.com  
3. DPRa PKS Rorotan: http://www.pksrorotan.multiply.com  
4. DPRa PKS Krukut : http://www.pkskrukut.multiply.com  
5. DPRa PKS Setiabudi : http://dprasetiabudi.wordpress.com  
6. DPRa PKS Bintaro : http://pksbintaro.blogspot.com  
7. DPRa PKS Kembangan Selatan : 
http://dprakembanganselatan.blogdrive.com  
8. DPRa PKS Pasir Jaya : http://pkspasirjaya.multiply.com  
9. DPRa PKS Pondok Jaya : http://pks-pondokjaya.org  
10. DPRa PKS Sinduadi : http://pkssinduadi.wordpress.com  
11. DPRa PKS Tropodo : http://pkstropodo.blogspot.com  
12. DPRa PKS Ulujami : http://dpraulujami.multiply.com 
6. Parlemen Pusat dan Daerah 
(Parliament Members from 
PKS both National and 
Provincial Levels) 
1. http://fpks-dpr-ri.com (Fraksi PKS DPR RI)  
2. http://www.f-pks.org (Fraksi PKS di DPR RI)  
3. http://fpks-kotasemarang.or.id (Fraksi PKS di DPRD Kota 
Semarang)  
4. http://fraksi.pks-diy.or.id (Fraksi PKS di DPRD DI 
Yogyakarta)  
5. http://www.f-pks.or.id (Fraksi PKS di DPRD DKI Jakarta)  
6. http://www.fpks-kalsel.or.id (Fraksi PKS di DPRD Provinsi 
 292
Kalimantan Selatan)  
7. http://www.fpks-depok.org (Fraksi PKS di DPRD Depok)  
8. http://www.fkspekanbaru.org (Fraksi Keadilan Sejahtera 
DPRD Kota Pekanbaru Riau)  
9. http://www.pks.web.id (Situs Pribadi Aleg DPR-RI 2004-
2009 asal PKS) 
10. http://www.azwar-nasir.com (Informasi Pemilihan Kepala 
Pemerintahan Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam)  
11. http://www.adang-dani.com (Situs Cagub-Cawagub PKS di 
Pilkada 2007 DKI Jakarta)  
 
7. Mailing List Organized by 
PKS cadres 
1. http://pksejahtera.net  
2. http://feeds.feedburner.com/duniapks 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/keadilan4all  
3. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/partai-keadilan-sejahtera  
4. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PKS_Kab_Bekasi  
5. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/pksplus  
6. http://fahruroji.blogspot.com  




Source: Adopted from www.pks-anz.org (accessed  January 21, 2008). 
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APPENDIX 2: List of PASTI Pre-School in Kelantan 
 
No Area Name of PASTI 
1. Kawasan 
Tumpat 
1. Baitul Ulum, Kedai Geting 
2. Nuruddin Kg Ketil 
3. Al Iman, Masjid Geting 
4. PASTI Kg. Sri Tujuh 
5. Nurul Ain, Kajang Sebidang 
6. Al Asma’ Kg. Telaga Bata 
7. Al Mawaddah, Kg. Baru Nelayan 
8. Nurul Hidayah, Kg. Dalam Rhu 
9. PASTI Kg. Padang Tembesu 
10. PASTI Kg. Alor Tal 
11. Nahdatul Ilmi, Kg Morak 
12. Ar Rahmah, Kg. Palekbang 
13. Wan Adam, Kg. Laut 
14. PASTI Hj Omar, Kg. Sg. Pinang 
15. Al Ihsan, Kg. Kok Keli 
16. PASTI Tok Selehor, Kg. Kok Pasir 
17. Sayangku, Kg. Paloh 
18. Al Falahiah, Pasir Pekan 
19. At Taqwa, Kg. Ana 
20. An Nur, Kg. Mak Neralang 
21. PASTI Kg. Berangan 
22. Wildanuzzahab, Kg. Pak Kerau 
23. Al Husna, Kg. Kelaboran 
24. At Taqwa, Kg. Lambor Delima 
25. As Syamsiah, Wakaf Bharu 
26. Ar Riadhah, Kg. Cenderong Batu 
27. PASTI Tok Wan Ali, Kg. Kutan 
28. Al Jamieyah, Kg. Tok Malik, 
29. At Tarbiah, Kg. Belukar 
30. Al Jihad, Kg. Kubang Batang 
31. PASTI Kg. Bunut Sarang Burung 
32. PASTI Kota Kubang Labu 
33. Al Husna, Kg. Alor Durian 
34. PASTI Kg. Baru, Pasir Pekan 
35. Ar Rahman, Bandar Tumpat 
36. Al Irsyad, Kg. Padang Rokma 
37. PASTI Kg. Kelong 
Total PASTI = 37, Teachers = 73, Students = 1,537 
 Kawasan Chepa 1. Al Ahmadi, Kg. Tebing Tinggi 
2. Ar Rabbaniah, Kg. Sabak 
3. Al Haqq, Kg. Kedai Buluh 
4. Darul Anwar, Kg. Pulau Melaka 
5. Al Qiadah, Kg. Che Deris 
6. An Naim, Kg. Penambang 
7. Al Huda, Kg. Pulau Belanga 
8. Al Arsyadi, Kg. Panchor 
9. Al Hikmah, Kg. Jambu 
10. Al Sulha, Kg. Pengkalan Datu 
11. At Taqwa, Kg. Gelong Machang 
12. Al Hidayah, Kg. Belukar Pauh 
13. Raudatul Munawarah, Kg. Tapang 
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14. An-Nur, Kg. Jaya Setia 
15. Al Hikmah, Kg. Kijang 
Total PASTI = 16, Teacher = 42, Student = 937 
 
 Kawasan Kota 
Bharu 
1. Al Mustaqim, Telipot 
2. Al Hidayah, Kg. Langgar 
3. Jaafariah, Kg. Pak Da Jaafar 
4. Ar Rahmah, Berek 12 
5. Al Manar, Wakaf Mek Zainab 
6. An Nur, Kg. Atas Banggol 
7. Al Qamariah, Kg. Sungai Keladi 
8. Al Ahmadi, Kg. Cherang 
9. Al Husna, Lorong Pak Dir 
10. Al Hikmah, Baung Bayam 
11. Az Zahrah Desa Rahmat 
12. Al Iqra, Kg. Kubang Tuman 
13. Fatimah Az Zahrah 1 
14. Fatimah Az Zahrah 2 
15. Ar Raudah, Kg. Lundang 
16. PASTI Muaz b. Jabbar 
17. Darul Qarar, Kg. Kubur Maras 
Total PASTI = 17, Teacher = 36, Student = 587 
 Kawasan Pasir 
Mas 
1. Nurul Huda, Kg. Kubang Pandak 
2. PASTI Tmn Mekasar 
3. An Nur, Kubang Bemban 
4. Nurul Fadhilah, Kg. Paloh 
5. Al Ain, Kg. Bechah Tendong 
6. At Tajdid, Kg. Bunut Susu 
7. Al Muttaqim, Kg. Kubang Badak 
8. Al Mithali, Kg. Pengkalan Pasir 
9. At Taqwa, Kg. Padang Embun 
10. Al Hidayah, Tendong 
11. Al Hasaniah, Kg. Lemal 
12. Al Hikmah, Kg. Kelar 
13. An Nasihah, Kg. Kedondong 
14. Al Huda, Kg. Kubang Panjang 
15. Ar Rahman, Kg. Pondok Sipol 
16. Al Huda, Kg. Bechah Kelubi 
17. Al Hassani, Chabang 4 Chetok 
18. At-Taqwa, Kg. Galok 
19. At-Taqwa, Kg. Gelang Mas 
20. Al Hanan, Kg Tendong 
21. PASTI Kg. Banggol Ara 
Total PASTI = 21, Teacher = 32, Student = 653 
 
 Kawasan Rantau 
Panjang 
1. Ar Rahmaniah, Kg Pondok Lati 
2. At-Taqwa, Kg. Tiang Chandi 
3. Al Hasanah, Kg. Banggol Setol 
4. Al Ukhuwah, Kg. Meranti 
5. Al Fitrah, Kg. Banggol Kulim 
6. Al Yaakobiah, Masjid Lati 
7. Raudatul Atfal, Kg. Pohon Buloh 
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8. Al Huda, Taman Desa Johan 
9. Darul Ulum, Kg. Lubok Kawah 
10. Nurul Iman, Kg. Gual Periok 
11. Al Mukhlisin, Kg. Lubuk Tapah 
12. Al Hidayah, Kg. Repek 
13. Al Hidayah, Kg. Telaga Mas 
14. Al Iqra’, Kg. Kubang Chenok 
15. An Nur, Kg. Bukit Tandak 
16. Al Ihsaniah, Kg. Siram 
17. Fahada, Kg. Gual Tinggi 
18. Diauddin, Kg. Lubuk Setol 
Total PASTI = 18, Teacher = 37, Student = 717 
 Kawasan 
Kubang Kerian 
1. PASTI Kg. Gong Dermin 
2. At Taqwa, Kg. Tini 
3. PASTI Kedai Mulong 
4. PASTI Nilam Baru 
5. As Salsabila, Kg. Wakaf Stan 
6. At Taqwa, Kg. Seribong 
7. An Nadwa, Kg. Kota 
8. Al Irfan, Kg. Telok Kandis 
9. PASTI Kg. Beta Hilir 
10. PASTI Kg. Seberang Pasir Mas 
11. At Taqwa, Kg. Terusan 
12. PASTI Kg. Derdap 
13. Raudhatul Ilmi, Kg. Lating 
14. PASTI Kg. Tanjung Stan 
15. Al Hikmah, Kg. Chepa 
16. Ittihad As Syakirin, Kg. Pasir To' Kambing 
17. PASTI Desa Wangi 
18. Ripas Al Mardhiah, Kg. Demit 
19. Al Ittihad, Kg. Salor 
20. PASTI Anak Soleh 
21. PASTI Binjai 
22. Al Husna, Kg. Jejulok 
23. Az Zawawi, Pondok Kenali 
24. PASTI Kg. Surau 
Total PASTI = 24, Teacher = 56, Student = 1,260  
 Kawasan Bachok 1. PASTI Kg. Pengkalan Haji Ali 
2. Al Yaakubiah, Kg. Nipah 
3. Ar Rahmaani, Kg. Repek 
4. Darul Islam, Kg. Tok Jawa 
5. Ar Rasyidin, Kg. Budi 
6. Al Muttaqin, Kg. Beris Tengah 
7. Darul Naim, Pekan Jelawat 
8. Al Iman, Kg. Kemudi 
9. Al Hidayah, Kg. Perupok 
10. Al Ittisom, Pekan Gunung 
11. Nurul Hidayah, Kg. Chap 
12. PASTI Teluk Kemunting, Tawang 
13. PASTI Kg. Bakong 
14. Nurul Ain, Kg. Permatang Piah 
15. Al Ehsan, Kg. Padang Luas 
16. An Nur, Kg. Teratak Pulai 
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17. Al Hilal, Kg. Tok Belian 
18. Al-Muhammadiah, Kg. Pantai Damat 
19. Al Husna, Kg. Bator 
20. Al Falah, Kg. Padang Lati 
21. Al Intisar, Kg. Kuala Rekang 
22. Zinnur Ain, Kg. Beris Panchor 
23. Al Hidayah, Kg. Wakaf Aik 
24. Al-Muhammadiah, Kg. Pantai Senok 
25. Nur Iman, Kg. Kolam 
26. Al Barakah, Kg. Gelong Badak 
Total PASTI = 26, Teacher = 44, Student = 885  
Source: Adopted from PASTI Kelantan official website: 
http://pastikelate.blogspot.com, (accessed February 9, 2009).  
 
